Common Discourse Particles in English Conversation by Schourup, Lawrence C.
Working Papers in Linguistics  
No. 28  
COMMON DISCOURSE PARTICLES  
IN ENGLISH CONVERSATION  
By  
Lawrence C. Schourup  
May 1983 
The Ohio State University 
DEPARTMENT OF LINGUISTICS  
Copyrigh~ by 
Lawrenc, Glifford Schourup 
1982 
COMMON DISCOURSE PARTICLES IN ENGLISH CONVERSATION 
DISSERTATION 
Pres~nt~d in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for  
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate  
School of The Ohio State University  
By 
Lawrence Clifford Schourup, B. A. , M. A. 
* * * * 
The Ohio State University 
1982 
Reading Committee: Approved by 
Robert A. Fox  
Michael L. Geis  
Brian D1 Joseph  
Arnold M. Zwicky  Adviser 
Department of Linguistics 
----
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
I am first deeply grateful to my academic adviser, Arnold Zwicky. 
~is penetrating comments at every stage of this research have caused me 
to think more deeply about many of the topics discussed here and, more 
than once, to broaden my perspective. I have benefited greatly from 
his friendship, and from the encouragement I have found in his scholarly 
example. 
My sincere thaµks to Robert Fox, Michael Geis, and Brian Joseph 
for reading this dissertation and making many valuable suggestions. 
Several people have helped by discussing specific issues with me; 
thanks particularly to William Boslego, Douglas Fuller, Richard Garner, 
Carol Jean Godby, JoQn Nerbonne, Deborah Schaffer, and Rachel Schaffer. 
Thapks also to Joseph Pettigrew for responding to early sketches, and to 
the numerous people who provided examples and references. 
I would like to thank Francisco Varela of Naropa Institute for 
first pointing out to me the great inherent fascination of conversation 
studies. 
Several other people, through their patient friendship, have also 
supported this work. Special thanks to Deborah Andersen, Chester Drake, 
Carolyn Kurtz, Jacquelyn McKee, Karen Shockey, Hel~n Thiry, Jeffrey 
Thomas, and Richard Weiner; and to Marlene Payha, Linguistics Department 
Secretary, for her ~eemingly inexhaustible helpfulness and good cheer. 
My personal debt to Stephen D. Miller is very great; no one could 
be a righter, truer friend. 
Last--far from least--! thank my father, William Schourup, for 
his love and trust. 
- ii -
- 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
LIST OF TABLES 
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
Chapter 
TABLE OF CONTl•:NT:-i 
Page 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1. 1 Gene>ral Ht•markH • • • . • • • • 
1.2 Covert Th1nkln!-\ 111 Convt•nmtion 
1.3 	 Three 'Worlds' of tht· Spt•11ker 
1.4 	 Routinizat1on ....... .  
1.5 	 Use of Speech Materials ••• 
1.6 	 Outline of RenwJnln~ Ch,1pters 
Footnotes -- Chaptt>r l 
2 EV INCIVES . . . . 
2. 1 	 Interjections AS Evincives 
2.2 	 Evincives in Quotations . . 
2 . 2 . 1 Well and 	Oh in Quotations 
2.3 	 Enquoting 
2.4 	 Quotation 
2 . 5 	 Summary . . • 
Footnotes -- Chapter 2  
3 LIKE . . . . . . 
3. 1 	 Like in Conversation . . . . . 
3.2 	 Like Introducing Direct Discourse 
3.3 	 Like After Questions . 
3. 4 	 The 'For Example' Reading 
3.5 	 Like as an 
3.6 	 It's Like . 
3.7 	 Conclusion 
Footnotes -
WELL 
Interjection . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
- Chapter 3  
4.1 lntroduc tion . . . . . . . . 
- iii -
. . . V  
vi  
. . . 	 1  
1  
3  
s 
7  
8  
10 . . ' 
11  
13  
16  
. . . . . 16  
21  
22  
. . 25  
26  
28  
32  
. . . 35  
. . 	 36 ~ ' 39  
44  
. . . . 45  
47  
. . . . . 48  
ii 
4 
'•. '/ W1· I I II, · I on· Exe lamat ions • • • • • 'j(J ,.. ., W,• 11 1111 n,tl11cing Direct Ul i,c<J11nH! JI 
1,.1. Top le !;Jti It ing •••• SJ ,..., W1· I I 111· I ore Answers 54 
'•. (1 W,· I I 1\1· I ore Quest ions 55 . 
W,· I I anti Sc l f -Repair . 56'•. I 
I,. H W,· I I 1111d Other-Repair • • • • • • 59 
::,-1111•1wc•-f inal Well 61'•. 'J 
,•• 10 t<,·dun·d WPl I • -.-.-•••••••• 61 
1,. II W1· I I ;111d N;1rrative Elision 62 
t,. I '/. We· 11 111111 'Intension' 63 
/1. I ·1 C111w I w;fon ••.••• 64 
Fool 11011•:; -- Ch:1pter 4 67 
5 Y' KNOW 
5. I 	 l'n•l lmlnary !{(•marks •••••••••. 68 
r) • 2 YK a !, a Tr11t h l';1n! nl ltc!t ical • • , , , , 69 
'>. 2. I YK ;111cl l'rop(•rt Jes of Truth Paren-
t lw I I c :1 Is • • . • 70 
S.3 	 Ev ltfc•11n• for Two Typ<is of YK • 71 
5.4 	 The.• Us<• of YKh • • . • 73 
5.5 	 C:oldlu•rv,'s YK Jll 76 
5.6 	 DI scour st! Fun<:l ions of YKb • 77 
5.6.I TopJc lntrocl11c tJon 77 
5.6.2 TopJc Tr :1cking 80 
5.6.3 YKb and l<cpaJr 	 86 
5.7 	 YKb as a 'Sympathetic: Circul:irity Sequcnce' 90 
5.8 	 lntcrroKative YK. • • . • • • .••.• 92 
5.9 	 YK and Turn T:iking. • • • • . •••••• 93 
5. 10 Distributional Properties of YK: Quantitative 
Results 97 
5. 11 Conclusion. 98 
Footnotes -- Chapter 5 lOr; 
6 THE ROLE OF DISCOURSE PARTICLES IN CO~VERSAT IO!; 
6. 1 General Remarks ·on Like, We 11 , and Y' know 10~ 
6.2 Now 10 .'.. 
6.3 	 I Mean •••••• 10 ~ 
6.4 	 Mind You •• , • , 10 ; 
6.5 	 Sort of, Kind of, And everything, And stuff, 
And so on, etc. 10~ 
6.6 Interjections !08 
6.7 A Taxonomy • 11)'1 
6.8 Conclusion. 111 
Footnotes Chapter 6 11; 
LIST OF REFERENCES 	 11..'.. 
- iv -
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 	 Page 
1. 	 Turn and Quote Initial Well and Oh in a Conversa-
tion of 336 Turns Including 62 Turn Internal  
Quotations .•.•••.••••• 17  
2. 	 111 Quote Initial Interjections in a Corpus of 328  
Conversational Quotations • • • • • • • • • • • 17  
3. 	 Quote Allegiance of Well and Oh • • • • 24  
4. 	 Disclosure Relationships and Discourse Particles. 110  
- V -
? 
( ) 
( ( ) ) 
underscoring 
CAPS 
II 
LIST OF SYMBOLS 
indicates material elided 
indicates falling ('declarative') intonation 
indicates level ('continuing') intonation 
indicates rising ('question') intonation 
when empty, indicates material unintelligible to tran-
scriber; enclosing a complete word or words, indicates 
transcriber uncertainty; containing part of a word, 
indicates sounds corresponding to enclosed letters 
were not pronounced; enclosing h internal in an other-
wise complete word, indicates a-'laugh token' (brief 
voiceless exhalation); enclosing numbers, indicates 
length in seconds of an unfilled pause 
enclose transcriber comments. J may also enclose 
phonetic tra.qscriptions and duration in seconds of an 
unfilled pause 
indicates an overlong segment or syllable 
indicates extra stress on a word or syllable 
indicate very heavy stress on a word or syllable 
within a single turn, indicates preceding item was 
spoken as if closely linked with following item; used 
at the end of a speaking turn and repeated at begin-
ning of same speaker's next turn, indicates that what 
precedes the first= is linked to what follows the 
second= 
with space to right, indic.ates preceding item was bro-
ken off or spoken haltingly; with spaces to left and 
right both, indicates an unmeasured pause 
indicate point at which talk by one speaker began to 
overlap that of another speaker 
indicates the end of the overlap (see [) 
- vi -
CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 General Remarks 
This is a study of several common items in English conversation 
known variously as 'discourse particles', 'interjections', 'discourse' 
markers', and less respectfully as 'hesitations' or 'fillers'. Primary 
attention will be to analyses of like, well and y'know, but the larger 
concern of this study is the entire set of items of which these are mem-
bers, and some attention will therefore also be given to related items, 
including I mean, now, oh, hey and aha. The term discourse particles 
is used throughout the study to refer to the forms and short phrases un-
der discussion. The term is intended as a neutral label for these 
items that avoids a priori judgments on their function or granunatical 
affiliations but does suggest that they are primarily discourse phenom-
ena. The general program of the study is to examine several such parti-
cles in detail and propose a theoretical framework in which their uses 
individually make sense and in which revealing comparisons can be made 
between them. A correct understanding of these particles will be shown 
to considerably widen the usual purview of conversation studies. 
The need for work on discourse particles is apparent on examining 
almost any transcript of ordinary English conversation. The repertoire 
of favored items may differ from speaker to speaker, but in general in-
stances of like, well, y'know and similar items abound in conversation. 
Despite their great frequency of occurrence, however, until recently on-
ly crude attempts had been made to characterize the role of these items 
in conversation. By many researchers they were dismissed as meaning-
less and presumed to lack interesting distributional features; others 
offered tentative analyses applicable only to a narrow range of the 
items' occurrence; and in the popular view such items have tended to be 
stigmatized as verbal 'crutches' used by those deficient in speaking 
ability. Reviews of these early treatments are found in James (1974) 
and Goldberg (1980). 
The former neglect of these items seems to have been largely due 
to the fact that their appearance is for the most part limited to con-
versation, a use of language itself neglected until fairly recently 
(despite widespread availability of tape recorders since the 1950's). 
But the difficulties discourse particles can present when examined by 
introspection have no doubt also been an obstacle to research. Ques-
tions to informants concerning the use or meaning of well. for example, 
are apt to provoke only puzzlement or a list of examples. It will be 
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suggested below that there may be a deeper reason for these introspec-
tive difficulties than the commonly noted tendency for such items to 
be spoken more or less unconsciously. 
During the last decade, in which interest in the structure of 
conversation has increased enormously, the sheer frequency of these 
items in talk and the lack of an adequate account of their function 
have led to several serious investigations . All this recent work be-
gins from the no longer disputed observation that such items differ 
from each other in distribution and use and so cannot be simply re-
garded as 'fillers' . The studies now available can be divided into two 
broad categories, according to the type of data used. Studies of the 
first type are based almost entirely on intuitive evidential state-
ments (e.g. James 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978; R. Lakoff 1973; Hines 1977; 
Murray 1979). The most ambitious work of this kind is that of James, 
who has described the semantic and distributional properties of such 
items as oh, ah and say in some detail (referring to them as 'inter-
jections'--the traditional categorization for forms resisting inclusion 
in the 'sentential' word classes). Another group of studies attempts to 
isolate the conventional functions of discourse particles by examining 
their use in tapes and transcripts of natural conversation. Important 
studies of this kind have been carried out by Crysta) and Davy (1975), 
Goldberg (1980), Svartvik (1980) and Schiffrin (1981b). Each of the  
studies mentioned so far will be discussed in more detail in following  
chapters.  
The present study will use both recorded conversations and intro-
spective data in an attempt to identify a core use for several dis-
course particles. It will be shown that when the basic use of each 
item has been correctly isolated, an understanding of the variety of 
discourse functions that item is capable of serving proceeds directly 
from considering how its core use is interpretable in particular con-
versational contexts. In addition the general function of discourse 
particles will be characterized by showing how they constitute the 
range of conventionalized responses in English to what will be called 
the problem of disclosure. Briefly, the disclosure problem is that un-
expressed thinking engaged in by conversants concurrent with their par-
ticipation in a conversation may be relevant to the display of their 
overt behaviors. It is claimed below that each discourse particle con-
sidered mediates in a specific way between the covert thinking of con-
versants and what they do in the way of talk and other external behav-
iors. 
Since in the position to be developed it will be crucial to have 
established that conversants do in fact engage in unexpressed thinking--
and because most treatments of conversational behavior either conve-
niently ignore or specifically exclude what is unexpressed--it will be 
of use here to briefly review the importance of the 'invisible ' aspects 
of conversation. 
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1.2. Covert Thinking in Conversation 
As a rule, conversants don't say aloud everything that crosses 
their minds; they select some 'mental contents ' as appropriate to 
verbalize and retain others as inappropriate; or thought may be temporarily 
'shelved' and introduced later when--perhaps through deliberate attempts 
at redirecting the conversation--its verbalization becomes appropriate . 
It is unimportant to the real matter of this distinction between talk 
and covert thought whether what is deferred or left unexpressed is 
'silent speech' or some form of nonlinguistic or quasilinguistic mental 
activity ; in either case what gets spoken is only part of what comes 
to mind. 
There are obviously aspects of conversational behavior that are 
nonspontaneous. The tum-taking system may be held partly accountable: 
well-behaved speakers aren't free to practice an absolute extemporaneity, 
speaking their minds when moved to. Frequently they bide their time, 
awaiting a proper moment to insert what they have to say. The numerous 
recent explorations of conversational structure by sociologists (Sacks, 
Schegloff, Jefferson, and others) have been helpful in establishing 
that speakers do not in general voice thoughts when they will , but 
judiciously retain, shape, reshape, or place them in ways that often 
display consider3ble gamesmanship. There is room within the tonusl 
of a conversation for much private thought . We form overall judgments , 
plan provisional responses, rank and revise them, store questions, 
foresee the need for further conversations, and so on , and routinely 
do these things while someone else is talking, or while we ourselves 
hold the turn . 
Speakers sometimes report thoughts as having occurred covertly 
during talk by introducing their subsequent verbalization of them with 
a prefix like those in (1):2 
(1) 	 I thought of this while you were/I was talking ...  
I was going to say ...  
Your mentioning cholera a moment ago reminded me ...  
Naturally, speakers are free to think while holding the turn or while 
being addressed. It is not unacceptable, and is often expected, that 
we ponder what is said, and we may affect this by head scratching or 
chin pulling, as well as by the considered responsiveness of what we 
say. Private thought is only troublesome if it becomes preoccupation. 
Items like What in the world! represent another way speakers natural-
ize covert thought into their speech, though here the subcurrent 
of thought is ostensibly verbalized as it occurs. The dual status of 
these utterances has been discussed by Goffman. Using them, the 
speaker "renders readily accessible to witnesses what he chooses to 
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assign to his inward state" (Goffman 1978 : 794). Muttering is much the 
same (796). 
There is of course also mental activity involved in the routine 
processing of speech. Beyond the basic cognitive processes involved 
in production and comprehension, we draw inferences, devise and no-
tice implicatures, reconstruct the targets of speech errors, distin-
guish given and new, recover material elided in ritualized encounters, 
take note of lurking presuppositions, identify denigrations, and mar-
shal various other monitorings and pragmatic operations the extent of 
which is apt to be grossly underestimated if we look only at solitary, 
unsituated sentences. While basic cognitive processing is automatic 
and unconscious, many aspects of linguistic processing can be conscious-
ly noted and verbalized or not, as the speaker chooses.--
It is clear, then, that what we call speakers are also thinkers, 
with one foot in the collaborative world of talk, and the other in the 
internal world of their thoughts, which they may, or not, choose to 
display. 
The inaccessibility of covert thinking to the researcher is what 
has sometimes been called the problem of 'intention', ' meaning', or 
'motivation' (see Duncan and Fiske 1977:17) . Conversation analysts 
are for the most part3 limited to working with what is said or cione ra-
ther than what is thought, and to the extent that conversants them-
selves find each other's thoughts indiscernible, it has seemed both 
necessary and fair to researchers to restrict their attention to what 
is audibly and, if video equipment is used, visibly expressed. It 
nevertheless remains true that there is a covert subcurrent of thought 
'beneath' the speech and other overt behavior of participants in a 
conversation, and that the course of their thoughts is not entirely 
identical to the course of their talk, let alone fully accessible to 
the most talented researcher. 
The bias of researchers toward what is manifest is often simply  
adopted as a methodological principal (e.g. Duncan and Fiske 1977:17);  
or, as in the work of Sacks, Schegloff, and others, it may be taken to  
define the range of phenomena under investigation:  
Our analysis has sought to explicate the ways in which the materi-
als are produced by members in orderly ways that exhibit their or-
derliness, have their orderliness appreciated and used, and have 
that appreciated and displayed and treated as the basis for subse-
quent action (Schegloff and Sacks 1970:290) . 
Even in conversational analyses supposedly limited to 'observables', 
however , the researcher must often engage in guesswork. Studies of 
this kind are peppered with qualifiers necessary because what is dis-
played by conversants permits multiple interpretations all consistent 
'With their talk. 
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Wh.at is unmanifested is not entirely excludable from the analy-
sis of conversation, then, but neither--practically speaking--can it 
be fully included. The middle ground, though an unsettled one, is to 
acknowledge the existence and importance of covert thinking to what is 
said and done by conversants, and also to acknowledge the difficulties 
in ascertaining the details of their covert mental activity. This 
tempered point of view seems to characterize much of the work of Gar-
fink~l and Goffman (see, especially, Garfinkel 1972). 
1.3 Three 'Worlds' of the Speaker 
Though some conversation analysts may, for practical reasons, 
exclude covert thinking from consideration, speakers do not. To de-
scribe the position of the individual participant in a conversation, a 
tripartite model seems essential. The covert thinking of the speaker, 
what that speaker has presently in mind and may, or not, disclose, will 
be referred to below as the private world; what is on display as talk 
and other behavior on the part of conversants and is thus available to 
both the speaker and some other(s) will be called the shared world; and 
the covert thinking of other conversants, which is invisible to the 
speaker, will be called the other world. This terminology is applica-
ble equally to any of the participants in a conversation, so that what 
is private world for one conversant may be be other world for some 
other conversant. 
That conversants should be described as orienting to the exist-
ence of these three different spheres of information is certainly not 
a revolutionary claim, though it seems that conversants are not often 
conceived of in this way and are more often simply viewed as the manu-
facturers of the talk which is taken, by the researcher, to be of prj-
mary interest. A notable exception to this latter tendency is R. 
Lakoff (1974), where we are reminded that language is not only used to 
present information about the 'real world', but also to encode 'inter-
nal' information.4 
There will be repeated occasion in later chapters to refer to the 
tripartite model of the speaker's world just proposed. The disclosure 
problem discussed above, which will be the basis for understanding 
items such a like, well, and y'know, can be restated in the context of 
this model as follows: 
The Disclosure Problem: Current undisclosed material in the pri-
vate and other worlds may be relevant to what the speaker is now 
doing, or has just now done, or will just now be doing, in the 
shared world. 
In the discussion that follows it will be helpful to keep in 
mind that the 'contents' of the shared world differ in important re-
spects from those of the two covert worlds. Material spoken into the 
shared world may be strategically placed there and is subject to what 
Sacks et al. have called recipient design: 
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a multitude of respects in which the talk by a party is a conversa-
tion is constructed or designed in ways which display an orienta-
tion and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the co-par-
ticipants (1974:727). 
Moreover, speakers are constrained by the sequential requirements of 
conversation. Answers, to take a well-worked example, are contingent 
upon questions; or, more precisely, what follows a question should be 
placed there with sensitivity to the conditioned relevance of an an-
swer at that point (see Goffman 1976 for a fuller discussion). The 
recent literature on conversational repair also illustrates the stra-
tegic nature of some contributions of talk. Speakers regularly fail 
to initiate repair on another's repairable utterance until it becomes 
obvious that the repairable will not be self-corrected by its speaker 
(Schegloff et al., 1977). On other occasions participants choose not 
to initiate repair on some obviously repairable item (Shegloff et al. 
1977:375 refer to these occasions as 'opportunities NOT TAKEN'), pos-
sibly because the repair, which would involve work by both parties, 
doesn't seem worth the trouble, or because repair might implicate dis-
agreement. In thesP situations--delayed repair and intentional non-
repair--it appears that thinking is left temporarily unexpressed in 
the first case and altogether unexpressed in the second . 
The shared world is in general one in which what is placed there 
is intendedly understandable by interlocutors based on their shared 
knowledge, including knowledge of what has earlier, and just, been 
said and done by them in the conversation. 
In contrast--though here we have only difficult introspections 
to guide us--unexpressed thought seems not to respect sequential and 
politeness conventions governing talk by behaving conversants, and 
needn't be explicit, complete, or well-formed, since it is not designed 
or destined for presentation in the shared world . The situation in 
the covert worlds would appear to be altogether less inhibited than are 
external behaviors. 'Free' associations are certainly possible; 
thoughts may be tangential to the present conversation or even ap-
parently unrelated to it. Talk and thought, though occurrin~ in the 
same speaking situation, need not run parallel. It may even be inap-
propriate to speak of 'the course of thinking' as if it possessed a 
cohesiveness and structural integrity similar to what appears in 
speech . It would be preferable to use a very general term like 'state 
of consciousness' (Keller 1981) or ' internal state' (R. Lakoff 1974) 
to refer to covert thinking rather than suggest, as in Goldberg (1976 : 
39) that covert thinking constitutes a separate unspoken conversation 
concurrent with what is actually said , or that what appears as talk is 
simply a selection from such an internal conversation or monologue . 5 
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1.4 Routinization 
In the discussion of discourse particles, the question of routi-
nization arises constantly. Many such items have come to be so close-
ly associated with particular discourse situations that they may be 
considered conventional responses to these situations . For example, 
well, with low-rising intonation, is a conventional response to the 
situation in which one conversant awaits an overdue response from 
another. Well, used in this way, may therefore be considered a rou-
tine (see Coulmas 1980) . Routines are "highly conventionalized pre-
patterned expressions [or single words] whose occurrence is tied to 
more or less standardized couununication situations" (ibid . , 3). The 
meaning of items of verbal routine is thought to differ from that of 
other nonroutine items in that the literal meaning m;1y be outshown, 
overshadowed, or even altogether obscured by the conventional use of 
the item, or the conventional use may be taken to C'haracterize the 1-
item to the total exclusion of a~y literal meaning: The routine good-
bye , for example (see Clark and French 1981; cf. Laver 1981), occurs 
in a specifiable discourse situation (leave taking) and constitutes a 
conventionalized response to this situation, but if we ask the meaning 
of the item, informants balk. Either we must admit that the item hns 
no particular meaning, or broaden the concept of meaning to include 
conventional uses, which is, in effect, what lexicographers do with 
items like this. Webster's Collegiate lists only the following brief 
definition for goodbye: "a concluding remark or gesture at parting", 
Goodbye is a special example in two respects: it has a single 
predominant routine use, and it has no discernible literal meaning, 
Neither of these features can be extended to routines in general. 
Often a single item has multiple uses, and often indeed a routine does 
have some specifiable literal meaning. The speaker who repeatedly 
issues the word right while listening to a complicated set of instruc-
tions may well have a literal meaning of the item ('correct') in mind 
despite using the word as a point-granting routine. It is unlikely 
that such routines as how are you?, take care, and see you are entirely 
devoid of literal meaning. See you, like goodbye, is used for leave 
taking, but, consonant with its literal reading, is appropriate for 
temporary rather than permanent leave taking . How are you? even in its 
basically phatic use (cf. Malinowski 1946:248-251) can elicit a re-
sponse relevant to its literal meaning. 
It would be a mistake, though, to insist too strongly on the li-
teral meaning of routines. It is perfectly possible that on specific 
occasions of utterance their literal meaning is more or less disregarded 
!n favor of their routine function, The sometimes lax attention paid 
to literal meaning of routines is exemplified by the peculiar item 
I could care less (Tannen and Oztek 1981) which sometimes replaces 
I couldn't care less , Tannen and Oztek claim that the interchangeabil-
ity of these two items illustrates the purely conventional nature of 
the expressions and their loss of all contact with literal meaning. 
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But the literal meaning is not really so far away . For one thing , 
less is a negative item which, under the less attentive conditions 
under which rout i nes tend to be uttered, might itself be felt by the 
speaker to convey the missing sentential negation (note that compara-
tives in general seem to involve an internal negation ; thus they occur 
with negative polarity items : less than anyone); for another thing, it 
is difficult to imagine this expression evolving at any future point 
into, for example I couldn't care more , I could say less , or I must 
care less; notice also that the occurrence of t his item in construc-
tions like I could care less about your old shoe speaks quite 
strongly in favor of the item's retention of literal meaning. 
In the discussion of like , well and y'know in the following chap-
ters, it will be necessary to keep in mind both the likelihood of their 
routinization with different functions and the compatability of this 
routinization with each item's having a basic or core use which remains 
constant though all the routine functions of the item. The watchword 
'routine' should not be taken as a license to forget the basic linguis-
tic value, if any, of an item, although this value, if there is one, 
might be less than fully present in the mind of the speaker on a given 
occasion of utterance. This notion seems to be implicit in the follow-
ing claim by Coulmas: 
Every normal member of a speech connnunity can distinguish routine 
utterances from idiosyncratic ones. Furthermore, he knows that rou-
tine usage affects the meaningfulness of expressions, and he knows 
whether or not an utterance is to be assigned the full force of its 
literal meaning (1981:16 ; emphasis mine) . 
As Coulmas notes, the degree of meaningfulness of an item may de-
pend to an extent on its frequency of occurrence . The more an item is 
used routinely , the more it is apt to lose contact with its literal 
meaning, an idea commemorated in the phrase 'crying wolf'. In the case 
of the discourse particles under study here, the question is more ap-
propriately formulated as one of use rather than meaning, but the gen-
eral point still holds. The position taken in the present study is 
that the basic use of each discourse particle discussed can be domi-
nated by its specific routine functions, but is never completely obli-
terated, remains available to scrutiny, and, most importantly , defines 
the possibilities for the multiple routine uses of the item. This po-
sition is first developed and exemplified in Chapter 3 with the item 
l ike. 
1.5 Use of Speech Materials 
Several types of data were used for this study . Materials desig-
nated RTS below are from tape recordings of radio talk show conversa-
tions . Callers engage the show's host in a brief discussion rclnted to 
the chosen topic for that evening, or the host engages a celebrity 
'guest caller' in conversation . Two important features of these 
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materials are that kinesis plays no role since the callers and the host 
cannot see each other, and that the recordings themselves are free of 
any possible investigative bias because there is no personal contact 
between the investigator and either callers or host.6 
Materials designated LAB consist of three extended dyadic face-
to-face conversations between friends (3 pairs, 6 speakers total). 
Pairs of friends were chosen to create as relaxed a situation as pos-
sible . The subjects were seated in comfortable chairs a few feet 
apart and were allowed to talk about whatever they wished. Neither 
the tape recordernor the researcher were present in the room where the 
conversations took place, though microphones were present and visi-
ble. Judging by the intimate nature of some of the topics discussed, 
the LAB conversants were probably not much intimidated by the record-
ing situation.7 All six speakers were undergraduate student volun-
teers; all were native residents of central Ohio. The only selection 
criterion was the pre-existing friendship of the members of each pair. 
In some cases below part of an analysis will be based on intui-
tive judgments of acceptability, but because of the well-know prob-
lems in interpreting such data, ·wherever feasible important points are 
illustrated with several observed examples; in some cases, statisti-
cal evaluations of distribution are also presented. 
Examples cited in the text appear in different 'reader's' tran-
scription systems, according to the source of the data. Examples 
cited from published work by other researchers (with one exception 
noted in Chapter 4) appear in the transcription system used in the 
quoted source. Examples drawn from RTS and LAB materi~ls appear in a 
reader's notation similar to that used in Schenke:fn (1978), but with a 
few modifications. Symbols appearing in cited examples are explained 
in the List of Symbols. Reader's transcription is intended to make a 
conversation readily accessible to the reader's eye. No attempt is 
made to render fine phonetic detail or to specify the relative timing 
of items with great accuracy.8 Such transcript notations naturally 
embody numerous claims about what is significant in an excerpted 
stretch of talk and should not be taken to represent a complete or ut-
terly objective rendering of any conversation. Such transcripts do, 
however , strive for the inclusion of all and only those vocal sounds 
occurring in a conversation, and they do purport to accurately indicate 
the identity of the speaker responsible for each particular contribu-
tion of talk. The transcription systems in widest use also permit the 
transcriber to indicate uncertainty with regard to materials that are 
partially inaudible or otherwise problematic. 
The limited use in this study of statistical analyses of large 
numbers of instances of the items under study has proved successful 
enough to suggest the general usefulness of this type of data in per-
forming analyses of conversation structure. The general objection to 
quantitative analyses of individual conversational items (voiced, for 
example, in Schegloff 1981) is that the items cannot be productively 
extracted from their individual situations of utterance--that is, that 
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they cannot be fully appreciated without examining their position in 
the extended, sequentially organized body of talk of which they are 
parts. This objection to the use of quantitative analysis is ill-
founded insofar as it asswnes that discourse items are to be entirely 
understood in terms of their role in particular conversational con-
texts. In the analysis of these items proposed below, attention is 
paid to the possibility that such items may have a specifiable lin-
guistic use which may govern their distribution with respect to adja-
cent linguistic items and structures. It seems very likely that the 
entire area of conversational studies can benefit from a more quanti-
tative approach. It is almost always possible to test the conclusions 
derived from micro-sequential analyses of the sort done by Schegloff, 
Jefferson and others through the statistical examination of distribu-
tional predictions based on these conclusions. An admirably clear and 
valuable example is provided by Clark and French (1981). 
1. 6 Outline of Remaining Chapters 
In Chapter 2 a class of items referred to as evincives is char-
acterized; these are lexical items the primary function of which is to 
exhibit the existence of unexpressed thinking at a particular moment of 
utterance without displaying this thinking in detail. Most of the 
items discussed in later chapters are evincives in this sense . As an 
illustration of the evincive nature of items such as well and oh, their 
function in one particular discourse context, quotation:-is discussed 
at length. 
Chapters 2, 4, and 5 discuss particular discourse items (like. 
well and y'know, respectively) whose basic use is related to the dis-
closure problem. Like and well are evincives, but y'know, while simi-
lar to ordinary evincives in some respects, is related to the disclo-
sure problem in a different way . 
Chapter 6 contains general remarks on like, well and y'know and 
discusses implications of the proposed treatment for theories of con-
versational behavior and for semantic theory. These three items are 
related to others, including now, I mean, mind you and several items 
most commonly referred to as interjections. These items are compared 
to each other in relation to the tripartite model of the speaker's view 
proposed in Chapter l and to the general problem of disclosure that is 
describable in terms of that model. A useful framework emerges that 
could be used to compare ways in which the disclosure problem is han-
dled in other languages. 
FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER 1  
1This term is apparently due to Goffman. In his words: 
We owe to any social situation in which we find ourselves, evidence 
that we are reasonably alive to what is already in it--and further-
more to what may arise, whether on schedule or unexpectedly. If 
need for immediate action is required of us, we will be ready--if 
not mobilized, mobilizable ••• If addressed by anyone in the situa-
tion, we should not have far to go to respond (1978:791). 
2Such prefixes only incidentally tell us that thought occurred dur-
ing speech. Their primary use is to usher in material no longer ob-
viously relevant to what has just occurred in the conversation. As 
such they are provisions for violating the convention that what one 
says ought to be discernibly or inferrably relatable to what precedes 
it in the conversation (Grice's Maxim of Relevance). 
3Deborah Tannen (1979) has experimented with playing tapes of con-
versations back to those who participated in them and asking them to 
explain their reactions. The principal limitation of this investiga-
tive tool is obvious: there is no way to check the accuracy of hind-
sight. 
4There are several interesting parallels between what is proposed 
here as a framework for the study of discourse particles and that pro-
posed in R. Lakoff (1974). For example, the notion that most sen-
tences "give clues, in one way or another, as to how, precisely, that 
utterance is to mediate between the speaker's mentality and the real 
world outside" {p. XVIII-1) is parallel to the claim in the present 
study that some linguistic items mediate between the private and the 
shared worlds. An important difference between these two approaches 
involves the noncongruity of Lakoff's internal world/real world dis-
tinction and the distinction between private and shared worlds in the 
present work. The private world consists of the current unexpressed 
thoughts of the speaker in conversation (excluding the contents of 
memory), and the notion shared world is also relevant to a particular 
moment in a particular conversation and has nothing directly to do with 
the notion 'infonnation about the real world' (see R. Lakoff 1974: 
XVIII-1). 
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5It does. though, sometimes occur that a speaker carries on two 
lines of talk in the same conversational 'space'; for example, a 
speaker cay intersperse exchanges with a distant interlocutor with 
quietly muttered self-addressed remarks. 
6There appear to be legal problems with recording talk shows. In 
informal consultation with University lawyers I learned that anonymous 
callers to such shows can later object to the use of tapes or tran-
scripts of their speech being used for purposes beyond those original-
ly intended by them in calling the talk show. Rights of radio sta-
tions to control the use of what they broadcast may also be at issue. 
RTS examples appearing in this dissertation have been altered to con-
ceal their source. Every attempt has been made not to alter features 
of examples that are crucial to the analysis. 
7The seeming casualness of these conversations is not mentioned in 
support of their suitability as data. The three particles receiving 
major attention in this study are by no means peculiar to casual 
speech. If anything, their occurrence is provoked by more formal 
speaking situations. In the RTS materials, for example , like, well, 
and y'know occur in large numbers even though callers are presumably 
aware that what they say is being overheard by a large section of the 
community in which they live. 
8Reader's transcripts do make an attempt to correctly indicate the 
point of onset of overlapping material with respect to what is over-
lapped, and, sometimes, to indicate the point at which the overlap 
ends, but only crude attempts. through word spacing, are ever made to 
indicate what precisely overlaps .what during the period of the overlap 
itself. Transcripts differ widely in how accurately pauses are indi-
cated. Sometimes pauses are recorded to within .1 second; sometimes 
the pauses are rounded off to the nearest half second or whole second; 
but often they are not indicated at all. Moreover, reader's tran-
scripts are not usually accompanied by a statement of the degree of 
their temporal accuracy. 
CHAPTER TWO 
EVINCIVES 
2.1 Interjections as Evincives 
According to James (1974:1-5). traditional descriptions of in-
terjections usually mention two definitive characteristics: (1) forms 
of this class express some strong emotion on the part of the speaker, 
and (2) they bear no clear grammatical relationship to other elements 
in the sentences in which they occur. The concern of this chapter is 
with the first of these putative characteristics. The claim that emo-
tion is what is involved with these items will be re-examined and a 
reformulation proposed that captures their relation to disclosure 
(Chapter 1). 
While it is true that interjections are usually viewed as gram-
matically independent expressions of strong emotion--and this seems 
patently true of such items as ouch--traditional descriptions mention 
other features of this class as well. Jespersen, for example, offers 
this definition: "interjections are abrupt expressions for sudden sen-
sations and emotions" (1923:415); and Fries describes interjections as 
"spontaneous reactions to situations suddenly confronting the speaker" 
(1952:fn26). Based on these quotations from Jespersen and Fries, a 
third component of the traditional definition of interjections can be 
identified. This feature is hinted at in their words "abrupt', "sud-
den" and "spontaneous": interjections are somehow tied to the speaker's 
present internal state. or to use the terminology proposed in Chapter 
1, these quotations suggest that interjections are reflections of the 
private world. 
A fourth possible component of the definition emerges in a fur-
ther claim by Fries (1952:53) that the meanings of interjections are 
to be "inferred from the situations in which they usually occur", As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, James has argued that some interjections do 
have a particular meaning that persists regardless of their context of 
occurrence, but it will be claimed below that there is nonetheless 
some truth to what Fries says. While many interjections do haven 
specifiable meaning, part of their meaning is dependent in an inter-
esting way on interpretation in context. 
The idea that what is expressed by interjections is "strong emo-
tion" is incorrect. James (1974) noticed that some interjections, 
such as oh (in some uses to be discussed below) and well, do not Beem 
to express strong emotion. It will be argued below that a 
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generalization that does characterize a large number of items tradi-
tionally called interjections is that they indicate some form of unex-
pressed thinking on the part of the speaker. 
The claims that interjections indicate unexpressed thinking, that 
they are somehow abrupt or spontaneous in that they reflect the current 
speaker's present internal state, and that they are subject to acer-
tain amount of contextual interpretation while nevertheless having a 
specifiable core use, can be captured by considering interjections to 
be evincives, where this term is defined as follows: 
EVINCIVE: a linguistic item1 that indicates that at the moment at 
which it is said the speaker is engaged in, or has just then been 
engaged in, thinking; the evincive item indicates that this thinking 
is now occurring or has just now occurred but does not completely 
specify its content. 
According to the proposed definition, evincives are tied to the 
present moment of utterance . This important point deserves elabora-
tion. Items like aha are not simply expressions of the existence of 
undisclosed thoughtbut express something about the current contents 
of the private world. There is no occasion (aside from mention) on 
which this item can be used other than as a direct reflection of the 
speaker's state of mind at the moment of utterance. Even if the item 
is attributed to someone in a quotation, 
(1) John said, "Aha, the century plant bloomed". 
it is understood to reflect the current contents of the quoted speak-
er's mind at the retrospectively quoted moment of utterance. In this 
way items like aha differ from items like happy, which are not tied 
to the current or quoted moment of utterance: 
(2) I was happy to see you. 
While items like happy may mask undisclosed thinking, it is not their 
specific function to do so, and they do not indicate undisclosed 
thinking. 
The term evincive is chosen here rather than interjection so that 
the term used for these items will adequately reflect the fact that 
some of what is mentioned or 'brought up' by using such items remains 
in the private world . Evincives are flags marking the presence of 
unspoken thought.2 This feature of evincives will become clear in the 
following discussion of particular items, and also underlies the dis-
cussion in later chapters. 
The distinction between interjections and discourse particles or 
markers has been lost in the foregoing discussion. This merger was 
intentional. There is already an overlap between items that go by 
these different names. James, for example, refers to well and~ 
as interjections, while the same items are considered discourse parti-
cles or markers by Goldberg (1980) and Schiffrin (198Ia) . It should be 
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emphasized, though, that the intention here in using the term evincive 
is not only to avoid the terminological problem, but to clarify the 
basic nature of these items. It is implied that their status as evin-
cives is more basic than either their membership in the traditional 
word class interjections or their role in structuring discourse. 
The evincive items in linguistic systems enable speakers to ex-
press the importance of what they have in mind at a particular point 
·1n a conversation, without fully displaying their thinking. For ex-
ample, the evincive well, as will be argued at length in Chapter 4, 
indicates that the speaker, at the point at which the item is uttered, 
is consulting his or her then present thoughts, but does not specify 
the exact nature of these thoughts . The need for evincives such as 
well arises primarily from a general restriction on conversational be-
havior formulated in one clause of Grice's Maxim of Quantity: "Do not 
make your contribution more informative than is required" (Grice 1975: 
45)3. It is often relevant for a speaker to bring up that something 
is in mind, but not to bring up exactly what is in rnina":--For example, 
the speaker issuing well before a considered reply to a question re-
frains from displaying for interlocutors all the unessential details 
of the ruminations that lead to the answer; to mention th~ details 
might implicate, possibly to the detriment of communication, that 
these details are viewed by the speaker as significant enough to men-
tion ('worth mentioning'). 
Because they are tied to the moment of utterance, evincives have 
an added virtue: they enable speakers to establish the timeliness of 
what they have in mind with respect to the measured delivery of their 
utterances. Thus the use of an item like ah in conversation establish-
es that the moment of utterance (of ah) cor"responds to the occurrence 
of some covert mental event (ah is discussed further below); that is, 
it establishes the real time locus of some mentionable covert mental 
event that may come up in the shared world only later in the conversa-
tion. Consider the following hypothetical exchange: 
(3) A: There were four concerts today, all in the evening. 
B: 	 Ah! That explains why Chris didn't come to the meeting: 
she must have been asked to work on one of the sound crews . 
This use of ah marks as occurring after A's word evening a mental 
event of B's which is then delineated by B's ensuing talk . Time 
elapses during the explanation of B's covert thinking, but through the 
use of ah, the underlying thought itself is marked as occurring at 
precisely the relevant spot. Evincives are therefore of obvious use 
in establishing the speaker's accountability. To say 
(4) I didn't make the phone call you asked me to. 
can 	be quite different from saying 
(5) Oh! I didn't make the phone call you asked me to. 
since oh in (5) can be used to indicate that a thought expressed in 
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the sentence following oh just entered the speaker's head and thereby 
implicate that the speaker's failure to make the call was due to for-
getfulness, not malevolent intent. 
Evincives as a class are therefore capable of two general and im-
portant functions in conversation: most fundamentally, they establish 
the conversational relevance- -but not the details--of undisclosed 
thinking by the speaker; and they can mark the real time moment of 
occurrence of that thinking in order to establish the timeliness of a 
speaker's reaction. These items thus respond to the disclosure prob-
lem and to the incongruity of the unrestricted flow of mental events 
in the private world and the restricted flow of talk in the shared 
world. Section 2.2 examines the way in which these related properties 
of evincives can be used to explain their function in directly re-
ported speech. 
2.2 Evincives in Quotations 
To illustrate the role of evincives, it is instructive to examine 
their use in a particular conversational situation in which they occur 
with great frequency. An examination of the speech materials used for 
this study revealed that large numbers of evincive items occur as the 
first item in direct quotations, as in 
(6) Robert said, "Well, posture is important". 
(7) Ann said, "Oh, I don't think Malthus was an American" . 
2.2.1 Well and Oh in Quotations 
A corpus of 328 conversational quotations was assembled from the 
RTS and LAB materials and several published data sources (in Sudnow 
1972, Schenkein 1978, Chafe 1980, and Schiffrin 1981a) . All clear in-
stances of quotation in each source were included. In this corpus well 
and oh occur quite frequently in quote-initial position. These two--
itemsbegin 74 of the 328 quotations (22 . 6%; cf. Table 1 below). 
Well is in general found in conversation more at the beginnings 
of speaking turns than in other positions. Svartvik (1980:169), for 
example , remarks that half of the well's in a large corpus of British 
English conversation he studied were turn-initial; the other half were 
distributed between various other positions. Surveying one 8 ,000 word 
LAB conversation, 50 well's were found, of which 23 (46%) are turn-
initial4, a figure comparable to Svartvik's estimate. Of the remaining 
27 well's, 10 are quote-initial . As shown in Table 1, well is signifi-
cantly more likely to occur initial in a turn-internal quotation than 
in turn-initial position, the position in which well occurs most fre-
quently overall. The situation is essentially the same for oh: there 
is again a significant disparity between the two positions i~the di-
drection of there being more instances of the item beginning quotes 
than speaking turns. 
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TABLE 1 
Turn and Quote Initial Well and Oh in a Conversation 
of 336 Turns Including 62 Turn Internal Quotations 
Oh Well Combined 
Turn Initial 12 23 35 
Quote Initial 9 10 19 
Chi-square values (df=l): 
oh: 10.46 (p (.01) 
well 5. 94 (p <· 02) 
combined: 16 . 59 (p<.001) 
When quote-initial items are examined in general, many other ap-
parently evincive items are found in the same position . Table 2 is a 
list of the interjections occurring in quote-initial position (using, 
in most cases, the class membership assigned to these items in 
Webster's Third) . 
TABLE 2 
111 Quote Initial Interjections in a Corpus of 328 
Conversational Quotations 
well (47) um (2) hah howdy uuoo-000-000 
oh (27) hi (2) whoa buzz 
hey (7) [!:::] (2) shh [ uno] 
man (3) mmm hhh poof 
aha (2) ah wow rrue l 
hxmn (2) eh tsk HHHOHHhhh 
As apparent from this table, just over a third of the quotations 
begin with an interjection (34%). The usual rate of occurrence of in-
terjections, based on LAB-A turn beginnings, is 13% (44/337). Thus 
overall difference is significant at p <.001 (chi-square 40 . 18; df=l) . 
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Some explanation is required for the preponderance of interjec-
tions in quote-initial position as opposed to other discourse posi-
tions. This skewing is counterintuitive on the assumption that quota-
tions are direct reports of actually occurring talk.5 If quotations 
are factual reports, the incidence of initial interjections in quota-
tions should be no higher than in unquoted utterances. But the assump-
tion that quotations are factual reports is in fact unwarranted. 
There is much evidence that quotation could not be literal. This is 
clear from numerous experiments in which neither short- nor long-term 
memory has proved accessible for strictly verbatim detail when there 
has been no attempt at verbatim memorization (see Quirk and Svartvik 
1966, Sachs 1967, Martin and Strange 1968, Greenbaum 1970, Greenbal.Dll 
and Quirk 1970, Martin 1971). Moreover, speakers seem to have a tacit 
understanding of their limitations in this regard and permit each other 
to present as directly quoted material differing unimportantly from 
what may have actually been said; a plausible equivalent can pass as 
a direct quote. 
Since in casual talk no one expects quotations to be exact, or-
dinarily B's response in (8) would be heard as unduly stringent: 
(8) A: . .. so I asked Harvey for the time, and he said, "Around 
four thirty". 
B: I was there at the time, and what he really said was, 
"About half past four." 
In fact, when speakers quote verbatim, they tend, if it matters , to 
mark what they say accordingly: 
(9) Eve said, and these were her exact words , "Bugaku sickens me" . 
Since quoted speech is partly constructed anyway , the occurrence 
of more initial interjections within quotations than occur outside 
them is not paradoxical. Speakers may insert these items for some 
reason when they construct quotations. The question that then arises, 
of course, is why they would do so. 
Here it is helpful to enlist the features of evincives mentioned 
in the previous section. One feature of these items is that they es-
tablish the existence of the speaker's undisclosed thought without 
displaying it in detail. This aspect of evincives makes them poten-
tially quite useful in contextualizing quotations which are, after all, 
pieces of nonpresent situations. Evincives situate the quotations and 
the quoted speaker by portraying the speaker as 'with thought' and spe-
cifying the general quality or cast of the speaker's thought at that 
point. It is to the reporting speaker's advantage to prepare the 
ground on which a quotation can have its desired force by establishing 
the quoted speaker as present in and mindful of the (recalled or ima-
gined) proceedings--as integral, that is, to the situation from which 
the quotation is drawn . By using particular evincives, the quoting 
speaker can do this very easily, and in a number of specifiably differ-
ent ways. The most popular choices by far are well and oh, though they 
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are simply the most statistically prominent members of a fairly large 
class of items the function of which is to mediate between undisclosed 
thinking and overt behaviors. Using these forms, speakers can, at a 
single stroke, bring the tenor of their thoughts and the fact that they 
are, or have just been, thinking,into play in the conversation, with-
out exhibiting unnecessary detail. This function of evincives will be 
referred to as backgrounding. 
As a backgrounder, well (see Chapter 4) indicates that the speak-
er is 'with' mental contents at the moment of uttering well, and, more 
specifically, that the speaker is consulting these mental contents. 
The discussion of oh, the second most frequently occurring item in 
Table 2, must takeinto account at least two distinct items designated 
by James oh1 and oh2• Oh1, according to James, indicates that the 
speaker has just become aware of something--a piece of information, a 
sudden strong emotion, or thats/he should perform some speech act 
(James 1974:37). Oh2 indicates that the speaker has paused to make a 
decision or choice between alternatives, no one of which is the cor-
rect, right, or accurate one (ibid. , 84); because it means this oh2 al-
so tends to express casualness~xamples of oh1 and oh2 appear in (10) 
and (11). 
(10) Oh! What a lovely drill press! 
(11) Sander would probably go for, oh, a nice bordeaux. 
Oh 1 is clearly evincive: it indicates that some thought has just now 
occurred but does not, itself, express what the thought is. Oh2, also 
evincive, indicates that alternatives are under consideration but does 
not specify them. Typically, but not always, oh 1 is followed by an ex-
planation; ohz normally is not. 
James notes that oh1 can occur in response to a statement; it  
then indicates that thespeaker did not know the information in the  
statement:  
(12) A: .•• So this argument proves that Quantifier-Float is 
global. 
B: Oh. (James 1974 : 28) 
Here the evincive function of oh is preempted by A's statement--what 
oh evinces precedes it in plainview. 
James mentions a third use of oh (hereafter oh3) which she claims 
is close to oh2 but seems to indicate only casualness: 
(13) A: There sure aren't very many people here. 
B: Oh, more people will probably come. (James 1974:25) 
Oh3, though more casual, is very similar in use to well and thus also 
appears to be evincive. 
The use of oh in quotations usually involves oh1, though at  
times it is hard to distinguish oh1 from oh3. The back~  
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grounding function of oh1 is to provide that the speaker has just no-
ticed something; it thereby establishes the speaker as present and 
mindfully reacting in the situation of the quoted utterance. Both 
well and oh are tied to the particular present moment of utterance of 
the quoted speaker. Because of this. their use has the effect of in-
voking or 'creating' the moment at which the utterance occurred. and 
so providing a 'living' context for the quote. Because forms like 
well and oh are reflections of the private world, they establish the 
existenceof that world with respect to the quoted speaker and thus 
portray that speaker as someone with mental contents contributing in 
an ordinary way to the shared world and also engaging in undisclosed 
thinking . The claim, then, is that the occurrence of so many evin-
cives in quote-initial position is due to their insertion there by 
quoting speakers as a routine part of the process of of constructing 
quotations: such items are optional but are frequently inserted quote-
initially because they background the quotation, enhancing the useful-
ness of the quotation to the quoting speaker's connnunicative purpose. 
Many of the other items in Table 2 are also evincive , and so  
serve the same function, but each in a slightly different way. The  
summons hey, often found preceding a vocative, is the third most fre- 
quent item in Table 2. Summonses seek attention but also indicate  
having in mind something to say or do:  
(14) Hey! Hand me that socket wrench. 
The sununons itself does not present thoughts but evinces them as co-
vertly there. For this reason a felicitous summons precedes some 
indication, linguistic or otherwise, of the speaker's intention in 
issuing it. Beginning a quotation, hey specifies that the quoted 
speaker wished to make a contribution. Because it is a summons, hey 
marks the quotation as directed to some other(s) and situated as part, 
possibly the first part, of an ordinary proceedings in which speakers 
oriented to each other in a manner routine for conversations . Hey, 
like well and oh, backgrounds--it provides context for appreciating 
the ensuing quotation; specifically, it tells us something about the 
quoted speaker's 'state of consciousness' (cf. use of this term in 
Keller 1981). 
Aha occurs twice quote-initially. In the present data aha indi-
cates that the speaker now sees a connection previously missed or has 
pieced together the logic of a situation. Aha evinces that some con-
nection has just now been made, without itself specifying either what 
the connection is or by what mental process the speaker arrived at it, 
Ah has a different r .ea1i ng. According to James (1974: 37), it 
indicates that the speaker has just now thought of something and finds 
that thin~, or having thought of it, pleasing or significant. Ah 
and aha differ in use: 
(15) We went down to ah! Spindrift Beach on the Fourth. 
(16) We went down to aha! Spindrift Beach on the Fourth . 
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(15) could be said if the speaker is pleased to have remembered the 
name of the beach, but (16) cannot, I think, have this meaning and 
would most likely be taken to imply--oddly--that the speaker has only 
just now deduced the name of the beach. Both ah and aha are evincive 
but differ in what they attribute to the undisclosed thinking of the 
speaker. 
Man, often a term of address, also has an evincive use: 
(17) Mani Is this chili ever hot! 
As an evincive, man! indicates that a speaker finds whats/he had in 
mind at that point amazing or at least mildly surprising. Compare: 
( 18) 
(19) 
Man! 
Man! 
A comet just hit Randy. 
You can't store water in a sieve. 
Anyone s
Table 2, 
aying (19) might be seen as slow-witted. Another 
wow, seems quite similar in use to evincive man. 
item in 
Filled pause is represented in Table 2 by two instances of um. 
Both um and uh evince mental contents that are momentarily null, in-
distinct, orti"nresolvable, and as such have many uses in conversation. 
Well, in contrast, indicates more pointed deliberation or considera-
tion. Compare (20) and (21) as answers to the questions, "What are 
you doing over the Fourth?" 
(20) Well, I don't know. 
(21) Uh, I don't know. 
Hmm and mmm, with sharply falling intonation, can mark conclu-
sive appreciation or consideration; the meaning of these items varies 
widely, depending on intonation . 
A few items in Table 2 (e.g. [!::]) are probably occasional in-
ventions (some of them written in the published eye-dialect renderings 
of their transcribers), but seem to be evincive . Two items are not 
evincive: hi and howdy. These greeting words do not mark the occur-
rence of undisclosed thinking. One may, of course, think privately 
while uttering such a greeting wvrd, but the word itself does not in-
dicate this. 
2.3 Enquoting 
It is thus possible to explain the inordinate frequency of oc-
currence of evincives initial in quotations by considering their use-
fulness as backgrounders in connection with the need of quotations for 
the kind of backgrounding they provide. Another factor may well be 
involved in the statistical skewing of evincive items in quotations, 
though it will be argued that this second factor is less importnnt 
than the backgrounding function. 
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Both well and oh are found almost exclusively in utterance-ini-
tial positiOO:-- In her work based on introspective data James has made 
much of the fact that both items can occur sentence-internally, as in 
(22) 
(23) 
There were, 
There were, 
well, four of them. 
oh, four of them. 
but in fact this use of these forms 
instances of well and oh in the LAB 
is statistically unusual. All 
materials used for this study, 
110 
for 
example, are initial. Sentences like (22) and (23) no doubt occur, 
but not very often. 
Since well and oh predominantly occur initially, they may cue 
initiation, and if so-,-a second reason for the unexpectedly high fre-
quency of evincives in quote-initial position suggests itself: perhaps 
quote-initial evincives mark the quote as a 'beginning'. Since most 
quotations occur within a matrix sentence, issuing an initiator within 
a sentence, particularly after a verb ~f saying, may cue a beginning 
within the utterance unit, which is .:,ne way of describing a turn-in-
ternal quotation (the speaker does, in effect, change6). 
2.4 Quotation 
To quote, speakers must indicate that after a certain point what 
they say is to be understood as quoted and face an opposite task when 
the quote is done: how to signal a return to present contributions of 
talk, from the citation of prior talk or projected future talk, The 
first task will be called enquoting; the other one, unquoting, will be 
ignored in what follows. 
A primary resource for quotation is introduction of quoted ma-
terial with a verb of verbal communication, usually~: 
(24) Theresa said, "David, just go". 
But use of these verbs doesn't itself enquote, as shown by spoken sen-
tences ambiguous between a direct and an indirect reading:7 
(25) Theresa said David just left for Ontario. 
(26) Asa said I'm to blame. 
Since such sentences are on one reading paraphrasable by ones like (27) 
and (28), 
(27) Theresa said that David just left for Ontario. 
(28) Asa said that I'm to blame. 
enquoting is not accomplished simply by saying (25) or (26). Failure 
to enquote can lead to misunderstandings: for example, (26) leaves it 
unclear whether Asa or the speaker of (26) is considered to blame . 
Narrative go, as in (29) does enquote (Schourup 1982): 
(29) Mort goes, "We should leave . " 
(30) *Mort goes that we should leave. 
-23-
but speakers who avoid go 'say', as most over thirty do (Butters 1980), 
cannot in general enquote by the choice of a verb alone. 
But there are other resources available for enquoting involving 
the quoted material itself. Enquoting occurs when the quoted material 
exhibits one or more features peculiar to directly reported speech 
(a list of these appears in Banfield 1973) . Thus, for example, WH-
questions after said are heard as directly quoted: 
(31) Muriel said, "Who are you?" 
(32) *Muriel said that who are you? 
To enquote, speakers could select for quotation material that will be 
unambiguously heard as directly reported. 
But it is also possible that speakers enlist features of direct-
ly reported speech to enquote, refashioning what they wish to quote to 
make it sound more direct. Possibly speakers insert items like well 
and oh quote-initially in order to enquote. That they might do so is 
suggested by the fact that insertion of an evincive does enquote: 
(33) Lyle said steak would be fine. 
(34) Lyle said oh steak would be fine. 
While (33) is ambiguous between a direct and an indirect reading, (34) 
is only capable of the direct reading . 
This interpretation of well and oh as enquoting initiators 
marches well with a curious fact for which there is otherwise no appar-
ent explanation. Consider spoken sentences capable of two readings, 
one in which the interjection is quote-initial, and one in which it is 
the last item before the quotation begins: 
(35) John said well plastics are the future. 
(36) Marla said oh Grace takes Chemistry 103. 
Subjects strongly tend to assign the interjection to the quoted speak-
er, not the quoting one, even though the interjection could reasonably 
be attributed to the quoting speaker, as would occur when what follows 
the interjection is an indirect report: 
(37) John said, well, that plastics are the future. 
(38) Marla said, oh, that Grace takes Chemistry 103. 
A simple experiment was done to establish this point. Sentences (35) 
and (36) were presented in written form without punctuation or capital-
ization and subjects were asked to punctuate them. Table 3 shows the 
result. Most subjects added quote marks before the interjections. 
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TABLE 3 
Quote Allegiance of Well and Oh 
Well Oh 
Assigned to quoted speaker 51 56 
Assigned to quoting speaker 2 0 
Uninterpretable response 5 2 
58 58 
Another group of subjects was asked to punctuate the same sentences 
without the interjections. Only half of these (12/24) used quotation 
marks. Considered in conjunction with Table 3, this datum suggests 
that well and oh could serve an important enquoting function in addi-
tion to servingas backgrounders. 
Whether speakers do heavily use well and oh and other evincives 
for enquoting is, however, questionable. There is some evidence that 
the enquoting function of evincives is secondary to their backgrounding 
function. In many cases a quotation begun with an evincive is intro-
duced with go 'say', so that the enquoting is already performed before 
the evinciveis issued: 
(39) ••. and she goes "Well if my check's big enough I'll buy 
ya an eight- or a twelve pack •.. (LAB-A,9) 
(40) .•• and he's just goin(g) "Oh come on hurry up" (LAB-A, 16) 
Probably the enquoting function of evincives should not be dismissed 
entirely. It is certainly true that forms like well and oh are capable 
of this function (as seen in Table 3), but it is equally clear from 
examples like (39) and (40) that their role in enquoting is not always 
crucial. 8 
The backgrounding function of evincives is logically prior to 
their enquoting function. It is the capability of evincives to ini-
tiate utterances that makes them suitable for enquoting, but their 
tendency to occur initially is itself due to the fact that they are 
backgrounders: it is natural that evincives strongly tend to occur in 
initial position, since this is the natural place for backgrounding ma-
terial to appear. In quotations, for example, the speak.er will wish 
to first establish the quoted speaker as present in the situation of 
the quoted utterance, rather than to insist on this after the quote is 
underway. The enquoting function is discussed further in Chapter 4 in 
connection with the discourse functions of well. 
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2.5 Summary 
The notion 'evincive' is applicable to a number of items occur-
ring in ordinary conversation. Many forms usually described as inter-
jections are evincive in function. The backgrounding function of many 
evincives makes them useful in quotation. Backgrounding is not a 
function only of quoted evincives, but the usefulness of evincives to 
background quotations is great because quotations stand in need of 
contextualization. It is not surprising, therefore, that evincives 
occur more frequently initial in quotations than initial in speaking 
turns . 
Evincives represent one kind of speaker response to the problem 
of disclosure discussed in Chapter 1. Specifically, evincives like 
well and oh allow the speaker to call attention to current thought in 
the private world and to specify, with a broad stroke, the tenor of 
what is in mind, without placing the details of the speaker's thoughts 
in the shared world. Using evincives, the speaker may acknowledge the 
existence and importance of the private world in current conversational 
behavior and so solve the disclosure problem as it relates to the pri-
vate world. 
FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER 2 
1 rn this study the noun evincive is reserved for particular lexical 
items with evincive function. The adjective is not just applicable to 
individual words. The routine expression let me see, for example, is 
clearly evincive, and one may evince with novel sentences: I am think-
ing of a large object with three moving parts. Note , however, that 
the verb think is not itself primarily evincive. It does not neces-
sarily evince current undisclosed thinking: If I think of it, I ' ll give 
you a call. 
2Items like ouch are apparently not evincive . They appear not to 
serve important routine discourse functions and are notab:e for occur-
ring at virtually any point in an utterance--even within a word . Such 
items are probably best described as interruptions (cf. Rotenberg 
1978) . 
3Other Gricean maxims may also be involved in specific cases, for 
example, "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence (a 
clause of the Maxim of Quality) and "Be brief" ( a clause of the Maxim 
of Manner). 
4Turn initiations were identified using three criteria: i) back 
channel responses (e.g. uh huh, my God!, etc . ) were not considered 
to be separate turns; ii) talk intermitted or overlapped by such back-
channel responses was considered to constitute an unbroken turn; iii) 
only extended contributions following extended contributions by a just 
prior speaker were considered true turn initiations . These criteria 
are admittedly too conservative. This limitation seems necessary here, 
though, in view of the lack of any clear decision procedures for de-
termining the location of turn changes. Probably any theory of turn 
structure would have to admit at least the changes included for pur-
poses of this statistical count. 
5This assumption is only relevant for retrospective quota-
tions, ~ut in the present data, and probably in general , this type of 
quotation is by far the most common. 
6Even when speakers quote themselves , the turn changes in the sense 
that the self-reported material entails a suspension of the presently 
-26-
-27-
motivated contributions of talk. The motivation. situational rele-
vance. etc. of the reported material is in some other conversation or 
situation than the present one. 
7There are other verbs that enquote. but because their meanings are 
so specific. their usefulness for enquoting is limited (e.g. print. 
recite, sing; cf. Sadock 1969:317-319). 
8!,he use of pauses, intonational breaks, and the adoption of styl-
ized voice quality are probably of considerable importance in initiat-
ing quotations in speech, as well as in unquoting. I ~ould hazard a 
guess, however, that such cues are not as reliable as one might at 
first think. I have noticed that the tendency for well to be heard as 
an initiator is quite strong--so strong that pausing. intonation and 
voice quality adjustments cannot 'coax' well out of a quotation. I 
asked two volunteers to stand before a class and read aloud the fol-
lowing sentences from cards: 
(a) John said, well, "Think of the starving people in India". 
(b) Mary said, well, "I like fish". 
The volunteers were told to go to whatever lengths necessary to make 
sure that those listening would get the impression that well belonged 
outside the quotation. Fifteen subjects were asked to write down the 
sentences just as they heard them. with appropriate punctuation. As 
the following results show. the subjects were for the most part unable 
to 'hear' what the two volunt~ers were saying. 
sentence (a) sentence (b) 
well attributed to  
4 1quoting speaker 
well attributed to 
11 14quoted speaker 
IT IT 
CHAPTER THREE 
LIKE 
3.1 Like in Conversation 
The concern of this chapter is with convl.•rs,,tional uses of like 
beyond those regularly attested as standard in dictionaries, The ml,n' 
well received uses of like mentioned in Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary are: 
1. 	as a transitive verb: 
I'd like to have my back rubbed. 
2. 	as a noun: 
Everyone has likes and dislikes,  
the like(s) of which the world has never seen  
3. 	as an adjective with various meanings, including 'the same 01· 
nearly so' and 'likely': 
tables of like color  
I have prepared dishes that are like to please you.  
4. 	as a preposition with numerous meanings, jncluding 'similar 
to, 'typical of', 'similarly to', 'inclined to', and 'such 
as': 
His typewriter is like a small airplane,  
It was like her not to come to her own party.  
John always acts like a clown.  
It looks like rain today,  
a subject like physics  
5. 	as an adverb with various meanings, including 'nearly', and 
'rather': 
The actual interest is more like 18 percent. 
She sauntered over nonchalant like, 
6. 	as a conjunction, usually meaning 'ns' or 'as if': 
She holds her pencil like most people hold a toothbrush. 
He looked like he wanted a warm pl:tCl' to stay. 
Examining the LAB and RTS materials, :1 gn•at many instances of 
like were found that could not be adequately characterized in any of 
1the above six ways. One frequent use of the.• form was preceding de-
scriptions involving exact numbers: 
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(1) like one more week 
(2) like five til eight 
(3) like twenty dollars 
(4) like- thirteen bucks 
(5) like thirty-eight indictments 
(6) like eighty million buildings 
(7) like four floors 
(8) like two parties 
(9) like three years 
(10) like eleven guys 
(11) like two- two blocks down 
(12) like three blocks 
(13) like five o'clock Thursday 
(14) like - one lane 
(15) like Seventeenth and Summit 
(16) like ninety, y'know 
(17) like ten years ago 
(18) like from twenty ta thirty 
(19) like at six o ' clock 
(20) like three weeks 
(21) like two years 
(22) like just one finger 
(23) like twelve years 
(24) like on the twenty-sixth 
(25) like two weeks before 
but in other cases like precedes descriptions that are exact in other 
ways: 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
like every other night 
like uh quite a few songs 
like - lots of singers 
like every night 
like every other weekend 
like chilly enough to where they could possibly have a coat 
on 
(32) like tangible. They're there. I can hear (th)em. 
and also descriptions that are obviously imprecise : 
(33) 
(34) 
He's like maybe . . . what 
know (Chafe 1981 : 302). 
like - it ' s right behind 
ten or something? 
(us) in a way 
Twelve? I don't 
These and other nonstandard uses of like are often considered sympto-
matic of careless or meaningless speech, and those who use like in 
these ways have been criticized for this by purists such as Newman 
(1974:15), who, interestingly, chooses a numerical expression to exem-
plify the abuse: like six feet tall (cf . Major 1970 : 77: like two 
years) , But if nonstandard like is only a meaningless interjection 
(see White 1955:303; cf. Wentworth and Flexner 1975:319, Major 1970, 
Landy 1971, Wood and Hill 1979, and even Wright 1857) , why is it com-
mon before very exact and obviously inexact descriptions? 
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This use of like is reminiscent of, though not equivalent to, 
its use as an adverb meaning 'nearly' (use ll5 above), but like in (1)-
(34) does not carry the implication 'less than' conveyed by that defi-
nition; in fact, the meaning 'nearly' seems more properly attributed 
not to like itself but to the entire construction more like+ (NP), 
Note that, despite the frequent claims to the contrary, there is 
a specifiable semantic difference between descriptions preceded by 
like and identical descriptions without like. For example, if someone 
applying for a driver's license were asked by a clerk in a department 
of motor vehicles, "How tall are you?", a reply of "I'm like six feet 
tall" would probably lead the clerk to ask for a more exact response. 
Apparently, then, like, at least in this use, is not entirely without 
function. While sixfeet tall can be standardly used for heights be-
tween roughly 5'11" and 6 1 1", in a situation where precision is re-
quired, six feet tall can serve as a relatively exact response, but 
like six feet tall cannot. 
For most of the examples (1)-(34) it is reasonable to claim that 
like is an adverb meaning 'approximately'. Approximately or about or 
around can be substituted for like in most of these examples without 
noticeably altering their meaning or acceptability. But the substitu-
tion of approximately in some of these examples is not a happy one, 
especially when the examples are examined in their surrounding context. 
For example, consider (7) in more detail: 
(7') SUE: 	 You know that um - they've been livin(£) in this big 
three-story house with basements- like four floors 
y'know- gigantic house on Summit ... (LAB-B,22) 
It seems fairly clear here that the speaker is not saying simply that 
the house in question has, say, somewhere between three and five 
floors, which is normally what would be conveyed by the expressions 
about four floors and approximately four floors. Rather, the speak.er 
explicitly expresses that the house has exactly three stories, at 
least in the way that people usually talk about houses having stories. 
We know from context, on the other hand, that the speaker is concerned 
with the largeness of this house (referring to it as~ and gigan-
tic). To further convey a sense of its largeness, it is advantageous 
toinclude the basements in the description of the house. But to 
simply say that the house has four floors would be an unusual use of 
floors, since basements are conventionally excluded from such de-
scriptions (cf. first floor, etc., referring to floors above ground 
level). Rather, it appears that like is used by Sue to indicate that 
four floors is being used with a special meaning. If so, one could 
offer as a synonym for like in (7') 'as it were' or 'so to speak', 
Consider another example: 
(27') H: Is that [i.e. music] a secret ambition? 
C: 	 Uh: yes. A matter of fact right now we've written 
like uh quite a few songs - y'know (RTS,13) 
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Substitution of about or approximately before quite a few would be odd 
in (27') because the quantification quite a few expresses that the 
speaker finds the number of songs notably large, while approximately 
allows as possibilities that the quantity was either more than or less 
than quite a few. Approximately quite a few is thus internally con-
tradictory, roughly parallel to saying, ,1This lamp cost around 
$26.11". But the contradictoriness disappears if the use of like here 
is assumed to be similar to its use in (7'), that is, if it is consi-
dered to express the possibility that quite a few may be an imprecise 
or inappropriate rendering of what the speaker has in mind. (A simi-
lar argument can be constructed for like - lots of singers.) 
Substitution of approxmately or about is also quite odd in (22'): 
(22') EVA: 	 My dog a lotta times when we're playin(g) (a)n(d) stuff 
y'know (m- b- h-) my hand'll get into (h)is mouth or: 
like just one finger or sump'm like that ••. (LAB-B) 
Just as in 	the case of like quite a few and of like lots of singers, 
like just one is internally contradictory if like has the meaning 
'approximately', since just conveys that the speaker is certain about 
the number, and about conveys the opposite. But there is again no 
contradiction if like indicates simply that the speaker's words are 
an inexact 	formulation and should not be understood as a complete or 
accurate portrayal of what the speaker has in mind, rather than con-
veying that one is approximately the number of fingers involved. 
A further indication that like is not equivalent to approximate-
.!l or about is that these items can co-occur without any particular 
redundancy resulting: 
(35) 	 And that [.2] the little boy is like approx- about ten years 
old (Chafe 1980:305) 
Like in all of the above cases can be described as indicating a 
possible discrepancy between what the speaker is about to say and 
what the speaker feels ideally might or should be said. Like in this 
use can be seen as a device available to speakers to provide for a 
loose fit between their chosen words and the conceptual material their 
words are meant to reflect. Like with this use would thus be similar 
to the evincive items discussed in Chapter 2 in specifying a general 
connection between talk and unexpressed thought. More specifically, 
the hypothesis to be examined below is that like is used to express 
alX)ssible unspecified minor nonequivalence ofwhat is said and what is 
meant. In cases where like precedes a very exact description, it 
would 	therefore constitute a kind of 'hedge'2, attenuating the over-
exactness of the speaker's chosen formulation; in the cases where like 
precedes obviously inexact formulations, it would indicate that th_e__ 
speaker is 	aware that what follows is an imprecise rendering of what 
is in 	mind. 
The remainder of this chapter explores how far one can get in  
understanding the conversational functions of like by applying this  
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evincive treatment to the various nonstandard occurrences of like in 
the present data . It should be noted that several of the standard 
uses of like mentioned at the beginning of this chapter share with 
evincive like the notion of approximation, so that evincive like can 
be viewed'""""asrelated to the standard comparative uses of the form. 
Before leaving the discussion of this general use of like, some 
parallels in other languages can be mentioned. First note that the 
double duty of like as both a nonevincive comparative item and as an 
evincive is not~sual. In the next section parallels in several 
other languages are discussed. But consider here as an initial ex-
ample the form nymi~ in the West Central dialect of Sierra Miwok 
(Freeland and Broadbent 1960 :61; cf. Freeland 1951:169) which means 
'like' but is also used to mean 'as it were': 
(36) 	 mu-uj-nymi~ 'in the trail, as it were' 
Forms usually meaning ' like' but also translatable as 'about' are also 
found, as illustrated in the following examples. In the Sino-Tibetan 
language Lahu (Matisoff 1973 : 135), the form~ can mean ';:ibout', as in 
(37) 	 ~~ ga qhe  
five (people counter) like  
'about five people'  
qhe is usually used to mean 'like', as in 
(38) 	 y&-{ qhe te ve  
small child like do INDIC  
'He acts like a child'  
Likewise, in Raluana, spoken in New Britain (Lanyon-Orgill 1960:134), 
the form d~ generally has the meaning 'like'. as in 
(39) 	 i mal d~ r~ parau  
he dresses like white man  
'He dresses like a whiteman'  
but note its use in the following example: 
(40) 	 da ravinun  
like ten  
'about ten'  
3.2 	 Like Introducing Direct Discourse 
A second use of nonstandard like in the present data is immedi-
ately preceding a direct quotation: 
(41) 	 Both sides o(f) the street can hear her yellin(g) at us and 
she's like "Come in here (a)n(d) have a beer" y'know? [LAB-A, 
61. 
(La) 	 so I go "Um [ :stylized] - Mom (a)n(d) Dad got me pants just 
about like that and I've worn those already", hint hint, 
y'know. I was like "Come on, Dummy" [LAB-A,18) 
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(4 3) he goes "I'm sorry but you've only got seventeen dollars in 
here" - and I'm like "WHAT I!! I THOUGHT I HAD SIXTY DOLLARS IN 
THERE! I!" [laughs] [LAB-A,21] 
(44) 	 It's not that she minds it so much. She's like "Well why ( ) 
waste all that gas. You know you you can find a ride home with 
somebody else". [LAB-A,37]. 
(45) 	 he kep- talkin(g) about how "Oh we're livin(g) together nex t 
year=it'll be so much easier for us cuz nobody else'll be 
around" and I'm just like "Buzz, aw" y'know. [LAB-A,50] 
(46) 	 I came back an(d) called the police an(d) they told me - that it 
was there an(d) it was gonna be thirty-six bucks ta get it out -
an(d) I was just like "Oh my Go: :d" [LAB-A,61] 
(47) 	 An(d) then on the way home it started snowin(g) . It was terri-
ble on the way home - I was drivin(g) twenty-five miles an 
hour - an{d) I was just like "[!i::::: ]" And then . . . [LAB-A,63] . 
This use of like appears not to have been described previously 
in the literature3; I do not know its distribution, but it is at least 
very connnon among younger speakers in Central Ohio, where the present 
data were gathered.4 The construction apparently cannot precede in-
direct discourse: 
(48) 	 ?He was like that he wanted to leave early. 
and, if so, the quotative use of like is similar to narrative~ 'say' 
(see Chapter 2) in being potentially useful as an enquoting device. 
However, examples (41)-(47) are not true quotations. Speakers 
who use this construction claim that it prefaces not direct retro-
spective reports of speech, but internal speaker reactions--what the 
speaker had in mind to say but did not, or how the speaker felt at the 
time. One user of this construction suggested that it reports the 
speaker's "attitude". Thus what like in its quotative use introduces 
is a direct discourse rendering of what someone was thinking. It is 
as if the speaker were saying, "What I am about to report is like 
what so-and-so must have had in mind". Thus here again thereisa 
possible unspecified minor nonequivalence of what is said and what is 
meant. Even when the item is used in the past tense: 
(49) 	 I was like "Oh my Go: :d" 
like mediates between some former attitude the speaker now recalls and 
some immediately following suggestive or inexact formulation of this 
in the form of an 'internal' quotation. 
Some recent comparative work offers an interesting line of sup-
port for this analysis of the origin of like preceding direct dis-
course in English . Joseph (1981) argues that Hittite (i)-wa(r), a 
particle introducing direct discourse, is related to Sanskrit iva 
'like, as', citing a claim by MacDonnell that iva, in additionto 
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meaning 'like' or 'as' in similes, was used to modify 11 a statement not 
intended to be understood in its strict sense" (MacDonnell 1971:219-
220) . Joseph suggests that the similarity of (i)wa(r) and iva lies in 
the fact that both particles "inject into the discourse elements of 
what the speaker has in mind" . This consideration of the uses of 
(i)wa(r) and iva therefore provides a striking parallel to the inci-
pient use of like in English to introduce internal quotations. All it 
would take for the English quotative use of like to become altogether 
congruent to the quotative use of (i)wa(r) would be for an extension 
to occur from internal to ordinary quotation . In either case, though, 
these particles introduce direct discourse. 
Joseph also adduces in support of his claim about (i)wa(r) a 
similar particle with quotative function and meaning 'like' in Tok 
Pisin (Woolford 1979 : 117) : 
(51) 	 Elizabeth i tok olsem, "Yumi mas kisim ol samting pastaim." 
'Elizabeth spoke thus, 11We must get things first." 
Olsem 	usually has the meaning 'like ' , as in 
(52) 	 Em i kamap yangpela boi olsem James  
he VBL.PRT grow-up young boy like  
' He grew up (to be) a young boy like James'  
And Joseph mentions a similar particle, (na)be, also discussed by 
Woolford (ibid. 118), in Buang, and the Sanskrit particle iti which 
is used both as a quotative particle and in constructions like the 
following: 
(53) 	 Tvam ambaya putra iti pratigrhitah  
you mother/INST son like be- received  
'You have been received by my mother like a son'  
To these examples may be added the Lahu form qhe, already mentioned, 
which Matisoff (1973:134) refers to as "the most general and versa-
tile of all Lahu words of comparison ... usually translatable as 
' like ' , 'as', or 'thus'~, as in (38).5 qhe is used to close quota-
tions: 
;.. ' (\ ~ (54) 	 "te ma phe?" qhe qor pi ve yo 
do not able like say BENEF INDIC DECL  
'"Cannot do it" thus he said'  
qhe may represent a close parallel to English quotative like; that is, 
it may be restricted to use with internal quotations. To establish 
this point would require further research, but it is at least suggest-
tive that Matisoff (ibid. 468) mentions that of the two quotative 
particles te and qhe~e former is most likely to appear with longer 
and more complicated quotations. It is precisely quotations of 
length and complexity that are most unlikely to be internal. All 
Examples of-English quotative like seem all to involve simple, brief 
broad- stroke sketches of a speaker ' s attitude . 
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Because of the similarities in Tok Pisin, Buang, Sanskrit, and 
Lahu, it appears that the parallel between Hittite (i)wa(r) and Ohio 
quotative like is not accidental but reflects a functional correspon-
dence (cf. Joseph and Schourup 1982) . In all five languages an item 
meaning 'like' does double duty as a quotative particle. 
The extension of quotative like in English from internal quota-
tions to quotations in general would not represent a conventionaliza-
tion of the item at the loss of its proposed use (i.e. to indicate a 
possible minor unspecified nonequivalence of what is said and what is 
meant). As argued in Chapter 2, speakers are aware of the inexact 
nature of retrospective quotations; in view of their inexactness, it 
is perfectly appropriate to indicate that what the speaker reports as 
having occurred is only like what may have actually been said . Thus, 
whether or not the Hittire:-Sanskrit, Tok Pisin and Buang cases be-
gan as restricted to internal quotation, these languages share with 
English the property of indicating the approximative nature of a 
direct discourse report by means of a form meaning 'like'. 
3.3 Like After Questions 
In the following examples like occurs following a question : 
(55) 	 [Tape begins: conversation already in progress) 
SUE: Wesley Point. 
EVA : Last Bonus Weekend like? 
SUE: No it was um - What comes up? Labor Day? Weekend? 
[LAB-B,27) 
(56) 	SUE: What radio station do you listen to? 
EVA : When I'm down here I listen to Dayton//When I'm at home 
I listen to Akron.  
SUE: ( ) Yeah but which one like.  
EVA: W. oh! W.N .Q.X.... [LAB-B,27]  
(57) 	 SUE: An(d) h(h)e g(h)ot th(h)e b(h)ir(h)r(h)d. 
£VA: In (h)is mouth like? 
SUE: In (h)is mouth. But he ditn' (h)ave a chance ta bite 
~	on (h)im. [LAB-B,21] 
These are the only examples in the present data in which like is 
linked to a preceding sentence. In all three instances the speaker 
is soliciting clarification of something said by the speaker just pre-
vious to her. In the first two e>:amples the speaker asks whether the 
formulation in the question is discrepant with respect to what the 
previous speaker intends. These examples are therefore also charac-
terizable by the proposed evincive reading, the only difference being 
that, since the utterance to which like is attached is a question, it 
is understood with reference to what the other speaker has in mind 
(note, though, that a possible discrepancy is implied between the 
questioner's proposed formulation and what the questioner feels the 
previous speaker meant). The difference between like in statements 
and questions reflects a general difference between questions and 
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statements , not a difference between two uses of like. The third ex-
ample differs from the other two in that like was spoken with low 
stress and pitch. The speaker seems to express a possible discrepancy 
between the question she is asking and what she thinks it would have 
been ideally appropriate to ask. 
The Oxford English Dictionary lists as dialectal and vulgar the 
parenthetical use of like after a statement , citing 19th century ex-
amples , including in ano"rdinary way like and If your honour were 
amongst us, there might be more discipline like, attributing to these 
instances a meaning essentially equivalent to the general one proposed 
above for evincive like : "' as it were', 'so to speak'" . Partridge 
(1970:482) specifies the meaning of like in this position as "some-
what , not altogether : as it were , inaway ; in short, expressive of 
vagueness or afterthoughted modification" . Although the post-senten-
tial or ' tag' uses of like cited in these two sources follow declara-
tives, the approximative reading seems equally applicable following 
questions , with the only differences being attendant on differences 
between questions and statements . In view of the small number of ex-
amples in the present sample, it is probably accidental that only in-
terrogative instances occur. 
3.4 The ' For Example ' Reading 
Many instances of like appear to have the meaning 'for example ', 
among them the following~ 
(58) 	 C: The trucks are speeding on the side streets y'know that are 
one-way (a)n(d) then there ' s a wide at the end of it -
y'know that there go out like on - oh Broadway for instance 
or Fifth , or something l i ke that - [RTS,10] 
(59) 	 J : Yeah. Because see 1- a lotta people like in business or  
other - uh things like that, they get internships y'know  
for the sununers. [LAB-B, 3]  
(60) 	 C: Y' know um - besides taking care of groups of pe opl e 
or - um y'know uh I ' m ~peaking in like a secretarial situa-
tion - where you're workingfor - y ' know you're you're h-
you're having to - set up your time . . . [RTS-1] 
(61) 	 C: People would be - would come from all areas - of the um 
of the States - an(d) uh and uh so I would work in (th)e 
Graceland Club nn(d) and some people would like uh - to 
hear like uh bluegrass music - so we would do a - a little 
bit of like uh uh uh uh 1- little bluegrass-flavored 
music [RTS] 
(62) 	 SUE: I mean you don ' t have to get somethinsz really expensive. 
Just go ta um - like Petric's. Or that's//not what 
that's called . 
EVA : Mary Ann's. 
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In some of these examples the 'for example' reading is strongly rein-
forced by context. In (58) for instance appears, as does oh2 (see 
Chapter 2); in (59) that in business is to be understood as an example 
is provided for by the continuation or other - uh things like that ; 
in (63) this is indicated by or something, and by use of the inter-
jection say (see James 1974 on say) . However, even if these guiding 
contextual elements are eliminated, the 'for example ' reading can per-
sist: 
(64) 
(65) 
(66) 
These trucks . .. go out like on Broadway 
a lot of people like in business 
what ' s gonna stop him from like throwing a knife at (h)im .• . 
Can the 'for example ' reading be regarded as a contextual interpreta-
tion of the usual evincive ' discrepancy' reading? Since, for in-
stance, on Broadway is not plausibly discrepant in being an imprecise 
representation with respect to what the speaker has in mind , the only 
remaining logically possible discrepancy is that on Broadway is an 
accurate but selective representation, which is what the 'for example' 
reading suggests. 
Since like in the treatment proposed here indicates some minor 
discrepancy between what is said and what is meant (roughly , 'What 
I say is like what I mean') , the ' for example' reading should be pos-
sible in any case where selectivity of report is conceivably the na-
ture of the discrepancy ; in certain contexts (e.g. (58)), this pos-
sibility looms larger than in others (e . g. (65)), and in some cases 
the ' for example' reading is clearly absurd: · 
(67) When he unbuttoned his pants they like fell to the ground . 
It is difficult to adduce tests that will tell us whether the 
'for example' reading is a distinct lexical meaning of like , The item 
does not lend itself to the usual ambiguity tests (a number of which 
are discussed in Zwicky and Sadock 1973) . The position taken tenta-
tively here is that, unless relevant ambiguity tests can be devised 
that indicate otherwise, the 'for example' reading of like can be 
taken to involve simply the interpretation of evincive like in con-
texts where a reasonable kind of d iscrepancy that couldbeindicated 
between what is said and what the speaker has in mind is one of 
selective mention. However , no f i rm position on the ambiguity/vague-
ness issue will be taken here. It does seem quite plausible that 
the ambiguity is genuine since the 'for example' reading and the or-
dinary evincive reading differ in one crucial respect: the 'for 
example reading has a cohesive use in linking specifics of prior dis-
course to what follows like. Like therefore turns up frequently in 
sentence-initial position with the 'for example' reading : 
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(68) 	 C: .. .but just walkin(g) through the middle of a crowd -
y'know. Now like at the airport - uh - P.R . , I don ' t 
think there's any way anybody could've attempted to knock 
off the Pope . [RTS,35] 
(69) 	 [Caller has been attempting to show that Michigan State fans 
are poor sports] 
C: 	 I don't know like just - Like when the Cleveland State 
plays Michigan State - I mean right afterwards- there's -
it somet imes it seems like it's worse - even when they 
win - y'know . Like I heard that some o(f) the store -
y'know people that sold popcorn ' n stuff they're not gonna 
sell anythin(g) that ' s in a bottle [i.e., so the fans 
can ' t throw the bottles on the playing field]. [FTF3,4] 
(70) 	 [Caller is attempting to show that Michigan drivers are worse 
than Ohio drivers] 
C: 	 ...Like - um - I was on the freeway the other day with 
uh: :on a - halfway trip comin(g) home to Ann Arbor - some 
car cuts over on me - never even looked. [RTS3,10] 
(71) 	 [Caller is attempting to show that assassinations are very 
easy to carry out ] 
C: 	 if somebody really y ' know knew about that [i.e . doing 
papal blessings by television insteadofin person] and 
uh y'know sort o(f) like OK like they go in an(d) - strap 
y'know uh on a - a light coat y ' know where it'd be like 
chilly enough to where they could possibly have a coat 
on - and put on a - little bit o(f) plastic explosive 
around (h) im - sayin( g) "OK" y I know " I ' m gonna be gone." 
[RTS20,28] 
(72) 	 C: uh :b - you know I - uh (p) I think they could build a 
like a: - a plastic uh - walkway - for the Pope. Like 
when he was walkin(g) through that - uh that hotel last 
Thursday - to (h)is car they could've wrapped a bulletproof -
plastic . . . shield - o(f) some sor t - He'd still be out 
in public . [FTS34a, 32] 
(73) 	 SUE : Uh Fred ' s - Fred is my supplier o(f) cigarettes, man. 
(h)e came up brings me a carton, I go home he'll buy me 
a t least two or three packs a week. I mean, Like Saturday 
night he ' ll - buy me three packs o(f) cigarettes ... then -
the next - I see (h)im almost every weekend ... [LAB-A,28] 
For the only other initial like in the data, the ' for example' reading 
i s at least plausible (i.e . t he reading of (74) in which 'she ' only 
sometimes works six days): 
(74) 	 I told her anytime she could come down y'know? But - I have 
to - the hours she works - She got two days off in a row. 
Like she would work six days an(d) then . .. [LAB- B,28) 
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Schiffrin (1981a:ll} has claimed that like is a 'non-causal 
marker of evidence'. This characterization only seems well suited to 
the 'for example' reading of like {and especially when this reading is 
used utterance-initially). !~conventional use of like with this 
reading, however, cannot be used as evidence for the true ambiguity 
of the item. 
3.5 	 Like as an Interjection 
In addition to utterance-initial uses of like . many examples in 
the present data occur preclausally. Taken together these cases are 
of particular interest because the most often cited 'empty' slang use 
of like is in initial position: 
(75) 	 Like, we was up in this freak's pad. man, and she came off 
real lame. (White 1955:303) 
(76) 	 Like do you understand? (Landy 1971:120) 
(77) 	 Like, man, I was out in Wyoming .•. (Major 1970) 
(The controversy over this use of like should not be confused with the 
unworthy debate, smouldering through most of this century, over whe-
ther or not it is proper to use like as a conjunction. See Whitman 
1974; Krapp 1925:239-240; Literary Digest 1937; Bryant 1962; Follett 
1966; Copperud 1980.) 
But the preclausal use of like in the present data, unlike the  
stereotyped use, is not utterance-initial. As the following examples  
illustrate, like is typically preceded by prefatory material:  
(78) 	 but I found like that helped me a lot 
(79) 	 so like basically people can differentiate 
(80) 	 I'm just wondering like - if somebody can 
(81) 	 (be)cause like some countries - y'know 
(82) 	 and y'know like say right now he 
(83) 	 because y ' know he has a bulletproof vest 
(84) 	 I mean like Saturday night he ' ll 
(85) 	 but like - it's right behind us 
(86) 	 And like before I met Fred (h)e was always 
(87) 	 and well like Robbie's goin(g) 
(88) 	 cuz like - he'll just he'll fly in your 
(89) 	 y'know an(d) - like he buzzed her 
(90) 	 I mean- and you know like - most peo- an(d) 
(91) 	 So like I- I- 1- could 
(92) 	 W{e)ll like um - with my brother-in-law 
(93) 	 Well like Ip- y ' know play tennis 
(94) 	 So like if you play song-one song-two song-three 
In many of these cases the 'for example' reading is completely inap-
propriate (in (89), for instance, like precedes a problematical de-
scriptive term; 'buzzing' is not one of many things that could have 
been mentioned, but one way of designating what the speaker's sister's 
dog did to a parakeet on a particular occasion). It is over cases 
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like these that the accusation of meaninglessness waits most menacing-
ly . and in which it is most tempting to label like 'hesitative' or 
'procrastinative' (as does Urdang 1979:78; cf. Landy 1971:120; Major 
1970 : 77 ; Woolford 1979:1237). 
At first the fact that so many of these like ' s do not occur in 
absolute utterance-initial position suggests that there may be some 
specific element of meaning or use that renders like especially useful 
in this discourse position, but on closer examination , this positional 
tendency can be construed as evidence for the claim that like is a 
pausal interjection . In a study of hesitations in spontaneous conver-
sation Boomer, expecting to find hesitations more numerous at the be-
ginning of phonemic clauses , found instead that "the greatest fre-
quency of hesitations is not at the outset but at position 2, after 
the first word of the clause" (Boomer 1965:151) . Schourup (1981:5) 
suggests that the reason for this is that a speaker may wish to begin 
a constituent before having fully planned it, because beginning at all 
preserves the turn by signaling the speaker ' s intention to continue, 
while not beginning risks a turn change. Similar reasoning can be 
applied to the post-prefatory uses of like exemplified above. It is 
particularly notable that in so many cases like occurs following a 
conjunction, the use of which clear ly indicates intended continuation. 
If like can serve as a pausal interjection , this would also ex-
plain why---"uis frequently followed by filled and unfilled pauses . 
There are in the data 25 instances of like immediately followed by 
filled and/or unfilled pause , as in: - -
(95) 	 They may not be nice - y ' know like - urn so nice. But they 
have nice dresses . [LAB-A , 12) 
In only seven cases is like preceded by pause. There are, moreover , 
many instances of like preceding a restart (a point at which the pre-
sent speaker stops an item under construction and recommences) : 
(96) 	 This like- This movie takes place in 1968 
(97) 	 What we do is like- We did a uh 
Three distributional facts point to the usefulness of like in positions 
of pausal interjection: its occurrence a) preclnusally but after pre-
fator y material; b) before filled and unf i lled pauses; and c) before 
restarts . Moreover , like is odd in positions in which pausal inter-
jections are in general odd (cf. James 1974: 150-151); that is, like 
is odd in positions in which a pa~se to consider how to continue 
would be unmotivated: 
(98) 	*Not , like , only did John go, but he took all his stuff with 
him. 
(99) *I did , like , not ! 
(100) 	*Get out of here, and if you don't obey , like, me, I'll sock 
you. 
(101) 	*It's Julie's birthday today . We ' re giving , like , her a 
surprise party . 
(102) 	*Jack flies planes carefully , but I do , like, so with reck-
less abandon. 
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Interjectional use of like seems to be a conventionalized way in 
which many speakershandle the recurrent situation in which they in-
tend to continue an utterance but find it difficult to formulate the 
continuation. Notice that like, at least as used currently8, sounds 
peculiar before material that is easily formulable: 
(103) 	 Q: Were you born in Austria? 
A: Like no. 
The evincive reading of like is not strongly present in many of the 
examples (78)-(94), but this reading is not entirely irrelevant 
either. Coulmas (1981 :2) writes of "the delicate double a~alyzability 
of many routine formulae". In the case of the single word routine 
like the double analyzability is of an interesting kind that can shed 
light on the reason for the routinization of the item. Notice that 
the evincive reading of like is very generally applicable and appro-
priate in conversation because it is not limited to use in highly spe-
cific contexts. Like with this reading finds itself potentially at 
home in almost any utterance. The interjectional use of like may have 
acheived such great popularity with some speakers precisely because of 
this. Such speakers may use for hesitation forms the basic contribu-
tion of which will not importantly alter what the speaker is saying, 
but nevertheless have the virtue of being words, so that by using them 
speakers can be heard as 'saying something' even if a proper formula-
tion of their thoughts for the moment eludes them (cf. Jefferson 1973: 
69 on the notion 'utterance lengthener'). 
The position taken here is that it would be unwarranted to claim 
that interjectional like makes no contribution to utterances in which 
it occurs: like can be used as a routine hesitation formula but can 
serve this purpose because its core evincive use is both universally 
applicable and relatively innocuous to the proceedings. A speaker 
saying like during a pause to formulate a continuation subtly suggests 
a reason for the pause: the material about to follow9 is difficult to 
formulate appropriately or precisely. This is implied by the proposed 
evincive reading of the item. Unlike well and oh (Chapter 2) like 
is not predominantly an initiator. because formulation difficulties 
can and frequently do arise within an utterance or sentence. It is 
not surprising that like is found, aside from the favored positions al-
ready mentioned, distributed before many different phrase types and 
word classes: 
(106) 	 He was just- like losing it [LAB-A,16]  
I was able to like a(d)just [RTS,12]  
he like magnifie·:I it [RTSa,4]  
he like scuffed up against ... [LA.B-B,16}  
it w- like bled a little bit [LA.B-B,16)  
We have like rabbits that hop [LAB-B,24]  
It has to do with like uh things [RTSa,9]  
He's wearing like an apron [Chafe 1980:301]  
did ya put it on like a blue ••• [RTSa,5]  
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I can hear like a buzzing [LAB-B,19) 
He was like shy [RTSa,3] 
get like really heavy or serious [RTSa,l] 
eating like Chinese food [RTSa,6] 
we had like wicker baskets [Chafe 1980:309) 
who'd actua l ly been like--good samaritains [Chafe 1980:317) 
It ' d be like chilly enougb [RTS,20) 
with like - store Levis (LAB-A] 
We'd leave like early so I could .. . [LAB-A,16] 
He was like very funny [RTSa,6] 
We're gonna be like basically uh [RTSa,8] 
You see him - like - at a- at a distance {Chafe 1980:302) 
supposed to have like a Cambodian character {RTSa , 4) 
playing like with - I don't remember [Chafe 1980:309) 
There's like this situation (RTSa,3] 
everything's like thrown off [RTSa,8) 
To say that the evincive use of like can be latent--accessible 
and relevant but not promineut--amounts to proposing that we must speak 
of degrees of meaningfulness, literalness, or usefulness (cf . Powell 
1981) of items of verbal routine. However unpleasant the repercussions 
of this proposal may be--for they tend to cast the study of verbal rou-
tines into even murkier depths than they already occupy--some such 
notion seems unavoidable. If we consider the literal meaning of lexi-
cal hesitation forms to have been completely superceded by their rou-
tine function, we must account for the unimaginability of, say, unlike 
or four as hesitation forms . IO (See also the discussion of this topic 
in Chapter 1). 
Twenty-two subject volunteers were queried to determine to what 
extent, if any, they were able to assign a particular use or meaning 
to like in some of its nonstandard positions of occurrence. It was 
reasoned that if the evincive reading is latent rather than nonexistent, 
it should be accessible to some extent when subjects have a chance to 
scrutinize an utterance containing like. Students in an introductory 
linguistics course were asked to consider the word like in the following 
six conversation excerpts: 
(105) She was very like open about her past. 
(106) There was like nothing in any of the cupboards . 
(107) So like after the game we went down to the Char Bar. 
(108) Dorothy is like constantly asking for attention. 
(109) Oh fine. Except Ralph like kept kicking me under the table. 
(110) No matter what they say, I'll be like ••• flattered. 
Subjects were asked to write down the meaning, if any, of like in each 
of the example sentences . They were given as much time as they needed. 
Although the 'meanings' assigned to like differed from speaker t o 
speaker and from example to example, virtually all were consistent with 
the evincive reading in which ~ike indicates a possible minor nonequiva-
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lence of what is said and what is meant. The responses, however, tended 
to be quite specific about the particular discrepancies involved. For 
example, subjects agreed that in (105) like somehow suggested a special 
meaning for open but disagreed about what the special meanin~ was . 
One speaker suggested ' indirectly open ' ; another, 'very open but very 
blunt '; another, 'open, as you may have known other people to be'; 
another, 'almost very open', One speaker even suggested that openness 
was only one of the qualities involved (the 'for example' reading), 
In each case like was understood as conveying a difference between the 
speaker's words and what the speaker intended. 
Similar disagreements were found regarding the meaning of like 
in (106). Subjects saw like as conveying a special sense of the word 
nothing. Some of the suggested meanings: ' nothing worth having', 'no-
thing of importance', 'nothing that had appeal or value to the speak-
er', 'nothing the person wanted', 'nothing of interest or usefulness', 
' nothing that she likes' , 'almost nothing', 'it just seemed like no-
thing ' , 'absolutely nothing'. What these responses have in common is, 
again, that they convey an extra element of meaning beyond what the 
words following like would ordinarily convey . Two subjects thought 
like conveyed that the speaker was surprised or amazed at how empty 
the cupboards were . 
Like in (107) was taken to qualify after the game. Some of the 
suggested meanings: 'not immediately after', 'a while after', 'soon 
after but not immediately, 'not immediately following' . Two subjects 
assigned the 'for example' reading. 
Subjects disagreed about whether like in (108) expressed qualifi-
cations about constantly or emphasized it. One subject felt that like 
conveyed that the speaker felt the questioning to be 'a burden'. Simi-
lar disagreements were found with regard to the extent of the kicking 
in (109); some subjects felt that like emphasized the amount of kick-
ing that occurred, while others feltthat it was less than kept kicking 
me seemed to indicate . 
In a few cases subjects offered more general meanings, also con-
sistent with the evincive reading: 
(111) 
(112) 
(113) 
(114) 
"Speaker is unsure of how to say what he means" [re:(110)] 
"hesitant to say what you know" [re: (lll) J 
"gives the speaker room for qualification" [re:(111)] 
"expects the listener to fill in 11 [re:(111)] 
In (110) like was followed by periods , a conventional orthographic in-
dication of pause. One subject noted that the speaker has paused to 
think of the word flattered but nevertheless assigned an evincive 
reading to like: 'not sure he'll be flattered', Another subject sug-
gested that like "showsacomparison with a word not there, maybe a 
word similar to flattered ' . Another suggested that like . . • flattered 
means ' as if flattered'. Yet another suggested , 'She feels she is 
flattered but is not sure if that is the way she should take it'. 
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Another: 	 ' really wonders whether he'd be flattered or not'. 
These results indicate quite clearly that, while the basic use 
of like may not be consistently or clearly accessible to introspect ion , 
when a reading is assigned in a situation of close attentiveness, the 
use assigned theform is essentially the proposed evincive one . 
3 . 6 It's Like 
There are several instances of it ' s like in the data sentence-
initially without the clear literal sense in which it has a specific 
discourse referent or a referent in the situation ofutterance (as in 
Carmelita has a hot car. It's like the one that Cecil bought.) . Ra-
ther, it ' s like appears to have the same evincive reading that like 
has by itself--but here again the evincive reading may have bee_n__ 
eroded somewhat by routinization of the item as, in this case , a sen-
tence-initiating routine. But the evincive reading is available and 
appropriate if one were to insist on literalness. In the following 
examples the pronoun can, if pressed, be taken to refer to what the 
speaker has in mind to e~~ress: 
(115) 	 H: Does he thwart you at any time? Y'know w- things that he 
says? 
C: 	 Uh n::ot really . It's like uh:: uh: :m uh in a playful -
kinda way I guess - y'know [RTSa,l] 
(116) 	 H: It doesn't even get to the point where you kinda do a  
double take?  
C: 	 Uh y- Well - It's like w(e)ll sometimes that does happen . 
[RTSa,3] 
(117) 	 C: They tailor-made it uh - for us - almost - y'know. It's 
like they wrote it around us [RTSa,3] 
(118) 	 C: I mean like uh: : - I I like to use all kin{d)a pipes -
Ex- Excuse the expression - y'know like uh y'know wha(t) 
I- It's like what is that thing called? A ' buyer'? 
[ RT Sa, 5) 
(119) 	 EVA : An(d) it's like - y'know it's (j)us(t) (n-) - ya can't 
pass anybody anyway. It's one o(f) them- It's like- the 
road I live on here in Ohio y'know like - one lane or 
y ' know it ' s two-way (ya gotta) go off the side o(f) 
the road for anything ta pass . . . and it's like - It's 
just kinda wild. [LAB-A,64] 
(120) 	 H: How does a guy from Cheyenne find relating to let's say 
a Barbara Streisand kind of an audience? Uh - an easy 
or a hard job. 
C: 	 W- It's like when I went into the service - I went in the 
Marines - we were - [tells story] [RTS,13] 
(121) H: Is that a secret ambition? [i . e . doing a musical routine) 
C: Uh : yes . . . But it's like uh right now we've written like 
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uh quite a few songs. [RTS,13] 
(122) C: I met Charlie Goodrich and it's like 
[RTS,6] 
I met him at Aspen .•. 
(123) C: and uh y'know it's like uh:m 
Sullivan Show. [RTS] 
we did a thing on the Ed 
Two additional examples of it's like appear in the data preced-
ing internal quotation (cf. 3.2 above): 
(126) 	 It's like "Oh God. There's all these people walking by" hhh. 
[LAB-A,6] 
(127) 	 People wouldn't touch her for years because it's like "Oh 
she's a singer" y'know. [RTSa) 
Note that, just as like does, it's like frequently occurs before 
hesitations and other discontinuities. In all but two of the above 
examples it's like precedes a discontinuity of one kind or another. 
The only difference between it's like and like seems to be that it's 
like is restricted to clause- (and usually sentence-) initial position.
It's like occurs far less frequently than like, and there may be an im-
plicational hierarchy in their use: speakers who use it's like also 
use like, though the opposite appears not to be the case. 
3.7 Conclusion 
In the preceding discussion it is argued that the current efflor-
escence of like in conversation, at least among younger speakers, is 
not a sympt~as Newman would have it, of "the death of English", but 
the spread from its originally quite restricted range of occurrence of 
an item which in general indicates a possible loose fit between overt 
expression and intended meaning. With this use like is particularly 
suited to conversation, where speakers (even, probably, Edwin Nc'wTllan) 
frequently find themselves in the position of having to formulate 
what they have to say without the time for the considered eloquence 
possible when they are, say, hunched over a manuscript. The exigencies 
of speech, and even sometimes of writing, often call for such eminently 
acceptable locutions as so to speak and as it were, which, by rights, 
ought to be subject to as much censure as like insofar as they too 
indicate speakers' inability to forwnlate a strictly accurate or ap-
propriate version of what they want to express. No doubt like is the 
scapegoat of normativists because it is, at least in some positions of 
occurrence, a newcomer. 
To claim that the 'aberrant' uses of like are all meaningless is 
simply wrong, though this charge may be correctly leveled--but only to 
an extent--at the routine interjectional use of like in which the evin-
cive reading is less prominent, though still appropriate . The charge 
of meaninglessness is, on the other hand, clearly unjustified in the 
case of like before exact or obviously inexact descriptions and 
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internal quotations. 
To the extent that evincive like is a provision for loose talk, 
it is understandable that its use has been criticized. However, simi-
lar uses of like have been observed for centuries in Englishll; and 
only a pedant would insist that speakers ought to be always able to 
find the perfect outward expression for their thoughts . In addition 
to like and the more respectable expressions as it were, so to speak, 
more or less, in so many words, in a way, etc. (a list appears in 
G. Lakoff 1972), English has at the moment sorta, kinda, kinda like, 
sorta like, etc . , all of which can under certain circumstances indicate 
a possible discrepancy between what the speaker has in mind and wha t is 
overtly said (though, as Lakoff points out , there are fine differences 
between some items) . Such forms and expressions evince a discrepancy 
rather than specify it, since if they did specify it, there would be 
none. 12 
Nor can English be considered moribund for requiring items that 
acknowledge flawed, or possibly f lawed, expression. Speech is by na-
ture a selective and often an approximate rendering of mental contents. 
Though there might be a case for some thoughts being perfectly ex-
pressed by some wordings, it seems unlikely that such a perfect con-
nection exists as the rule. In any language one may comment on this 
fact, but the situation arises so frequently in speech that languages 
have conventional ways of dealing with it . 13 
Like thus joins the rank of maligned conversational items recent-
ly being resurrected under the comely title 'discourse particles'. 
Such items have a specifiable use in conversation but do not lend them-
selves to static entries in dictionaries. Evincive like, and other 
evincives, comes to life in the dynamics of ongoing talk with its 
temporal and turn taking requirements, unexpected turns of topic , 
sleights, distractions, and on-the-spot negotiations. In this kind of 
behavior the courses of thought and talk frequently diverge, and it 
can be helpful to the ends of communication if speakers have a simple 
way of saying so, or of making it seem so. 
Even in the use in which it is most routinized--as a pausal in-
terjection--evincive like has its peculiar virtues. Rather than just 
filling a hole in an utterance, it offers, at least insofar as its 
core use is attended to, a reason for the pause. By saying that what 
follows will be like what should or could be said, the speaker suggests 
that some thought is difficult to formulate. By being explicated, the 
pause is detoxified, becoming polite and reasonable, an attempt at ex-
pression rather than a failure of communication. 
FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER 3 
1Many dictionaries list as dialectal the use of like as a verbal 
auxiliary meaning 'crune near', as in I like to fellotrt of bed. 
2This term is due to G. Lakoff (1972). 
3 This usage is, however, mentioned in an editor's note to 
Schourup 1982. 
4rn an informal survey of 25 undergraduates at Ohio State, eight 
claimed to use the construction regularly and all had heard it. The 
students all agreed that the quotations it introduces are internal. 
5 'Thus' is probably an attempt at fluent English translation. It 
is clear that the item's usual meaning is 'like ' . 
6webster's Third does list a 'for example' reading for like in its 
use as a conjunction: when your car gives trouble--like whenthe motor 
won't start . 
7woolford considers the use of like to be peculiar to California. 
This is certainly not the case. 
8Did anyone, except the critics, ever really say "Like Hi!"? I 
suspect that this and other bizarre cases are due to overzealous imi-
tation by people who don't use like and are mystified/horrified by it. 
9The material may precede in the case of sentence-final like. 
10Perhaps this should be a query: do such cases exist? 
11Wright (1957:637-638) cites a pre-19th century example: So, like, 
Like and similar items may also be used for politeness as what 
I went directly. 
12Scare quotes are often used in writing to do what like does in 
speech. Examples are scattered throughout the text of this disserta-
tion. 
13 
House and Kasper (1981) call 'modality markers'. Such hedges can be 
used to avoid "a precise propositional specification thus circumvent-
ing the potential provocation such a specification might entail" (167). 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
WELL  
4.1 Introduction 
In th~s chapter it is argued that the discourse particle well is 
an ev~ncive with a particular basic use and that this fact is crucial 
to understanding the various ways in which well is used in conversa-
tion. The discourse particle is to be distinguished from the adverb 
well, as in 
(1) She swims well. 
and the 'degree word'~. as in 
(2) We were well into summer before the fog lifted . 
The well discussed in this chapter is usually referred to as an inter-
jection and has no obvious synchronic connection to the adverb or the 
degree word. The use of the discourse item is illustrated in (3) and 
(4): 
(3) Well, I dqn 1t know. 
(4) There were, well, four of them. 
Because it occurs so frequently in ordinary talk, the discourse 
particle well has been the subject of several recent studies. Particu-
lar interest has been shown in the 'discourse function' of well, which 
has been examined by considering how the appearance of this item in an 
utterance (imagined or actual) alters the meaning, use, or appropriate-
ness of the utterance. The general result of these studies has been 
to isolate a number of putatively distinct uses of well, each repre-
senting the pairing of some identifiable discourse position and an 
aspect of the meaning or use of utterances containing well in that po-
sition. The great variety of such uses has led, in addition, to gen-
eral pronouncements about what these uses, or some subgrouping of them, 
~ave in common. 
The principal aim of this chapter is not to dispute the accuracy 
or relevance of these previous studies (tpough some analyses will be 
questioned, and in some cases revisions will be suggested) but to pro-
pos~ a unified account of the many different discourse functions of 
well identified to date in the literature. As in the previous two 
chapters, this will involve having recourse to the notion 'evincive' 
(~ee, especially, Chapter 2), which, in the case of well, turns out to 
have considerable explanatory value. The issue to be addressed with 
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regard to each of the discourse functions considered will be why well 
in particular is used to fulfill each specific discourse function-:-the 
authors of the functional studies of well to be referred to below have 
seemed content, with two exceptions to be discussed, to talk about well 
as if its function were entirely describable by characterizing the 
function of utterances containing it. It will be argued 
below that as an evincive well has in fact a single use and that in 
particular discourse contexts this single use can lead to a variety of 
possible interpretations based on the interaction of the basic contri-
bution of the item with the contexts in which it occurs. The claim, 
then, is that once the use of well has been correctly isolated, the 
'functional polysemy' of the item is predictable and understandable. 
If, as just claimed, well has a single isolable use, how have so 
many researchers, many of them native speakers of English, managed to 
overlook it? The answer is probably that the basic contribution of 
well is not clearly accessible to introspection. For one thing, to 
adequately characterize the use of well, a speaker would have to cor-
rectly formulate its evincive statu--;:--This is a lot to ask. But the 
problem may be even deeper . In reporting the meaning of a sentence 
linguistically naive speakers do not carefully sort out pragmatic from 
strictly linguistic factors. and even competent linguists find it hard 
to extricate these two bedfellows . When speakers attempt to consult 
their intuitions about the contribution of well, this contribution is 
reported as an amalgam of the basic lexical contribution of the word 
and the implicatures and contextual understandings relevant when that 
contribution is used in situ (compare, in this regard, the meaning 
reports in Chapter 3). A third possible reason for difficulty in re-
porting the contribution of well is that interjections operate some-
where below the level of full conscious awareness (unless they become 
so abundant as to draw attention to themselves). Interjections are 
not in general heard as crucial to the content of an utterance and are. 
therefore, typically not faithfully reproduced in, for example, the re-
telling of a joke. Well does not entirely resist introspection, of 
course, as the studies discussed below attest. Differences between 
utterances containing well and those, otherwise the same, that do not, 
are noticeable, but they represent a combination of the basic contri-
bution of well and contextual interpretations of its use. 
The proposal of this chapter is that the basic evincive use of 
well is to indicate that the present speaker is now examining the con-
tents of the private world . The many distinct uses of well in dis-
course all share this core use, though the net interpretation of an 
utterance containing well will only be explicable by answering two 
questions : 1) Where in the sequential development of a particular sen-
tence, utterance, exchange, conversation, etc., does well occur? and 
2) Why does the speaker in that particular context and sequential posi-
tion choose to draw attention to his or her examination of the private 
world? In the following sections each of the discourse functions that 
have been attributed to well is examined individually with a view to 
showing how each can be appropriately described by answering these two 
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questions, provided that in each case well has the basic evincive use 
just proposed. 
4.2, Well Before Exclamations 
Svartvik (1980) takes well in examples like Well I'm damned (cf, 
Americ~n English Well I' 11 bedamned) to be an expression of "exclama-
tory surprise, etc." (173) and considers this use of well distinct from 
its other uses. Notice, however, that the expression--vm damned alone 
conveys exclamatory surprise, so that there is really no clear case 
for wel~ itself having this meaning. It can be suggested that well is 
connpon before items like shit, gee whiz, and hell, because such items 
are only appropriately uttered when the speaker has clear justification 
for r~~orting to emotionally charged languag~. Because well expresses 
that the speaker is engaged in private thin~ing, and doesthis just 
prior to the exclamatory utterance, well can be taken here to indicate 
that grounds for strong language exist":- Well does not itself indicate 
what these grounds might be--it indicates only that what the speaker 
says ~s ilJllilediately preceded by internal consultation. 
The interpretation of well in this case can be broken down fur-
ther in a way that will be useful' to apply to other functions of well 
aiso: 
1. 	 Well indicates speaker's current internal consultation of the  
private world (the core use);  
2. 	 since speakers routinely attend to the conversational proceedings 
in which they are participants, this inward consultation is 
inferrably related in some way to those proceedings; 
3. 	 since the internal consultation occurs before and after sequen-
tially placed contributions of talk, well is inferrably relevant 
in sequence; that is, it is specifically relevant with respect 
to what occurs before and after it; 
4. 	 an addressee may attempt to discern a reason why the speaker has 
used a marker of internal consultation at a given sequential posi-
tion in a conversation and, in making the assumption that the 
speaker is being cooperative, may try to deduce the reason for 
the consultation being evinced by use of well rather than brought 
up explicitly in the shared world; and the speaker using well may 
expect such inferences and deductions (or guesses) to occur-.--
In the particular case of Well I'm damned, well is seen as rele-
vant to the uttering of I'm damned. Since I'm damned is an expression 
of strong emotion, well is inferrably used here in an attempt to justi-
fy the employment of this charged item in the shared world. The speak-
er appears to be saying, "I'm not simply losing control of myself here 
--there is a good reason, which I am now internally consulting, for 
my choice of this emotive expression. 11 The specifics of the justifica-
tion that well evinces will in some cases be apparent to both speaker 
and interlocutors. For example, Well I'm damned could be spoken after 
another's shocking announcement. But these details may also be 
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something to which only the speaker is privy--for example, if Well I'm 
damned were uttered when the speaker had just felt an ectopic heart 
beat or suddenly noticed a close visual resemblance between some other 
conversant and Marie Curie. 
The procedure in 1-4 above will be referred to below as the 
Basic Interpretation Pattern for the use and understanding of well in 
conversation. This pattern will be alluded to repeatedly below in the 
discussion of other uses of well; it always applies in the same way, 
although the particulars in step 4 differ from context to context. 
Note that no claim is being made that speakers sequentially apply these 
steps in real time; the intent is simply to enumerate the factors in-
volved in a correct contextual interpretation of well. 
4.3 Well Introducing Direct Discourse 
Svartvik comments that well is used as a "signal indicating the 
beginning of direct speech, parallel to that of quotation marks in 
writing" (1980:175). It was argued above in Chapter 2 that well in 
this position has simply its basic evincive use. Strictly, it is cor-
rect in one way, and incorrect in another, to compare the use of well 
to that of quotation marks--correct in that well can p.erform the ~ 
quoting function (see 2.4), but incorrect in that well is attributed 
to the quoted speaker. Subjects presented with example sentences like 
(5) invariably agree that well is part of the quotation, not an item 
basically attributable to the quoting speaker: 
(5) Roger said, "Well, think it over and let me know Tuesday." 
Moreover, to claim that well is simply an enquoting mark fails to ex-
plain why many other evincive interjections are capable of serving the 
same function (see 2.2.1). 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that well is in general a construction 
on the part of the quoting speaker inserted by that speaker as back-
grounding for the substantive part of the quotation (but intended and 
heard as attributed to the quoted speaker) . Evincive well, because it 
calls into play the Basic Interpretation Pattern is useful to contex-
tualize a quotation by providing a background against which it can be 
appreciated. Via the Basic Pattern, well invokes a situation in which 
the quoted speaker may be seen as having spoken out of some then-current 
consideration and thereby situates the quotation as an integral part 
of some nonpresent situation. 
Goldberg (1980:113) suggests a similar, but importantly different 
function of well in utterances like (5), "Perhaps it is because the 
well ties the utterance-unit back to the preceding utterance-unit that 
well often prefaces reported speech. The quote is used to support or 
add colour to what has been related." First,notice that, as Svartvik 
did, Goldberg disregards the fact that well is attributed to the quoted 
rather than the quoting speaker. If it links anything to something 
prior, therefore, it should be seen as linking the quoted utterance to 
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something prior for the quoted speaker in the reported situation of 
utterance, not to the contribution of the quoting speaker. If such 
well's were to be heard as a linking device for tying together utter-
ances of the quoting speaker, we would expect well to occur somewhere 
before, not after, the verb of verbal communication, since occurring 
after that verb well is assigned to the quoted speaker (see 2.4). 
Note also that Goldberg's comment concerns the utterance-unit 
containing well rather than well itself. The principal force of her 
work on well and other discourse particles has been to demonstrate 
the collocation of these items with particular types of conversational 
'moves'l and the interpretation of particles as 'markers' of these 
move types. In the case of well introducing direct quotation, this 
leads away from the basic sense of well to an attempt to see well as a 
marker of a 'holding' or a 'progressive holding' move: --
An utterance-unit is ..• a holding move if it is a backchannel or 
if its discourse referents are drawn from those in the utterance-
unit(s) which inunediately preceded it, that is, referents may be 
"subtracted" or dropped but new referents may not be added; [an 
utterance is] a progressive-holding move if it shares some of the 
same discourse referents as the prior utterance-unit but also adds 
additional referents not present in the prior utterance-unit. 
(Goldberg 1980:89) 
The treatment of well as a marker of move type involves a diffi-
cult step of reasoning (which proves equally problematic for Go]dbcrg' s 
treatment of y'know discussed below in Chapter 6): use of the word 
'marker' implies that the item in question cues move type rather than 
that it is simply a frequent concomitant of certain move types. Pre-
sumably something referred to as a 'marker' is used by speakers spe-
cifically to mark move type and is understood that way by others. The 
weaker position, though it is the strongest position supported by 
Goldberg's data, is that well (because, I would claim, of its basic 
evincive use) is more likely to occur with some move types than others. 
The stronger 'marking' position would seem to require for its support 
a demonstration that conversants can actually identify move types by 
referring to well exclusive of following material. It seems unlikely 
that this could ever be demonstrated, however, since well in fact 
occurs with various move types and could not, thereforc:-unambiguously
2indicate any particular one. 
As illustrated in the following section, the evincive treatment 
of well can be used to explain the frequent occurrence of well with 
particular move types. 
In any case, the applicability of rnove analysis to well bei,:.inning 
quotations is ill-founded so long as the analysis attempts to relnte 
the quoted utterance to foregoing material contributed by the quoting 
speaker. Such well's are more appropriately viewed as backgrounders 
(Chapter 2) that contextualize the quotation with respect to the 
quoted speaker's situation of utterance. Such backgrounders are in 
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fact heard as speech attributed to the quoted, not the quoting, speak-
er . 
4.4 Topic Shifting 
Svartvik (1980 : 174) cites an example (here rewritten in reader's 
notation) in which well closes previous discourse and focuses on fol-
lowing discourse, offering as synonyms for this use 'all right then', 
'so' , 'ok', 'consequently': 
(6) 	 A: but if they wanted people around to talk to - then I 
would be very happy to sat - (and) got a letter back 
saying we have arranged for you to stay - Well let's 
take the interview first. 
This can 	again be regarded as simply the evincive reading used in con-
junction 	with the Basic Pattern. Without well the speaker would be 
seen as peremptorily changing topic without taking leave of the other 
participant to do so. This might lead to unwarranted impllcatures 
(for example, that the speaker is concealing something or is disturbed 
by 	the direction the conversation is taking). By evincing covert con-
sultation at the point just before an abrupt topic shift , the speaker 
can imply that the shift is a considered one and, by announcing that 
the consideration is occurring, invites the interlocutor to fill in 
some reasonable motive for the shift (for example, that it is time to 
get to the business at hand). 
Consider 	the following constructed example: 
(7) B: 	 ((talks about his new swimming pool)) 
A: 	 Do you have the merger papers with you? 
B: 	 Yes. So I thought, "Nine feet? Sure, that's 
deep enough ." 
A: Well, 	can we get started on this now? 
B: Oh , sure. I'm sorry . T~e papers are right here. 
Goldberg (1980) includes cases of this sort with instances of well 
prior to continuations following side sequences (see Jeffersonl972), 
well initiating a (pre-)closing section (see Schegloff and Sacks 1973), 
and well introducing the first topic of a conversation . She comments, 
"Well marked moves are essentially 'backward looking' with a forward 
looking disposition--that is, well marked moves tie the current utter-
ance-unit back to the prior utterance-unit(s) while providing informa-
tion which progresses the conversation into its next phase" (105). 
It was suggested earlier that the fact that well ties previous 
to following material follows simply from the fact that it occurs af-
ter preceding material and before following material (as do all other 
conversational items except the first and the last) and. given the 
cooperativeness of speakers , is taken as relevant to the developing 
conversational sequence in the sense that the speaker is presumed to be 
mindful of what has been said and prospectively attentive to what is 
to be said next. Even items like actually, which specify a break with 
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preceding material (see Goldberg 1980) are 'backward looking' insofar 
as they establish a break between what follows and what precedes . 
Topic shifts, preclosings, closings, and changes from introduc-
tory to topic talk are all straightforwardly what they are. The well 
often prefixed to these moves indicates that the speaker makes what-
ever the move is with prior consideration . To mark this cons~deration 
as occurring at just that point has the effect of smoothing the tran-
sition to the next phase, but well has this effect only by virtue of 
its basic use applied in the particular context in which it occurs; 
by drawing attention to the considered nature of the shift, the speaker 
indirectly provides that the shift is a motivated one and thereby 
forestalls any possible accusations of noncooperativeness, peremptori-
ness, or lack of attention to the developing sequence of shared talk. 
4.5 Well Before Answers 
Noting the occurrence of well in examples such as (8) and (9) , 
(8) 	 What time is it?  
Well, the sun just came up.  
(9) 	 Did you kill your wife?  
Well, yes.  
R. Lakoff (1973:458-459) proposes that well preceding an answer ex-
presses either some kind of insufficiency in the answer itself, or 
that the answerer considers the question to be in some respect insuf-
ficient or deficient. Hines' tr~atment (1977) differs from Lakoff's 
in treating well as an acknowledgment that the addressee has heard the 
question and grants the previous speaker's right to ask it. ln either 
view it is expected that well will frequently occur before indirect 
answers, as in (8): these answers might otherwise be in danger of seem-
ing unresponsive or uncooperative, 
Hines claims that if well precedes a direct answer, it expresses  
either that the speaker is unsure whether the answer is responsive to  
all that is meant by the question, or that the question is itself de- 
ficient in some way--for example, in that it asks for information the  
questioner may be presumed to have already (cf. Hines 1977:311).  
In Hines' treatment well does not itself indicate insufficiency  
but rather is used to implicate insufficiency. For example, occurring  
before a direct answer, as in (10),  
(10) Q: What time is it? 
A: Well, three o'clock. 
well is, in this view, heard as basically acknowledging the question-
er's right to ask the question. If the answerer acknowledges the 
speaker's right to ask the question where such an acknowledgment is 
not obviously called for, as in (10), the answerer thereby implicates 
that the ri~ht to ask the question was questionable. 
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The evincive treatment of well offers a simple explanation for 
why well is found so commonly before indirect answers and after ques-
tions the answerer finds problematical . Again. the Basic Pattern can 
be called into use. The primary fact here is that the speaker chooses 
to express that inner consultation is occurring prior to answering. 
Hines' term 'acknowledgment' is functionally apt in cases like this. 
but the evincive treatment explains why well is capable of performing 
this acknowledgment. 
Since well evinces current inner consultation and is placed be-
tween the two parts of a question/answer sequence. between the ques-
tion that just occurred and the answer that is about to, well is in-
ferrably related to the question and/or the answer. In any case the 
question is taken into consideration and thus. in effect. acknowledged. 
The evincive treatment also provides a reason for the 'insuffi-
ciency'. To evince internal consultation at a given point embodies 
a claim that to announce such consultation there is deemed relevant by 
the speaker. Since the expected response to a nonrhetorical question 
is a prompt and direct answer, any failure of a direct answer to follow 
the question in timely fashion implies difficulty on the speaker's part 
in answering. Either the meaning, appropriateness, etc. of the ques-
tion, or the answering process, may be the source of the difficulty. 
We may predict, as a third case not mentioned by Lakoff or Hines. se-
quences in which both question and answer are deemably insufficient. 
(11) is a hypothetical example: 
(11) Q: When did it all begin? 
A: 	 Well, if you mean the universe, I don't think it had 
to have a beginning, per se. 
The fourth case in which no insufficiency is really involved but an in-
ner consultation nevertheless occurs is not a real possibility. That 
well after questions implicates an insufficiency follows from the fact 
that it is issued between the question and the response or answer. 
Labov and Fanschel ( 1977: 189) note that well has a "temporizing and 
delaying" function. This follows from the evincive treatment: the 
speaker has paused to consult his or her thoughts. If so, the speaker 
must have been 'given pause' by something. This will be interpretable 
as indicating some insufficiency in the question or the answer or both. 
4.6 Well Before Questions 
R. Lakoff (1973) corrunents that well used before questions, as 
in 
(12) Well, who's going to take out the garbage? 
expresses insufficiency felt by the user of well to obtain in the ut-
terance or action to which the question is a response. Here again. an 
interpretation invited by a particular discourse context has been mis-
taken for a property of the word well itself. (12) conveys the speak-
er's impatience (due to an insuffTcTency in the existing situation). 
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~ut why would the speaker of (12) want to indicate inner consultation? 
The Garbage needs to be taken out (if this is a bona fide indirect re-
quest) and nobody is clearly intending to do it (another condition on 
sincere requests). Well is used to indicate that the speaker ' s in-
direct request is based on consideration of the existing situation, 
which itself involves an insufficiency. Well does not convey the in-
sufficiency--the question following well implicates it. 
Or consider (13) : 
(13) Well, why didn't Harvard trounce ' em? 
This well merely indicates that "Why didn ' t Harvard trounce 'em?" is a 
considered question. It is certainly true that there is something 
lacking in the situation to which the question is a response, but does 
well convey this? The question itself does so . If a question was 
asked , it must be because not all of the information the speaker of 
the question needs is apparent or has been provided . The only dif-
ference attendant on the use of well here is that by issuing it the 
speaker expresses inner consultation for one of various reasons none 
of which is explicitly announced by well itself, but which may there-
after be hinted at , implied, explained , or left hanging by the speaker , 
and for the addressee ' s part , may be guessed at, inferred, or, for that 
matter , left unquestioned . Since a question follows this announced in-
ner consultation , the consultation is heard as leading t o the question. 
The speaker appears to be saying, "On the basis of consideration, I am 
led to ask this ... " But this interpretation is grounded in pragmatics : 
to understand how well is used here, one must ask why it is that a 
speaker might ' announce' inner consultation prior to asking a particu-
lar question . 
4 . 7 Well and Self - Repair 
Svartvik (1980:75) and Goldberg (1980:229) cite work by DuBois 
in which he claims that well is one type of 'editing marker' , specifi-
cally, a 'claim editing' marker , in contrast to markers of 'reference 
editing' (e.g. that is), 'nuance editing ' (e . g. rather), and ' mistake 
editing' (e.g. I mean) . The repair following a well of this kind "em-
bodies a modification from the less accurate , more excessive, flamboy-
ant or exaggerated to the more moderate and accurate" (Goldberg 1980 : 
229). This observation appears to be essentially correct; it may be 
pointed out, though , that once again the usefulness of well for a par-
ticular discourse function (here , claim editing) is only understand-
able when the basic evincive use of well is taken into account. 
Well does not itself directly indicate correction of any kind. 
Note the discourse context in which these instances of well are 
found: after a repairable item and before a correction . The occurrence 
together of a repairable and a correction itself indicates that cor-
rection is being undertaken and what kind of correction is being made . 
To understand the role well plays in self-repair, it is only necessary 
to examine the consequences of inserting a marker of inner consultation 
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between the two 'halves' of certain repair sequences. The other marker 
types mentioned by DuBois all serve their function by virtue of an ele-
ment of meaning they bear. This is obvious from comparing the ascribed 
correction functions and the literal meanings of I mean . that is , and 
rather. As an evincive , well indicates looking inward at present men-
tal contents. The repaircases in which such inner consultations are 
most likely to be of use are those in which the speaker wishes to re-
consider somethings/he has just said and restate it roore in accordance 
with those mental contents . This is all that well does at repair 
sites. The notion that the correction involved is more accurate, less 
excessive , etc . than the original is not a fact about well, or even 
about ' claim editing'; it is a fact about correction itself. Virtually 
all correction and editing involves improvements in the direction of 
more accuracy. To say that well marked repairs have this function is 
therefore not very illuminating. 
Items like I mean, that is, and rather can help clarify the na-
ture of a particular correction where this might be in doubt, but well 
indicates only that the speaker is reconsidering. 
correction like (14) 
The oddness of a 
(14) ?I have a dog, well, cat named Flora. 
is due to the appearance it gives that the speaker is reconsidering the 
zootaxy of his or her pet. Such semantic substitution errors arise 
when the speaker slips and selects the wrong form from the mental lexi-
con. The speaker of an error like that in (14) does not mean~ as an 
inaccurate approximation of~. so no reconsideration is necessary--
only substitution of the correct form. The item I mean is acceptable 
in semantic substitution errors 
(15) I have a dog, I mean , cat named Flora. 
precisely because it specifically clarifies (with its literal reading) 
that the repairable is an incorrect (not simply inaccurate) represen-
tation of what the speaker has in mind to say. 
Not all self-repair involves correction. Well, as noted by James 
(see 2.3 above), can occur at sentence-internal points of pause: 
(4) There were, well , four of them. 
Since the sentence is incomplete at the point where well is issued, the 
inferrable reason for the pause is that the speaker has paused to con-
sider how to continue the sentence. 
Although James in general defers to R. Lakoff (1973) for discus-
sion of the meaning of well , she does make several comments regarding 
the sentence-internal use of the item. (James' discussion of well is 
in fact limited to these sentence-internal uses , and she even c]aims 
(1974:9) that well is primarily sentence-internal, although this is 
clearly far from the truth (see Chapter 2) . One use of well mentioned 
by James is to indicate that " the speaker can be stopping to think 
of the best way of saying what he has to say" (1974 : 17). In this use 
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well is onl y acceptable "when the speaker could have said something 
other than what he does say ; when there is thus a reason for him to 
stop and think". Interject i onal well thus "implies the presence of 
alternatives". Thus in her discussion of (16) 
(l6) 	 Sue won't ever finish her novel, well, Bill thinks . 
James 	says, "it seems that in saying .•. well before 'Bill thinks' , 
the speaker is indicating that there are other things he could say in 
addition to, or instead of , merely saying 'Bill thinks "' (1974:192) . 
However , James also mentions two other possibilities . Well 
could indicate merely "reluctance to speak"3 (ibid . 196) : 
(17) 	 I 'm afraid John is , well, dead. 
or it could indicate that the speaker is " stopping to think about 
whether to suspend a presupposi tion" , as in 
(18) 	 John doesn't beat his wife anymore , well, if he ever did , 
(James 1974 : 189) 
But it can be suggested that these three uses of well are not 
actually distinc t--that in each case well indicates inner consulta-
tion and that the differences between these three uses are superficial 
and transparent l y related to the contexts in which well is employed . 
James places considerable emphasis on the notion of interjection-
al 'reference'. She takes well in 
(19) The girl who said she liked, well , Vivaldi dried the dishes. 
to ' refer ' to Vivaldi in the sense that "it is that thing which, while 
pausing and saying the interjection , the speaker is selecting to men-
tion over other things, trying to think of the best description of, or 
trying to remember, etc . " (1974:ll3) . James sees reference, in this 
unusual sense of the word, as a property of pausal interjections she 
studied and uses the notion to demonstrate several syntactic re-
strictions on the use of these forms. The position taken in the pre-
sent work is that 'reference' is not a property of interjections, but 
a pragmatic notion that exists quite independently of them. The fact 
that interjections appear to 'refer' to constituents probably just 
indicates that constituents are units of utterance planning. Notice 
that even if an unfilled pause occurs instead of an interjection , the 
notion of 'reference' is still applicable : 
(20) 	 The girl who said she liked ...Vivaldi dried the dishes. 
The idea that this speaker has stopped to consider the formulation 
Vivaldi dried the dishes is just as absurd here as in the case of (19) . 
The notion 'reference' adds nothing to our understanding of the use of 
well in particular. The fact that well seems to ' refer' to what fol-
lows rather than what precedes (James 1974:125) results from the fact 
that James' internal well's precede continuations not corrections 
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(which latter cases James does not consider), In the case of correc-
tions it is clear that well is forward-referring only in the sense that 
what follows remains to~formulated ; in corrections both the cor-
rectible and the correction are necessarily involved to some extent in 
the inner consultation. 
4.8 Well 	and Other-Repair 
Goldberg (1980) discusses instances of ' other-repair', such as 
(21) B: It's very expensive here, I've discovered. 
A: Yeah(.) Well it would be just as expensive here as in 
the States, do(n't) you think? (235) 
She connnents, "When prefaced by a well the speaker of the other-ini-
tiated repair is heard as challenging the repairable speaker's compe-
tence or expertise by indicating that the offered repair is a matter of 
connnon knowledge and that the speaker of the troublesome item should 
also share that knowledge" (ibid. 234), 
Again an understanding of the evincive status of well can explain 
why well is used as it is in this particular discourse situation. 
The 'challenge' aspect of other-repair with well follows from the 
fact that well evinces internal consultation following something the 
other speaker has said . Since the speaker issuing well~ if cooperat-
ing , is presumed to be mindful of what was just sai~o say well just 
afterward indicates that the speaker wants to be seen as internally 
consulting at that point. The occasion for this inner consultation 
inferrably involves the preceding utterance. Notice that even if well 
alone is uttered in this position, it can be heard as a challenge : 
(22) 	 A: I've known lots of people who've died by spontaneous 
combustion. 
B: 	 Well. •• 
Bis not only internally consulting but announces that this is so 
following another speaker's statement. The Basic Pattern operates 
to yield a challenge : consideration following a statement by someone 
implicates that something about the statement has provoked the speak-
er's inner consultation. The challenge is not something inherent in 
the meaning or use of well but results from applying the usual evincive 
reading in yet another discourse environment. 
The claim that the offered repair is a matter of common knowledge 
is not entirely accurate. The following exchange seems plausible : 
(23) A: 	 A friend of mine had hepatitis. 
B: Which 	kind? 
A: 	 It was viral . 
B : 	 Well, a doctor friend of mine explained to me the 
other day that, contrary to popular belief , both 
major kinds of hepatitis are viral. 
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Here Bis clearly not presupposing that the viral nature of both kinds 
of hepatitis is common knowledge. Other-repair ·this certainly is, 
however. (Notice that in (22) the shared knowledge aspect of A's 
claim is 	explicitly indicated by do(n't) you think?) 
Goldberg 	connnents on well used in another kind of repair situa-
tion: 
Well prefaced acknowledgments of the other's repair convey a sense 
of impatience or displeasure. The other-repair is marked as un-
warranted at best and an uncondonable interruption at worst (Gold-
berg 1980:240). 
She cites the following example: 
<24 ) J: 	He went right down on the fie:ld'n'e w'js sittin there 
talkin like a nigger, en all the guys (mean) all these 
niggers er a:11 // up there in-
R: You mean Ne:gro: don'tcha. 
(.) 
J: Weh en// there all-ih-u ... (ibid. 240) 
But is well really the culprit in this tense situation? The 
scenario: J is speaking; R indicates other-repair on an item that J 
considers not to be in need of repair. B's well (weh) indicates inter-
nal consultation regarding what has just occurred--the unwarranted-
seeming repair. Repair in itself, as researchers working on this sub-
ject have found (e.g. Schegloff et al. 1977:380) is a risky business, 
however subtly initiated, because it can be the occasion for disagree-
ment. The occurrence of an unwarranted or only questionably warranted 
repair can be taken as a 'face threat' of some magnitude. The possi-
bility of impatience or displeasure on the part of J is implicit in 
this situation itself: the use of well with its ordinary evincive con-
tribution in this situation can suggest that the impatience or dis-
pleasure that might arise there in fact has. 
Goldberg claims that well in examples like (21) implies accept-
ance of the correction and points to a later element of that particu-
lar exchange that illustrates this. This is probably not a necessary 
feature of these exchanges. Consider the following: 
(25) A: 	 I visited my Aunt Pete . 
B: Do you mean your aunt Greta? 
A: Well, I don't have any Aunt Greta. 
Well here could only (indirectly by means of the Basic Pattern) indi-
cate acceptance to the extent of having understood and given due con-
sideration to B's question. In general one finds a polite attempt by 
speakers to see the good in repairs if possible, but it does occur 
from time to time that a repair is entirely unwarranted, and well does 
not seem to be excluded in such cases. 
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4.9 	 Sentence-final Well 
It is frequently pointed out that well is inappropriate sentence-
finally: 
(26) 	*My neighbor might wait for me for ten minutes, well. 
(James 1974:125) 
In the evincive treatment, this distributional aspect of well proceeds 
from the fact that well is predominantly used as an initiator (see 
Chapter 2). As an evincive initiator (a 'backgrounder') noninternal 
well's carry the strong implication that something will, or ought to, 
follow. Pronounced with a corresponding initiatory intonation, (26) 
becomes acceptable: 
(27) 	 My neighbor might wait for me for ten minutes. Well ••• 
Here the implication is that the speaker is reconsidering whats/he 
has just said and considers beginning (but does not express) a reformu-
lation; whereas, the speaker of (26) is in the peculiar position of 
assigning utterance-final intouation to an item strongly associated 
with initiation. 
4.10 	 Reduced Well 
Excluding suprasegmental variation, the two principal phonologi-
cal variants of well are the full form [wEl] and reduced [wl]. The 
--	 I 
occurrence of a particular variant is partly correlated with discourse 
position: the reduced variant does not occur as a pausal interjection: 
' (28) 	 *There were, [w}J, four of them, 
The reason for this restriction is probably that well in sentences like 
(28) is used to embody a genuine pause for consideration and, if re-
duced, seems to indicate that the pause is only perfunctory. 
A second interestin2 restriction is that [wt] preceding a direct 
answer can be used (via the Basic Pattern) 
of the question, but not the inadequacy of 
to indicate an insufficiency 
the answer: 
(29) A: Did you murder your husband? 
Bl: (w+J yes. 
B2: Well yes. 
Responses Bl and B2 are used differently. Bl would typically be used 
to convey that the question asked by A is inappropriate (e.g., because 
A already knew the answer). B2, on the other hand, is susceptible of 
this same 'inappropriateness' interpretation, but also, equally, of 
an interpretation in which the answer 'yes' is a qualified one. This 
difference is, again, probably attributable to the implication involved 
in using a reduced variant rather than to something about the meaning 
of well. This distributional restriction follows from an inherent dif-
fer~ between inappropriate questions and insufficient answers. In-
appropriateness of a question is irmnediately apparent. The well pre-
ceding a considered reply, on the other hand, should, if it is to be 
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taken 	seriously, be accompanied by a real pause to reflect. The re-
duced 	variant makes the inner consultation appear to be mechanical or 
perfunctory and so undermines the communicative aim of the speaker in 
uttering it . 
4.11 	 Well and Narrative Elision 
R. Lakoff distinguishes the use of well in narratives to "indi- 
cate that details have been omitted, that~e) narrative is not  
really complete" (1973:464) . She cites the following example:  
(30) 	 .• . So the man went to the old witch doctors who lived in 
each of the pyramids, as he had been instructed . He went 
to one after another, but none could help him, Finally, he 
reached the witch doctor who lived in the very last pyramid, 
and he asked him, 'How can I get the silver screw out of my 
bellybutton?' Well, to make a long story short, the witch 
doctor who lived in the last pyramid went into his pyramid 
and came out with a little silver screwdriver. He inserted 
this in the silver screw that was in the man's bellybutton, 
and he unscrewed and unscrewed and unscrewed, and finally 
the screw came out. 
Lakoff offers this example (as does Hines 1977) in further support of 
the claim that well indicates an insufficiency, but the example cannot 
serve as evidence for this claim because material follows well that 
explicitly states that the narrative will be shortened. Moreover, if 
well also indicates narrative shortening, (30) should be redundant, but 
it isn't. Consider another case of initial well in a narrative: 
(31) 	 .•• So what does Bill do? He gets out of the car and says 
he's going to walk if she won't take him, Well, that's a 
very long walk, but Bill walked the whole way without looking 
back once, 
Elision is a possible reading of what is going on in (31), but it 
doesn't seem more likely than various other interpretations. Well 
could, for example, simply indicate that the speaker is pausing to 
consider or formulate what he will say next, or could indicate in-
directly (via the Basic Pattern) that the speaker is beginning an 
aside to interject subjective material into an otherwise objective 
narrative account. 
Or consider (32), for which the elision rending seems remote: 
(32) 	 • . • She handed Robin the pancake on a plate and he said, 'but 
this pancake is GRAY!' He just stared nt it with a look of 
horror on his face. Well, neither of them said a word for 
about a whole minute or so, Not a muscle moved, and then 
there's this loud bang from a passing car that backfired••. 
It is hard to see what could have been elided here, since nothing hap-
pended between the moment when Roger began starrin~ at the pancake and 
the bang out in the street . What is much more likely is that the 
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speaker paused for inner consultation. Of course , if one is pausing 
in the middle of a narrative, the subject of one's thoughts may well 
be how to continue or complete the narrative, or whether to elide cer-
tain material, but the particular reason for the consultation is not 
expressed by the well itself; it is something known to the speaker but 
left to be guessed at or inquired after by the addressee, or explicated 
later by the speaker issuing the well. 
4 . 12 	 Well and 'Intension' 
Murray (2979) has proposed a unified account of well capable of  
handling a number of its uses. She makes the following claims (730):  
A. 	 Well signals (draws attention to) some expectation, hope, fear 
or other nominalization of an intensional verb , to which parties 
to the discourse are presumed to have access. 
B. 	 A pragmatic condition is attached to the use of well: it is 
appropriate to use well only if what follows is addressed to 
the same "intension-..-. -
The first claim runs into difficulty in cases like the following. 
Consider two people sitting in chairs in a livingroom reading. One 
says to the other: 
(33) 	 Well, how do you like that! Microbes are being used to build 
computers. 
This is clearly not a case in which , in Murray ' s words, "there is an 
intension to which parties to the discourse are supposed to be privy'' 
(731) . This well can , however , be used to indicate that the speaker's 
statement is based on internal consultation (here, presumably, re-
flection on the reading material). 
Discussing how her proposal relates to well preceding answers, 
Murray claims that "in question answers well is simply a signal that 
its speaker is aware of what some party to the discourse wants to be 
told" (730). This claim is problematic in cases like the following: 
(34) 	 A: Are you being flotsamed and jetsamed? 
B: 	 Well, I'm not sure what you're getting at. 
The generalization that the speaker is engaged in internal consultation 
can, however, be easily used to account for this occurrence of well, 
since the speaker is here presumably considering how to interpret the 
question. 
As further evidence for her claim, Murray cites the following 
examples : 
<35){*i:11J, I've been forgetting to say • • . 
(36){ 	Oh 1
*Well) ' by the way •• • 
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(37) {*OhWell1, once upon a time •.• 
{38) {*Oh , so we ' ll meet at three • . • 1 Well 
She comments , "Clearly, only well may introduce an anticipated topic, 
c;1nd only oh a new one" . This observation is correct and consistent 
with Murray's claims, but does not support them against the evincive 
treatment. Oh1, by virtue of its core contribution (see Chapter 2) , 
is used before material that just entered the speaker's mind. The 
unacceptability of well in (35) and (36) results from the fact that 
well indicates current consideration , which is inconsistent with the 
unexpected spontaneous arising of thought. The unacceptability of 
oh in (37) and (38) results from the fact that once upon a time and 
so we'll meet at three are initiations that would normally precede ma-
terial that did not suddenly and spontaneously arise in the speaker's 
mind. 
The first of Murray's claims is also problematic in cases where  
well seems to draw attention to the nominalization of an extensional  
rather than an intensional verb (assuming. for the sake of argument,  
that it makes sense to speak of well doing such a thing). Consider  
an exchange like the following:  
(39) 	 Could you please state your last two addresses?  
Well. I lived at 432 18th. and then at 1604 Canberra.  
If well here is spoken with sharply falling intonation (conveying 
certainty, definiteness), it can be used to signal knowing (know is 
factive, not an intensional verb) . If well is to be characterized as 
in Murray's first claim (A above), (39) should be at least mildly con-
tradictory , but it is not. The evincive treatment is, however, 
straightforwardly applicable to (39): the speaker could be stopping to 
remember the addresses (with a positive expectation of being able to 
do so--conveyed by the intonation) and wish to indicate that this is 
so. 
The pragmatic limitation mentioned in Murray's second claim 
(B above) follows directly from the fact that well is predominantly 
used as an initiator; as claimed above in Chapter 2, the association 
of well with initiation is closely related to its status as an evin-
cive . 
Thus Murray's proposals are interesting and remarkably compre-
hensive, but all of her examples submit readily to the cvincive 
treatment, and her proposal fails to capture the behavior of well in 
some environments which the evincive treatment can easily handle. 
4 ,1 3 	 Conclusion 
The discourse particle well is primarily an evincive indicating 
consultation by the speaker of his or her current thoughts. The form 
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cannot , therefore, be considered (as in Fries 1952:105) 'meaningless'. 
The particulars of the consultation evinced by well are not displayed 
by uttering it, though they may, of course, be elaborated in the speak-
er ' s ensuing talk. Inter-sentential well is heard as an initiator 
(see Chapter 2) , based on its usefulnessfor backgrounding . With its 
basic evincive use, well serves many secondary discourse functions: 
introducing questions or answers, direct quotations, topic shifts , 
exclamations, self- and other-repairs, and so on . In each case the 
evincive use is primary and the secondary discourse function is a pro-
duct of applying the Basic Interpretation Pattern to the use of evin-
cive well in particular discourse environments. 
The purpose above has not been to discredit the functional  
approaches to the uses of well, which are of interest in themselves,  
but to provide a unified treatment of well which has the following  
advantages over previous treatments :  
1. 	 It maintains that there is in fact only one discourse particle 
well, rather than a multiplicity of particles well each with a 
separate discourse function . This treatment is therefore much 
simpler and more comprehensive than existing treatments. 
2 . 	 It explains why well in particular gets used for the discourse 
functions it serves and not for others, and therefore accounts 
for the item's observed functional 'polysemy'. 
An important general feature of the use of well is that it is 
not used to indicate all internal consultation, but only consultation 
the speaker wishes tobring up. Many of the functions well may serve 
depend on the addressee's constructing the speaker's probable reason 
for bringing up the existence of covert thinking at a given point. 
Note also that well can be used to indicate current inner consultation 
of the private world even if no such consultation is actually in pro-
gress at the time--that is, well can be used wherever it is appropriate 
or desirable to indicate current inner consultation . 
A previous attempt to specify the meaning of well by Hines (1977) 
failed to capture the evincive quality of the item. Hines suggested 
a link between adverbial well and the discourse particle (see also 
Sadock 1969:298), claiming that: 
well is a word with positive connotations . It is used in an evalua-
tive sense as an adverb to indicate a point just above adequacy, 
When it occurs as an introductory word, it also has positive conno-
tations; it is an affirmation of the right of the previous speaker 
to say what he says (317). 
As implied in 4.5, this affirmative quality of well stems from its use 
in response to a question , which it indirectly acknowledges. Any real 
sense of affirmation beyond such acknowledgment evaporates when the 
item occurs preceding an explicit denial of affirmation: 
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(37) A: Short people should be kept under pool tables. 
B: 	 Well, I hardly think you have the right to say something 
like that. 
There is apparently no current semantic connection whatsoever between 
adverbial well and evincive well. 
Consideration of the use of well is complicated by the fact that 
semantic nuances may be conveyed by the intonation with which the item 
is spoken. For example, the famed Jack Benny well, spoken alone to 
convey exasperation , is said with rise-fall intonation and breathy 
voice (literal exasperation). This same meaning could be conveyed by 
paralinguistic noises ut t ered with the same intonation and voice qual-
ity. This and other special uses of well seem to result from a combi-
nation of the evincive use with the separate contribution of intonation 
and other suprasegmental parameters4 . 
Here , as in the discussion of like in Chapter 3, the question of 
routinization must also be addressed~as well become conventionalized 
as the embodiment of the various discourse functions it serves, so th~t 
its basic evincive use has been obscured? TPe contribution of this 
chapter to an answer to this question has been to establish that the 
basic evincive use of the item is respected by all of the separate dis-
course functions the item can serve . This seems to indicate that the 
basic use persists and underlies these discourse functions. 
FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER 4 
1Goldberg cites Coffman's characterization of conversational 
moves as having "a distinctive unitary bearing on some set or other 
of the circumstances in which participants find themsevles" (Goffman 
1976:272). 
2Goldberg entertains a fallback position in which rather than 
marking move type, discourse particles merely reinforce move type 
(1980:127), a much weaker and vaguer claim. 
3The reason for this particular pause could also be that the 
speaker is deciding whether to use a euphemism or not. The point is 
that we don't really know what particulars underlie a use of well, 
though some such particulars are often suggested by the conte~ 
4Svartvik (1980) offers some interesting exploratory conunents on 
intonation patterns associated with well. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
Y'KNOW1  
5.1. Preliminary Remarks 
The discourse particle y 'know (hereafter YK), as in (1)-(3) 
(1) if you look YK in the- newspaper ... (RTS,26) 
(2) I feel that - YK I think it's wrong . . . (RTS , 27) 
(3) but uh -YK ya get a feeling that . . . (RTS,34) 
is of interest if for no other reason than that it occurs so frequent-
ly in conversation. It can appear so often that its use by some speak-
ers is apt to be stigmatized , even by the speakers themselves, as a 
dysfluency. Others use YK sparingly, but those who use it not at all 
are uncommon, and it is rare that multi-party talk of any duration fails 
to contain at least a few instances. 
YK is popularly known as the brunt of prescriptivist railings 
against uncommunicative speech. English teachers are apt to charac-
terize it with epithets like 'verbal garbage' or 'anemic phrase', 
or to describe YK as a 'crutch' used when one has nothing to say , 
or when one cannot, or will not bother to, find the proper words to 
express something (cf . Lomas and Richardson 1956 :194-195). 2 These 
allegations presuppose that YK lacks a specific or important communi-
cative function: YK is seen not as a functional linguistic item so 
much as a disfigurement of speech (e.g. Newman 1974:14). Since, how-
ever, so many other discourse items accused of being meaningless (e . g. 
by Fries 1952:102) have proved on closer examination to be semanti-
cally interesting (James 1972, 1973 , 1974, 1978), these accusations 
regarding YK are suspicious and provoking. 
Probably because it pervades ordinary talk , a good deal of scholar-
ly attention has been paid to this item by researchers in various 
fields. By far the most extensive discussions are in Goldberg (1976, 
1980, 1981a, 1981b), though that by Bernstein (1962) is also 
ambitious ; and more modest contributions have been made by Duncan 
and Fiske (1977), Jefferson (1972, 1973), Sacks, Schegloff, and 
Jefferson (1974), and Crystal and Davies (1975). The item is briefly 
mentioned by numerous other writers. 
In this chapter the foregoing treatment of evincives is extended 
to include YK; this will involve a considerable broadening of the 
perspective of the last three chapters , since YK does not lend itself 
to the evincive treatment accorded like and well . In fact, the 
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notion ' evincive' will be seen in this chapter to be one of a 
set of notions that between them can be used to describe speakers' 
disclosure activity (see Chapter 1) . 
Not all the diverse proposals regarding the function of 
YK will be discussed below, though the most substantive ones will 
3all be considered . Section 5.2 deals with the differences between 
YK as a truth parenthetical and as a discourse particle. This 
distinction is important here because only the discourse particle 
displays properties relevant to the discussion of disclosure. 
In Section 5.3 the core use of the discourse particle is related 
to the several discourse functions that have been attributed to 
YK (5 . 3 parallels the treatment of like and well i n Chapters 3 
and 4). Some of these functional proposals will require substantive 
modification . The notion 'topic tracking' (Go l dberg 1981, 1981a), 
in particular, is criticized at length . Section 5 . 5 is a summary 
and general discussion of the use of YK in conversation . 
5.2. YK as a Truth Parenthetical 
A sharp distinction must be drawn between two kinds of YK. 
One is an ordinary truth parenthetical precisely parallel to other 
truth parentheticals such as I think, we fee l , it's true, I'm sure, 
etc . Sentences containing such parentheticals are commonly thought 
to be derived from structures in which the main proposition is 
the embedded complement of the parenthetical. In the analysis 
proposed by Ross (1972) structures like (4) 4 
(4) /s1 
V NP ~NP 
I I I 
feel I /!2~  
that V NP NP  
I I I\ 
is Max a Martian 
are converted by SLIFTING to structures like (5). 
(Parentheticals may also , of course, occur within the main sentence 
in various positions; this is accomplished by NICHING in Ross's 
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analysis.) When YK is an ordinary truth parenthetical of this 
kind it shares many properties with other truth parentheticals 
in general. 
A number of diagnostic tests for truth parentheticality are 
suggested in Knowles (1980) ; when applied to YK, these indicate 
that YK, in one use, should be classed with ordinary truth parenthe-
ticals. In applying these tests, it is sometimes hard to distinguish 
the discourse particle from the truth parenthetical . There is, 
fortunately, a way to avoid the ambiguity: only when YK is a truth 
parenthetical can know be stressed and pronounced with falling into-
nation. Thus (6) cat1only have the reading in which the main proposi-
tion is understood as the embedded complement of y(ou) KNOW: 
(6) It's going to be a long evening, y(ou) KNOW . 
In applying the following tests , therefore, know will be stressed 
whenever this would make the presentation clearer by excluding the 
irrelevant reading. 
5.2 . 1 . YK and Properties of Truth Parentheticals 
1) Parenthetical verbs. Only certain verbs occur in truth 
parentheticals (Urmson 1963 : 220); know is unquestionably one of 
these : 
(7) 
(8) 
Gertrude , I 
Clyde had, we 
four months. 
know, 
knew, 
has no 
been 
int
to 
ention of inviting Ezra to 
Europe often during the pre
tea. 
vious 
2) Acceptance of Main Clause. Jackendoff (1972) claims that 
"all the parentheticals are semantically one-place predicates. Ex-
actly one argument is missing, the complement sentence, from the 
functional structure." Parentheticals must be able to accept the 
main clause as the missing argument (Knowles 1980:397). This is 
certainly the case for YK, as indicated by the synonymy of (9) and 
(10): 
(9) John has every intention of being there, you KNOW. 
(10) 	 You KNOW John has every intention of being there . 
3) Truncated Form. Truth parentheticals are realized by 
elliptical sentences (i . e., those in which the complement sentence 
has been elided); this rules out, for example, 
(11) 	*John will eat all the cake, it ' s true that he will eat cake. 
(Knowles 1980:397) . 
Likewise ruled out--and to the same degree--is 
(12) *John will eat all the cake, YK that he will eat cake. 
4) Polarity . After an affirmative main clause, truth paren-
theticals are odd if negative (Knowles 1980 : 382): 
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(13) *John hates all liberated women, it isn't true. 
Compare : 
(14) *John hates all liberated women, you don't know . 
5) Comma Intonation. A truth parenthetical is "set aside 
intonationally from the intonation contour of the main proposition 
and has the potential for a slight (comma) pause on either side" 
(Knowles 1980:381). This is equally true of YK: 
(15) 	 Fred . .. you KNOW .• . feeds his angelfish only choice brine  
shrimp.  
6) Distribution. Truth parentheticals, and YK, may be 'niched' 
into various positions in a sentence . The positions are the same 
for YK and other truth parentheticals : 
(16) 	 It ' s true John went to Paris on Sunday .  
You KNOW John went to Paris on Sunday.  
(17) 	 John, it ' s true, went to Paris on Sunday .  
John, you KNOW, went to Paris on Sunday .  
(18) 	 John went, it's true, to Paris on Sunday.  
John went , you KNOW, to Paris on Sunday .  
(19) 	 John went to Paris, it's true, on Sunday.  
John went to Paris, you KNOW, on Sunday .  
(20) 	 John went to Paris on Sunday, it's true.  
John went to Paris on Sunday, you KNOW,  
7) Claim to Truth. A declarative truth parenthetical implies 
a positive claim to truth of the main propositions : 
(21) *John, it isn't true, had a good time Saturday . 
Compare: 
(22) *John, you don't KNOW , had a good time Saturday. 
8) Occurrence After Imperatives . In general truth parentheticals 
cannot occur after imperatives (cf . Knowles 1980:402) : 
{ it's true. }(23) *Get out of my way, 
I expect. 
Compare: 
(24) *Get out of my way, you KNOW . 
5 . 3. 	 Evidence for Two Types of YK 
In an early presentation of her ideas, Goldberg argues that 
there are three types of YK (YKI, II and III); it will be argued 
below that there are in fact only two clearly distinct types , which 
will be referred to as YKa and YKb . In this section evidence for 
such a two-way distinction is considered . 
I 
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Goldberg (1976:14) cites examples such as (25) in which YK 
(the truth parenthetical) has its full literal meaning, and the 
sentence is not acceptable: 
(25) *YK that Harry is an idiot is believed by Martha . 
Compare : 
(26) YK, that Harry is an idiot is believed by Martha. 
Goldberg explains the unacceptability of (25) as follows: "v.Then 
a sentence is embedded in an island, it cannot easily contain the 
primary information the speaker is interested in conveying to his 
addressee" (1976:14). Probably the explanation for the unacceptability 
of (25) is simpler though: subject complements require a complementizer, 
which is lacking here. The sentence becomes acceptable with the 
addition of that : 
(27) That you know that Harry is an idiot is believed by Martha. 
YK is not part of the subject complement in (26) and is therefore 
not ruled out. 
Certain tagged sentences may be cited as evidence for a distinc-
tion between two types of YK; 
(28) You know Alice is a sharp tens player , don't you? 
(29) *Y ' knowl Alice is a sharp tens player, don't you? 
As Goldberg (1976:28) points out in regard to similar sentences, 
the unacceptability results because don't you requires an antecedent 
in the main proposition, but only in sentences like (28) 
is such an antecedent present . This is not, of course , evidence 
for a difference between truth parenthetical YK and the discourse 
particle, since in (28) YK is not parenthetical at all, and in fact 
(28) becomes unacceptable if there is a comma pause after YK (oddly, 
in Goldberg's examples, a comma follows YK; that is why other examples 
are used here). 
A third example cited by Goldberg (1976:23) involves indirect 
speech acts: 
(30) YK it's cold in here. 
(31) YK, it's cold in here. 
Only (31), she claims, can be taken as an indirect speech act . Probably 
the claim should be that (30) is a more forceful indirect speech 
act than (31). Note that (32) can serve as a very pointed indirect 
request: 
(32) YK (that) I like salt on my potatoes. 
(33) can also be an indirect request, though a more polite one: 
(33) YK, I like salt on my potatoes. 
[n terms of the typology of levels of directness proposed by House 
a nd Kasper (1981:163-164), (33) ranks only as a 'strong hint', while 
(32 ) i s more direct in that tt "asserts a preparatory condition 
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holding 	for the execution of the action". 
Goldberg c l aims that YK I does not necessarily imply that 
"the speaker believes or knows the proposition to hold . YK I liter-
ally claims only that the addressee does know the proposition . .• If 
on the other hand a speaker uses YK II, the speaker himself must 
know or believe in the proposition . " No examples are cited, but 
if this claim is applied straightforwardly to examples like (34) 
and (35), its truth is doubtful : 
(34) YK John will come if you ask him to. 
(35) YK, John will come if you ask him to. 
My strong intuition is that (34) does indeed imply that the speaker 
believes that John will come if asked . I do , however , agree with 
Goldberg ' s assessment that (34) makes a stronger claim about the 
addressee's knowledge than does (35). 
The arguments in Goldberg (1976) favoring a distinction between 
truth parenthetical YK and the discourse particle are all inconclusive, 
but a clear difference emerges when the core use of YKb is considered. 
5.4. The Use of YKb 
Goldberg (1976) suggrsts as a synonym for YK I~ , 'you know 
what I mean'. This synonym seems particularly apt for interrogative 
YK, for which it can be ~cceptably substituted without apparent 
change in meaning or force : 
(36) We all had frostbite , YK? 
(37) We all had frostbite, YK what I mean? 
The substitution is somewhat odd , t:hough, in declaratives wibh low, 
parenthetical stress : 
(38) So I gave her my phone bill, YK. 
(39) ?So I gave her my pone bill , YK what I m~an . 
Possibly the oddity of (39) is due to a restriction on the length 
of tagged, low stress parenthetical clauses. Notice that the follow-
ing sentences are also odd: 
(40) 	 ?So I gave her my phone bill, I think you get my point 
here. 
(41) 	 ?So I gave her my phone bill, I guess you see why I'm  
saying this.  
The interrogative has rising intonation and is essentially indistin-
guishable from two structurally independent paratactic sentences. 
Other near paraphrases of YK II are possible, though some 
are nearer than others: 
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(42) 	 I find this boring, y'k.now? 
(you) 	 ,· dig 
6I see ? ' 
'· understand 
see 
(you) 
get 
dig 
understand 
what I { mean . } ? 
'm saying 
hear 
follow 
These all have in conunon that the speaker is questioning whether 
what is said has been correctly understood by some other(s). Notice 
that the verb know in one sense means 'understand' or 'grasp', as 
in 
(43) 	 I know how sewing machines work . 
To be more specific, though, the following use is proposed 
for YKb: 
YKb indicates that the speaker expects that there is no significant 
discrepancy between what is now in the private world and what 
is now in the other world, with respect to what is now in the 
shared world. 
This proposed use is not, in broad outline, anything particularly 
new. It is fairly close to Goldberg's 'you know what I mean', and 
to other loose characterizations by Labov and Fanshel (1977), Crystal 
and Davy (1975), R. Lakoff (1974), Bernstein (1962), and Fowler 
(1978). However, the proposed 'definition' is more specific than 
these others, and some justification for it will now be offered 
before considering· how this proposal can illuminate the varied dis-
course functions of YKb . 
First note that the proposed use provides an explanation for 
the odd fact that YKb cannot occur after true questions: 
(44) 1<Who are you, YK? 
(45) *What time is it, YK? 
The anomaly results because a true question seeks information from 
some other, while, according to the proposed use, YKb presumes a 
fundamental correspondence between what is in the private world 
and what is in the other world. Notice that YKb is perfectly accept-
able after rhetorical questions, in which the speaker is not really 
seeking information: 
(46) 	 The first thing I did after I inherited the billion was 
walk into my local Rolls dealer and say, "Give me four 
of the yellow ones". The guy looked at me funny and said, 
"Are you sure about that?" I said, "Sure I'm sure." I 
mean, what's a Rolls cost, YK? 
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The proposed use also explains why YKb cannot occur with per-
functory conversational items : 
(47) 	*Hello, YK(?) 7 
*Oh hell, YK(?) 
*Bye now, YK(?) 
*Oops, YK(?) 
In these cases the speaker issues items that are so transparent 
in use or meaning that it would be peculiar for the speaker to be 
interested in affirming that they have been properly appreciated. 
Statements about the speaker ' s personal thoughts or feelings 
which an addressee could not be aware of provide an interesting 
perspective on the use of YKb. Consider the following sentences: 
(48) I feel a chill, YK? 
(49) I was born in Brooklyn, YK? 
(50) I disagree with you, YK? 
YKb is only appropriate in these cases when there is some room for 
shared contents between the private and other worlds; the 'room 
for agreement' differs according to details of the sentence to which 
YK is attached . Thus in (48) the speaker could be asking if the 
addressee is also chilled and therefore able to appreciate the sentence 
I feel a chill,-~r whether the addressee is familiar with the sensation 
of feeling a chill. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that in 
(49) the speaker conveys information the addressee was not aware 
of. An answer of "Yeah, I have a grandmother who lives there" would 
be an appropriate response in that it acknowledges some shared ground 
between the private and other worlds with respect to what has been 
said . Although in (50) a correspondence between private and other 
worlds is specifically denied in the main proposition, the sentence 
is nevertheless acceptable with YKb if the particle is taken to 
imply something like, "We share an understanding of my motive for 
disagreeingl1 • Thus application of the proposed use of YKb in differ-
ent contexts has strikingly dif ferent results. 
Although YKb expects a correspondence between the private 
and other worlds, it is issued in cases of uncertainty about that 
correspondence: if there were no such uncertainty , there would 
be no point in mentioning the presumed correspondence. This uncer-
tainty can be concerning something connected with the sentence in 
which YKb occurs, for example, an awkwardness of expression: 
(51) 	 For our ducks we had them install a sort of largish pool-
like thing, YK? 
(cf. 5.5.3. below on the use of YKb at repair sites). Or the uncer-
tainty can be occasioned by a possible difficulty in appreciating 
the sequential relevance of the item with which YKb occurs . Assume 
that the speakers in the following exchange are acting cooperatively 
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and 	that they are strangers passing each other on a sidewalk: 
(52) 	 A: Excuse me. Do you have the time? 
B: 	 It's six o ' clock, YK. 
YKb is odd here because there is nothing apparently problematic about 
B' s utterance given its context, so that it is odd for B to bring 
up the existence of a possible discrepancy between the private 
and other world . But as part of a narrative , B's YKb tagged utter-
ance can become acceptable when there is conceivably some difficulty 
for an a ddressee in appreciating the sequential relevance of the 
statement: 
(53) 	 So Baby Face turns the dial and listens to the tumblers 
with his fingers. A light goes on outside the bank, but 
it's only a street lamp. It's six o'clock , YK. 
The speaker in this hypothetical example wishes to confirm that 
the addressee has caught the significance of it's six o'clock with 
respect to the fact that the street lamps went on. Notice that 
it is not the propositional content of the sentence it's six o'clock 
that is at issue here, so that it is incorrect to say that YK.b checks 
to see if speaker and addressee are together with regard to the 
propositional content of the utterance; rather, it is the sequential 
relevance of it's six o ' clock that is at issue. 
In the following sections it will be assumed that the use of 
YKb is that proposed above and that the only difference between 
the declarative and interrogative uses is their declarativity and 
interrogativity (the interrogative is, however, discussed separately 
in section 5 . 55). Note that YKb tentatively posits some area of 
speaker/ addressee solidarity with respect to the sentence to which 
YKb is attached, but the basis of this solidarity can vary greatly 
from case to case. 
5.5. 	 Goldberg's YK III 
There appears to be no substantive difference between Goldberg ' s 
YK II and YK III. She assigns to category III instances of YK in 
positions of hesitation, as in (54), 
(54) 	 I have some.. .YK . .. salami in my room if you'd like some, 
(Goldberg 1976 :8) 
claiming there are two differences between types II and III, and 
that the second of these is crucial for distinguishing the two types: 
i) 	 Pause length. YK II is "embedded in pauses of perceptually 
longer duration than the normal juncture pauses of [types 
I and III]" (48). 
ii) 	 Distribution. "Y ' know III as a filled pause can occur in 
syntactic environments prohibited to y'know I and II" (49) . 
I 
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The first of these differences does seem insufficient to dis- 
tinguish the two types, but the second difference is insufficient  
also. The data given in support of the syntactic restrictions are:  
(55) 	 a. *any, you know, peas 
b. '~any, y 'know, peas 
c. any ...you know . .. peas 
find a-call acceptable. But my objection goes beyond this 
intuitive disagreement: it is circular to claim a distinction between 
II and III and then, as the only evidence for the distinction, cite 
cases where III occurs but II does not. This presupposes the distinction 
being argued for . 
The point of view adopted below is that YK III is really just 
YKb used in a position of interjection (a matter of where. rather 
than what). Since YKb is structurally independent of the main sentence 
it is not surprising that it can fit into virtually any slot in a 
sentence. 8 A hesitation pause can accomodate YKb as well as the 
beginning or end of a sentence can. There is no fundamental differ-
ence in use between putative cases of YK II and YK III; the use 
proposed above for YKb is suitable in both cases, except that in 
the heistation cases YKb is interpreted in the context of the matter 
then at hand, that is, the situation in which a pause occurs before 
some item next to be issued. This use of YKb is discussed more 
fully below. 
5 . 6. 	 Discourse Functions of YKb 
In this section it is shown how the discourse functions of 
YKB follow from the proposed core use of the particle. As in previous 
chapters, the claim will be that there is an underlying unity in 
all the uses of this item and that functional differences arise 
when the item is used in particular discourse contexts. As is true 
for like and well, the core use of YKb naturally results in the 
item'sfunctional 'polysemy'; thus instead of emphasizing this poly-
semy, its source will be emphasized . Once the identity of all uses 
of YKb is established, it will then be possible to specify the general 
role of YKb in conversation and to relate this role to those of 
other discourse particles. 
5.6.1 . Topic Introduction 
Goldberg (1980, 1981b) remarks the frequent occurrence of 
YK before the introduction of a new topic, as in (56) 
(56) 	 President Nixon is talking to John Dean. Dean has just  
entered the room.  
P: Hi John, how are you? 
D: Good morning . Good morning . 
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P: Sit down. Sit down . Trying to get my remarks ready 
to [unintelligible ] the building trades. 
D: So I understand . 
P: Yes, indeed, yeah. You know, I was thinking we ought 
to get the odds and ends, uh [unintelligible] we talked, 
and, uh, it was confirmed that--you remember we talked 
about resignations and so forth and so on--that I 
should have in hand, not to be released. 
[White House:16-4-73am:187] 
(Cit. by Goldberg 1980:96) 
Goldberg notes that topic introduction is problematical because 
it is 'face-threatening' (cf. Brown and Levinson 1978): 
The speaker who initiates a new topic before the ongoing topic 
has been terminated can be regarded as threatening the other's 
face by suggesting that what the other is saying is of no interes.t 
to the speaker or, if the speaker interrupts himself then he 
can be heard as saying that what was being said is not intended 
for the other to hear. Similarly, if after the ongoing talk 
has reached a successful end a new topic is initiated but fails 
to receive the other ' s support, then the speaker who initiated 
the new topic i s subject to a face threat (Goldberg 198lb:3). 
YK used to introduce a new topic, it is cla imed, serves to alleviate 
the face-threatening potential of an obvio us and abrupt topic change: 
A strategy most often empl oyed to this end is to go even more 
baldly on record as initiating a topic change . Bounded topic 
initiation is b l atant at the best of t i mes so why not ca rry 
this property to its extreme: cal l attention to it, notify 
t he addressees that this is the speaker's intent (Goldberg 1981b : 
5). 
YK in this view is considered one of a set of items referred 
to as 'disjunct markers' the function of which is to flag initiating 
utterance-units. Other members of this set are hey, oh1, by the 
way, speaking of, guess what, vocatives, etc. 
This analysis is a later deve l opment of ideas presented in Goldberg 
(1980) ,where it was reported that 73% of YK marked moves in the corpora 
used for that study were (re- )introducing moves. This statistic 
by itself, of course , does not establish the role of YK as a topic 
introducer . The 73% figure is not compared to the overall frequencies 
of all move types in the data, so that it is, by itself, uninterpretable . 
The claim (Goldberg 1980) that YK is a 'marker' of introducing 
moves is replaced in her later anlaysis (1981b) by the ' disjunct 
marker' approach. As implied in the second quotation above, it 
is difficult to regard YK as marking introduction because bounded 
topic changes are themselves "blatant"; moreover, they are usually 
prefaced by a facilitating pause. Between these two indications of 
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topic change, it is unnecessary to mark intiation itself . It remains 
superficially reasonable , though, to claim that YK prefacing a topic 
change somehow calls attention to the change and so, by a strange 
twist, undercuts the possibl e face threats involved in the change 
by pointing to it. The supposed effect, in this view , would be 
parallel to that obtained by saying, "You might think this rude of 
me, but .. . " It seems very clear from Goldberg's numerous examples 
that YKb is particularly at home in that discourse position. Her 
characterization of YK as "possibly the least obtrusive and disrup-
tive" of the disjunctive items, also seems correct. 
The approach to be t aken here to this use of YKb is to claim 
that the particle, by virtue of its basic use, receives a special 
interpretation depending on its occurrence in pretopical discourse 
position. The fundamental question is this : does the basic use 
of YKb provide an explanation of why the particle appears so fre-
quently before topic initiations? 
All utterance-initial uses of YKb have a general peculiarity. 
With the proposed use, YKb presumes some shared ground between the 
private and other worlds with respect to what has been presented 
in the shared world; but initial YKb posits this presumed correspon-
dence before the utterance in question has in fact been entered in the 
shared world. The use of the item in this position with its basic 
use amounts to a prediction of common ground . As such, YKb in this 
position can be considered a type of 'intimacy ploy' (for this term 
see Schegloff 1968 : 1078). It is as if the speaker were saying, 
"We trust each other; our sensibilities are so attuned that I can 
count on your appreciation of essentials of what I say even before I 
say it". This peculiarity of initial YKb no doubt explains why 
the item carries a sense of 'folksiness'. Newman seems more or less 
on target when he notes (1975:28) that initial YK used in television 
commercials conveys "that the person doing the commercial is down to 
119earth, regular, not stuck up, and therefore to be trusted . 
This use of YKb asserts the existence of a shared orientation 
from the outset, which then buffers the introduction of new material. 
We thus have, in the use of YKb here with its proposed contribution , 
an underlying reason for why YKb performs topic initiations that 
are, in Goldberg's terms, not "obtrusive and disruptive". 
It is again possible, then, to use the discourse context in 
conjunction with the core use of a discourse particle to account 
for one of its special functions. In the present case, the relevant 
position of YKb is between two utterances that are topically unrelated, 
or else before the very first topic . With its basic use YKb asserts 
an overriding continuity despite the obvious topical discontinuity . 
The item doesn't exaggerate the discontinuity, as Goldberg claims, 
but attenuates it by asserting that a shared understanding spans 
the topical switch: "You can understand, comfortably encompass, 
go along with, my current act of topic changing/initiating". There 
is some truth in the notion that the speaker of YKb in this position 
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is "baldly announcing" the topic initiation . By asserting continuity  
of understanding. the speaker does implicate the existence of discon- 
tinuity; the real force of YKb here, though, is not to exaggerate  
the discontinuity but to play it down.  
5.6.2. Topic Tracking 
Goldberg (1980, 1981a) argues extensitvely that YK can be  
used as a ' topic tracking device' "optimally employed, in English,  
for indicating the central line of development or other important,  
noteworthy items" in extended talk by a speaker (1980: 142). It  
is specifically those YK's not used (solely) for repair that  
are thought to have this property (143). Topic tracking YK' s  
tag : i) topically significant items; ii) repetitions of topically  
significant items; and iii) parallel structures or contrastive items  
in the presentation of the topic talk. The function of topic tracking  
is to clarify which items are 'on' the topical core and distinguish  
them from items 'off' the core . This is seen as necessary because  
"items which are off the main line of development may inadvertently  
pull the talk onto tangential topics" (145) . The function of topic  
tracking is therefore to prevent these "potential drifts" (147) and  
also to prevent topics being subsumed by other topics (167) . Deter- 
mination of what is on and off the core is conducted by an algorithm  
details of which will not be discussed here (see Goldberg 1980) since  
they do not bear directly on the claims made below.  
In written language, indications of topical value are "usually  
accomplished . . . by grammatical subordination, relativization, and  
pronominalization" (Goldberg 1980:148), but in unplanned conversation ,  
topic tracking with YK is thought to predominate (149); reiterations  
are also used, though to a lesser extent (150-156) .  
The claim that "free floating" YK's tag topical value is a  
strong-one, as Goldberg is aware, and cannot be adequately supported  
simply by citing examples. In this connection, the following qualifi-
cation is important :  
This tracking account of y'know has the status of a description 
rather than an explanation. Support for this account comes in 
the form of examples ... Of course. given that the tagging of top-
ically significant items is optional, the descriptive account 
itself is in danger of being vacuous. Until a stronger account 
is offered, the one I have proposed seems reasonable (Goldberg 
1980:168-169). 
In the remainder of this section several arguments are given  
to show that there is currently no evidence that YK is in fact a  
topic tracking device and that the notion should be abandoned. These  
argumentsare summarized in the following list , then discussed separately: 
1) Simpler alternatives to topic tracking (TT) exist . TT is 
not the most straightforward account of the occurrence of "free floating" 
YKb's; 
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2) TT is excessively powerful . The range of possible TT points 
is too unconstrained; almost anything can, in some interpretation, 
be considered topically significant; 
3) TT lacks distributional accountability . TT offers no account 
of the diversity of placement positions of YKb within utterances; 
4) TT lacks positive support. TT is not unambiguously supported 
by the existing data; 
5) Counterexamples to TT exist. Clear cases of YKb marking 
utterances off the topical core occur frequently; 
6) A unified approach to YKb is possible. An account is proposed 
that facilitates inclusion of all instances of YKb within a single 
completely adequate description. 
1. Simpler alternatives. Consider an extended example. The 
following passage used by Goldberg (1980: 163-164) to exemplify TT 
is from a transcript appearing in Sharrock and Turner (1978:190-
196) . 
(57) C: I ha :ve a complaint um my neighbor is (0 . 5) le-subl-
well renting her garage out, and ah there are young 
boys, now they seem awfully nice an(d) everything but 
I don ' t know they ' re missing an awful lot of school, 
they're fifteen-year-old types, (0 . 5) an, they've got, 
apparently they ' ve got seven old cars, I guess they 
buy these old cars, but about a month ago they went 
to town sma: shing one of them ewith a pick axe ju : st 
absolutely annoying you knowl pounding all day . = 
P: (Mm) 
C: =and I: have a dog that ba:rks a lot an' I guess he ' s 
not taking too kindly to these kids. 
p: (Mm) 
C: But anyway there is two more cars in the-eh garage 
now: and- ah, the neighbor works in fact she's away 
all day 'n' she doesn't know what's going on but these 
kids are just spending their (h- e) one particular 
is spending most of the day there, and I know : :? that 
he's taking parts like driveshaft I- I just saw the 
muffler going with him just now?, (0.5) They take them 
an' we live close by, it's in ((section of Newton)) 
Willow Heights an' it's by Gullypark; an ' they take 
these (l.O) you know2 , big enough parts to ca :rry an' 
I think they're dumping them into the gully; (1.0) 
and I ' m j.!:!_st ~etting a little, annoyed about it because 
e-ah you know I think they've got about seven cars, 
I talked to one of the boys and I didn ' t let on that 
I was you know4 (1 . 0) annoyed or anything but and I 
wasn't at the//t ime, 
P: Do these cars all got license on them lady? 
C: A::h, e they're in a garage; I don't know; , I really 
don't know that. 
P: What is your name please. 
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C: Ah my name is Missis Tho:mpson, and it's at her address 
is twenty-nine thirty-four west thirty-four. 
P: Thirty-nine, 
C: No twenty-nine twenty-fi-- ah twen- ((rapidly)) I'm 
twenty-nine twenty-five, Twenty-nine, thirty-four 
(l,O) west thirty-// four 
P : West thirty-four, (that's)= 
C: =An' they're taking, you know5 these pa:rts, an' my 
daughter, (I got) a ten-year-old, was saying that she's 
seen all sorts of these parts down at the gully, I 
guess they go they follow the la:ne east, (it's inna) 
into the next blo=ck, and whether they're dumping or 
assembling something down there I really don't know 
but- (1.0) (i-e) they're sorta taking over the area 
with this business of eyou know6 , ( )sma//shing 
up these things , = 
P: (repairing) 
C: =an I know it's their business if their dads allow 
them to do it but (0.5) they're not they're not doing 
it by their house they've they live further down this 
one particular I know where he lives 'n' and ah 
In every case in this passage (and, in fact, in all of Goldberg's 
putative examples of TT) , the appearance of YKb can be explained 
on other grounds having to do with the particular discourse context 
in which the item appears and the basic use of YKb. It is therefore 
not necessary to enrich the theory of speakers' competence by the 
inclusion of TT . 
YKb Ill, with its usual use, 'presumes' that the addressee (a 
police officer) grasps the speaker's intent. To understand the place-
ment of YKb in this passage, it is important to keep in mind the 
nature of the telephone call: a complaint to the police. It is 
crucial that one who wishes to be heard as issuing a legitimate com-
plaint establish that some law has been violated, or may well have 
been violated. It is equally important to the complainer that the 
call not be heard as a mere 'gripe', based solely on personal ill 
feeling toward the parties complained against. In this particular 
complaint call the caller repeatedly (see the full text of the call 
in Sharrock and Turner 1978) allows the call to appear to be a gripe 
and moves to correct this impression, or talks in ways obviously 
geared to forestall the conclusion that the call is a gripe. Imme-
diately before YK #1, the caller has issued annoying, and, immediately 
following Ill, pounding. Annoying is a gripe word, which gets replaced 
¥ith a factual description: pounding all day . Pounding all day is 
not simply a replacement but a grammatical continuation. YKb is 
here at a repair site. Despite the absence of pauses, which, for 
Goldberg, are crucial for determining where a repair occurs, the 
occurrence of a repair here is obvious. (Moreover, it is not clear 
that there is no pause , since in this transcript only longish pauses 
are noted, and these are only grossly indicated.) 
-83-
#2 is also at a repair site. This is indicated both by the one  
second pause preceding #2 and by the discontinuity of the utterance  
when #2 is removed (an ' they take these big enough parts) , It is  
reasonable to suppose t hat the speaker cannot think of a smooth con- 
tinuation of the utterance having begun it with they take these and  
pauses before settling for the awkward big enough parts to carry (awk- 
ward both because it doesn ' t fit well a f ter these and because it  
doesn ' t make especially good sense- -Are some parts not big enough  
to carry?). #2 therefore also occupies a repair site .  
The same thing is true of #3. Whatever the transcription e-ah 
is intended to convey phonetically, it seems clear that the speaker is 
experiencing a dysfluency. Notice that here again the speaker is 
shifting from personal annoyance to a factual description : I think 
they've got about seven cars. The reason for the break in continuity 
is probably that the caller is 'changing gears'--I think, . . , after 
all, stands better as a reformulation than a continatuion of the 
clause introduced by because. 
#4 is also at a t rouble spot. The caller has previously retracted  
annoy twice , if the instance at #3 is counted, and here pauses a  
full second before issuing the retracted word . Notice that annoy is  
followed immediately by a 'downgrader' (see House and Kasper 1981:  
166) which lessens its force. The speaker is transparently involved  
in repair .  
#5 is another instance of the recurrence of a trouble source. 
The same trouble that occurred at #2 occurs here again. This time 
the abbreviated these pa:rts is chosen. This is not an instance 
of repair but of the introduction of a difficult designation (and, 
simultaneously, reintroduction of the earlier topic) . The core use 
of YKb is reasonable here: the caller has previously described these 
parts (after #2) and can be taken as pointing to the shared ground 
already established between speaker and addressee, 
#6 is at a repair site. Whatever eyou indicates phonetically, 
it is clear that some kind of discontinuity has occurred--a hesitation 
noise interrupted by YKb or some word cut off by YKb. And, again, 
the site i s a delicate one at which it is important to establish 
the factual basis of the complaint. (It may be relevant that the 
police officer initiates other-repair on what the caller formulates,) 
It can be argued, then, that these instances of YKb all occur 
at points of difficulty of one kind or another and that it is there-
fore not necessary to resort to TT to explain their occurrence. There 
is some positive indication of difficulty, discontinuity, or outright 
repair at the site of each YKb in the passage, and since YKb is common 
at repair sites in general , and there has its usual use (see 5 .6.3) , 
TT lacks appeal . This passage is only one of several cited by Goldberg; 
the others also submit readily to reanlaysis based on the core use 
of YKb . 
-84-
2. Excessive Power . The TT anlaysis is viable only if 'topic' 
can be defined in a way that permits uncontroversial assignment of 
utterances to topics; the analysis also requires some way to distin-
guish more important utterances in a particular topic from those 
that are less important. The problem that arises here is that when 
these notions are applied intuitively--as they generally are (especi-
ally the latter one)--there is a methodological danger that the utter-
ances viewed as topically important will be taken , circularly, to 
be those tagged by YK. Indeed , it is only by dint of much stretch-
ing of the original simple TT idea that certain stray YKb's can be 
brought into the TT fold. Not only are ' global topics' considered 
to be (optionally) so marked, but so are 'local topics', 'sublocal 
topics', and utterances that tie local to global and local to sublocal 
topics (Goldberg 1980:147, 183). 
Instances of YK not inunediately classifiable as marking topical 
value can often be conveniently shunted into the repair category. 
Goldberg claims, "when a repairable or repaired item is a significant 
item of a passage, the tracking usage of the particle may combine 
with the repair usage." But how is this possible? If YK in these 
cases serves to track the topic, there must be some way to tell a 
tracking repair from a nontracking one. The only way to do this 
is to appeal to some a priori notion of topical significance, but 
if this is done, the TT notion is vacuous. This rasies the ineluctable 
question: if the analyst can determine what is topically significant 
independent of the YK tag (which is Goldberg's claim) why cannot 
addressees do the same thing? 
3. Distributional Accountability. The TT analysis offers 
no explanation for the fact that YKb can appear at various positions 
within an utterance with different effects. All placements are regarded 
as functionally equivalent in that they mark the utterance as one 
of topical importance. With its core use, however, YKb can function 
to indicate that the speaker presumes addressee/speaker solidarity 
with respect to part of an utterance, or even various parts of one: 
(58) 	 I YK sort of budged ~he YK rootish looking thing into  
~y ...YK, whachacallit, Cusinart!--and ran like hell.  
YKb in such cases is essentially forward looking (cf. Goldberg 1980: 
105) . 
4. Lack of Positive Evidence. The TT idea lacks positive 
evidence in its support . As Goldberg concedes, citing possible examples 
cannot clinch the case. There are two separate problems here: 
i) Examples would have to be chosen randomly or considered 
exhaustively within a large corpus to be of conclusive value to the 
claim; and the examples would have to be unambiguous between TT and 
repair; 
ii) the TT function implies that addressees are able to recon-
struct the topical value of YK tagged utterances within a topic 
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independent of the content and sequential placement of the utter-
ances; some positive evidence that they do so is required . If ad-
dressees do not use YK.b to track topics, the TT notion is of no demon-
strated communicative i mportance and remains a hypothesis in search 
of data. 
5. Counterexamples . According to the TT hypothesis , it should 
not be possible to find YKb marked utterances which are both 1) off 
the topical core and 2) not a repair site . However, such examples 
occur often. For example, Goldberg considers off the topical core 
utterances that "provide more background to an understanding of [some 
previous item]" (1980 : 145). Thus she considers the fifth sentence 
in the following passage to be off-core : 
(59) 	 I discovered that the mother mouse wasn't in the cage. 
She just wasn ' t there. She had been there the day before . 
She was so big that she couldn ' t easily get through the 
bars of the cage . She was big because she had just had 
two litters. Her absence, was , therefore, very odd . (Gold-
berg 1980 : 144)10 
In (60)-(62) below, however, are presented three cases from a single 
LAB conversation in which YKb occurs with an utterance which , in 
just this way, provides background to an understanding of previous 
talk by that speaker . 
(60) EVA: She goes in there she goes - "Fanny!" [loud whisper] 
and she was tryin(g) to do it without wakin(g) up 
Janice cuz Janice hadn'tgot up yet YK - and she 
just tries wakin(g) her up and wakin(g) her up and 
she just raises up (h)er head - and she looks at 
(h)er and she just passes out again . [LABA,2] 
(61) EVA : And I don't remember that- I don ' t remember- Charlie 
callin(g) me I forgot he did call me that day but 
I had forgotten about it an(d) I know he would never 
change (it) charge it ta anyone else's number 
SUE: Yeah 
[ 
EVA: because YK he just pays for it automatically. And 
I said "Well I don ' t remember gettin(g) any phone 
calls" an(d) I said "and I ' m the only one that's 
even near Dayton" I said "So I'm sure the phone call 
would ' ve been for me" ... 
(62) 	 SUE: Are you gonna sublet yours? 
EVA : We're gonna. I dunno . Janice was talkin(g) about 
gettin(g) a job down-here - nex(t) sununer 
Yeah : : :. That 
could be because-
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EVA: 	 Carla (was-) wants to too and (I- ) and well like 
Ron's goin(g) ta school this summer so she might 
go the nex(t) summer too cuz she's engaged an(d) 
I'm sure she wants ta get out as soon as possible 
YK 
[  
SUE : Yeah .  
6 . A Unified Approach. The proposed use of YKb can be applied 
to explain the occurrence of YK.b wherever it is found in conversation . 
There is no evidence for a split between two categories: repair 
and nonrepair . 
It is certainly true that YKb often occurs with topically signi-
ficant utterances in a conv~rsation . With its basic use YKb is suit-
able for checking (with a positive expectation) whether speaker and 
addressee are ' on the same track' . It stands to reason that speakers 
might be particularly likely to perform such checking at points where 
to do so is most crucial--when a misunderstanding would have the 
most detrimental effect on communication . Key points in topical 
talk might thus be expected to be statistically very likely to co-occur 
with YKb-- but so might utterances that are awkward or clearly repair -
able in some way. The speaker is simply checking to see hows/he 
is doing at points where this seems to him or her to matter . It 
is a rather long step-~both experimentally and theoretically--from 
this simple claim to the idea that addressees can, in an unexplained 
way, identify some YK ' s (but not others) as utterance-level tags 
marking topical importance. 
5.6.3. YKb and Repair 
There is now an extensive literature on conversational repair 
(see Jefferson 1972, 1974, 1978; Schegloff et al . 1977, Schegloff 
1978; DuBois 1974; Goodwin 1975 ; Shimanoff and Brunak 1977). YKb 
occurs frequently at sites of self-repair, In Goldberg (1980) it 
is argued that YK is a 'marker ' of self-repair in exampl es like the 
following: 
(63) 	 Chuck, Chuck has gone through, you know, has worked on 
the list, and Dean's working the , the thing through IRS 
and, uh, in some cases, I think, some other(-----) things . 
[White House : 15-9-72:11 
(Cit. by Goldberg 1980:216) 
(64) 	 A: Well, then in two weeks there's his birthday which 
comes out on a Saturday night . So, we ' ll probably, 
y ' know, maybe we'll do something then,= 
[S/S:Arrangements:201] 
(Cit. by Goldberg 1980 : 218) 
In self-correction the speaker of some repairable executes repa i r 
o n i t (to be contrasted with other-repair in which the speaker perf orms 
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repair on another's utterance) . The reader is referred to the studies 
mentioned above for details on repair and correction. Familiarity 
with these studies will not be assumed below. 
In Goldberg (1980) a sharp distinction is drawn between TT 
YK and the repair marker . Three differences are found to obtain 
between the two types : 
i) 	 repair YK ' s are not confined to clausal or phrasal boundaries, 
but repair TT YK's are; 
ii) 	 repair YK's are "preceded by (and may be followed by) a 
'noticed' pause of a microsecond or longer"; 
iii) 	 the pronoun of repair YK ' s tends to be heard as lightly 
stressed , while that of the TT use is heard as elided . 
The first difference cannot be considered criteria! for distin-
guishing the two types. The distinction is (circularly) presupposed 
and then used to support the distributional difference . The second 
difference is li~ewise dependent on the proposed distinction itself; 
moreover , YK ' s used at repair sites needn't always be preceded by 
a noticeable pause (the figure of one microsecond is puzzling since 
most of the transcripts Goldberg uses are not annotated with precise 
pause measurements) . There is, for example , no pause in the following 
examples : 
(65) 
(66) 
C: 
C: 
.. •after it's been Y
• . . [RTS , 99] 
... I think that's YK 
K
I 
after the 
think we 
person's b
should do 
een shot 
that . .. 
[RTS , 131]. 
The third difference is difficult to interpret . Is an articulatory/ 
acoustical difference referred to or a perceptual/phonological one? 
In either case the distinction is dubious. The transcripts for the 
present study abound with apparent counterexamples in which YKb at 
a repair site lacks any perceptible stress on you , 
YJ.<b at repair sites is not substantially different from instances 
of YKb elsewhere. 
In Goldberg's treatment YK at repair sites indicates "that a 
repair has been initiated [and tends] to occur in the same turn as 
the trouble-source" (1980:214) . The repairs marked by YK "tend to 
clarify person, event, time, place , and other types of information . 
The re-pair upgrades the item's specificity" (217). The tendency 
for such repairs to "clarify" is, of course, an implicit feature 
of most all repair (otherwise why repair?), but the claim that repairs 
involving YK upgrade specificity could possibly distinguish them 
from some other types of repair. Repairs introduced by I mean are 
claimed to involve "a change in emphasis, direction , or meaning" 
(cf . Chapter 4). If YK repairs are in fact toward greater specifi-
city, the basic use of the item is entirely appropriate . Notice 
the oddity of (67): 
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(67) ?I got a dog, YK, cat for my birthday. 
compared to 
(68) 	 I got a dog, I mean, cat for my birthday. 
The fairly radical change of dog to cat is not very appropriately 
marked by YKb because it would be absurd (without further context) 
to expect that the addressee could grasp the speaker's intention 
from that speaker ' s having uttered dog . YKb is much more suited 
to repairs of the following type: 
(69) 	 I had to turn YK swerve to avoid the truck . [RTS-1] 
Swerve is plausibly the intention of the speaker in uttering turn . 
A parallel comment would apply in the following case : 
(70) 	 They have nice dresses in there. They may not be nice -
YK like - so nice but they have nice dresses . [LAB- A,8) 
It is , however, probably too restrictive to say that YKb up-
grades specificity . The correct generalization seems to be that 
YKb (as might be expected from its core use) can appear in those 
repair sites where the speaker wishes to confirm addressee under -
standing . The fo llowing examples from Goldberg's own work (1980) 
fit this latter characterization but do not seem to upgrade specifi-
city in any obvious way : 
(71) A: But , uh , at that// price= 
B: Yeah , but I had nothing , YK any( . ) all that I had 
were either junky or dirty//or drab. [S/S:Sheets:28] 
(Goldberg 1980:217). 
(72) P: They, they, they'd like to get Haldeman or Colson , 
Erlichman . They , they've got--
C: Or possibly Dean. You know, who, you know, who's huh--
anybody they can--I'm a small fish, but-- [White House: 
28-2-3 :46] (Goldberg 1980:218) . 
Goldberg makes the interesting comment that some YK marked 
repairs are 'semi-overt' (cf. DuBois 1974:III-5) in the sense that 
in these cases the repairable is "detected and deleted before it 
is vocalized but theYK marker is not" (Goldberg 1980 : 215) . She cites 
(73) as an example of this: 
(73) 	 Well, it's just none of their- you know, that's really 
none of their business . [White House: 28-2-73 : 43]. 
Goldberg ' s claim is that the complete repair structure is X- YK-X' 
and she speculates that cases of semi-overt repair "may have prompted 
the labeling of YK as a ' hesitation ' marker" . 
The issue of whether or not YK can mark hesitations (versus 
instances of correction) hinges on whether or not examples can be 
-89-
found in which YK flanked by one or two pauses can appear clause 
internally where no correction is evident--for example in the case 
of a word search , Such examples are not hard to find: 
(74) 	 C: . .. an employee should be able to evaluate their employer 
- and his abilities as a manager - and uh - YK time 
manager etcet 'ra [RTS,1] 
(75) 	 And the/n/ one of them is •. playing like with [.4] I don't 
remember, I used to play with /it/ when I was a kid, [.9 
but [.75]] it ' s like a ..wooden paddle [.6[.3] that [.15]] 
there ' s an elastic string attached to and there's a ball, 
[.3] you know that kind of thing that you [.4] you [.15) 
I • . don't remember the name of them [.35] but I played /with 
them/ for hours. (Chafe 1980:309) 
These could, of course, be dismissed as cases of TT YK but this seems 
intuitively odd, and the pauses must be explained. With its ordinary 
use YKb is suitable for word searches and would function there to 
'repair' (in the extended sense of this term: see Schegloff 
et al. 1977:363) the silence occasioned by the search. Ths speaker 
issuing .YKb in a case like (74) or (75) is saying, in effect, "you 
know what I'm getting at, even if this word/formulation for the moment 
escapes me" . 
Or such cases could be dismissed on grounds that some repairable 
has been covertly deleted before issue and replaced. There is no 
evidence for this, however. It is not enough to cite cases of X-
YK-X' repairs as representing the full form of YK repairs, since 
this assumes , without justification, that X-YK-X' is the full form 
of all YK repairs . 
The status of YKb as a hesitation marker is questionable, but 
more for the claim that it is a marker than for the claim that it 
occurs at points of hesitation . At a great many repair sites in 
which YKb occurs it is flanked on one or both sides by pause. Any 
midutterance pause is a potential place for a YKb since the speaker 
~as faltered momentarily and is therefore in danger of seeming communi-
catively incompetent. To use YKb with its usual contribution in 
such pauses invites the addressee to sanction the time out--say for 
a word search or to formulate a correction, Whether the YKb is flanked 
by pauses is of no consequence in this interpretation--the pauses 
simply show that time was taken before the utterance could be resumed. 
To summarize the claims in this section: YK at repair sites 
is YKb. To claim that this YK"patterns differently than the YK which 
has been characterized as a discourse particle and move marker" (Gold-
berg 1980:218) presupposes, without justification, that there is 
such a distinction. YKb has its usual use in positions of hesitation 
or misstep; with this core use it there invites addressees to go 
along with the discontinuity on the grounds that the speaker knows 
whats/he wants to get across but temporarily lacks a proper formula-
tion. If the discontinuity is too great to go along with (e.g. dog/ 
cat), a stronger phrase like I mean is apt to be used, YKb implies 
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that the speaker hopes the addressee can divine the continuation 
or grasp the point of the unfinished utterance. Use of I mean implies 
that the speaker thinks the addressee cannot. 
5.7. YKb as a 'Sympathetic Circularity Sequence' 
Bernstein (1962:238) classifies YKas a 'sociocentric sequence ' ,  
a term describing the conceptual content of his term 'sympathetic  
circularity sequence'. Bernstein has proposed an elaborate sociolog- 
ical account of the use of these sequences in conversation.  
The 'S.C.' class includes YK and tags such as isn't it, ain't 
it, and wouldn't he, all of which are also designated 'terminal 
sequences'. Bernstein found that S . C. sequences are used more by 
working class than by middle class speakers (1962:224) . His explana-
ton for this finding is given in terms of his widely discussed d~stinc-
tion between restricted and elaborated codes (Bernstein 1961a , 1961b , 
1962a, 1962b) , the claim being that S.C . sequences occur far more 
in restricted than elaborated codes . 
Restricted codes are thought to be less explicit, and one who 
uses such a code is thought to assume much about knowledge shared 
by speaker and hearer; speech in a restricted code is therefore con-
densed and less redundant than speech in an elaborated code (1962:235) . 
Bernstein's hypothesis about the sociologocal function of S.C . 
sequences is intricate and far-reaching. At its core, however, are 
the following observations : 
The S.C . sequences may be transmitted as a response of the speaker 
to the condensation of his own meanings. The speaker requires 
assurance that the message has been received and the listener 
requires an opportunity to indicate the contrary. It is as if 
the speaker is saying 'Check--are we together on this?'. On 
the whole the speaker expects affirmation (1962b:235) . 
. ,.these sequences may set up different constraints on the flow 
of communication, particularly on its logical development and 
elaboration . Inasmuch as the S.C . sequences, which are generated 
basically by uncertainty, invite implicit affirmation of the 
previous sequence then they tend to close communication in a 
particular area rather than facilitate its development and elabora-
tion. The sequences tend to act to maintain the reduction in 
redundancy and so the condensation of meaning (ibid . 237). 
Bernstein's reasoning, only highlights of which are quoted here, 
is marvelous and consistent. His interpretation of YK, though limited 
to final 'tag' position (where a minority of the total instances 
of YK occur) depends on the items having a use very near that proposed 
for YKb above . His formulation 'Check--Are we together on this' 
is suitably vague with regard to whether the speaker and addressee 
are in agreement with respect to the truth of the proposition tagged 
by YK. In the data for the present study cases frequently occur 
where YKb accompanies a proposit i on the truth of which the addressee 
is in no position to ascertain: 
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(76) 	 ...Yesterday I was in my bedroom, YK? And the air condi-
tioning doesn't even cool it off .. . [LAB-B,10] 
(77) 	 EVA: =You didn't see that postcard, it's a-= 
[ 
SUE: uh-uh . 
EVA: =Huh! It's a shopping cart? Full of pot, 
SUE: (Mm) 
SUE : ((Laughs)) 
EVA: Pot all over on the ground, too, YK? [LAB-A,8] 
(78) 	 ... I had a friend who took it an(d) she said it was a 
piece o(f) cake. She got a 'A' out o(f) the course YK 
an(d) no trouble really .. . [Lab-B,8] 
(79) 	 . .. there's this sheriff . . . He hit a person- uh a person 
(th)at was in jail with a ball bat an everything YK•.. 
[LAB-A] 
Bernstein's implication that terminal YK occurs at points where 
th~ speaker's meaning has been condensed is consistent with the evincive 
treatment proposed in the present work, but squarely at odds with 
the TT proposal . It should be possible to statistically examine 
the consequences of Bernstein's claim. What would be needed would 
be an objective measure of condensation of meaning. Lacking this, 
Bernstein's claim, though elegant, remains undemonstrated. 
The position taken here is that the range of occurrence of YK 
is much wider than that envisioned by Bernstein. This range should 
include locutions that are problematical for the rarity, slanginess, 
etc. of the words in them: 
(80) 	 Sue : =God, (he) went to all this trouble ( ) I 'm meeked 
out, YK? [LAB-A,13] 
for difficulties relating to sequential relevance of an utterance: 
(81) 	 [In this passage SUE tries to prove to EVA that FREDDY 
feels helpless as a shopper and hates to shop; the YK tagged 
utterance is not itself intended to show this but to be 
taken as setting up a situation in which the main point 
of the talk is then illustrated] 
SUE: 	 He hates the- He went .. . shoppin(g) him and (h)is 
brother and (h)is sister went Christmas shoppin(g) 
when (h)e bought me my brown pants YK? - and he 
said- he was just like losin(g) it ... 
for difficulties having to do with whether the addressee shares appre-
ciation of some aspect of common experience : 
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(82) SUE: I was- ..• dumb freshman . . . comin(g) from the hicks. 
Here I thought I was gonna take over the whole world 
YK? [LAB-A,63]. 
for the awkwardness of their wording: 
(83) 	 SUE : Big- He thinks he's a big man walkin(g) tall guy 
YK? [LAB-A,29] 
and so on. 	 Whether these different possibilities should all be pro-
perly considered 'condensations' is very questionable . What they 
all have in 	common is the fact that they represent situations in 
discourse in which a speaker might wish to check up on the corres-
pondence of 	his or her own communicative aims and the addressee's 
grasp 9f what that speaker has said. 
5.8. Interrogative YK 
The interrogative use ofYK mentioned and exemplified frequent-
ly above is very common, though not predominant, in the conversational 
materials used for this study. For example, of 74 YKb's in LAB-A 
17 are interrogatives (23%) . Goldberg (1980:135-136, 170) considers 
this type of YK equivalent in function to declarative TT YK (see 
Goldberg 1980:l35-136) and specifically argues against calling it 
a turn-exit device (see 5.9 below). YK? will be treated here as 
simply the interrogative counterpart of YKb. 
First note that YK? does not serve well as the interrogative 
counterpart of YKa. It is difficult to get a literal truth parenthe-
tical tag reading for a sentence like: 
(84) I like oranges, YK? 
This sentence would not typically be used as a paraphrase of: 
(85) YK that I like oranges? 
Rather, (84) seems to invite a YKb reading and is thus better para-
phrasable by: 
(86) I like oranges, you know what I mean? 
I find this 	to be true even if there is a substantial intonation 
break between oranges and YK in (84). But the dispreference for 
YKa in sentences like (84) is probably due to the extreme accessi-
bility of the YKb reading, rather than to the YKa reading being dis-
allowed. Thus notice that 
(87) I like oranges; you knew? 
in which the YKb reading is not in competition does easily permit 
a truth parenthetical tag reading. 
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If YK? has interrogative force, it could be followed by a response 
of some kind on the part of the addressee . In fact, this is of ten 
what happens. The following examples are taken from LAB-A. 
(88) 	 SUE: .• . I was thinkin(g) o(f)-writin(g) a check for Jean 
(a)n(d) Mom's (a)n(d) spendin(g) the rest o(f) that 
whole- my whole paycheck on me YK? 
EVA: YEAH. 	 [LAB-A,19] 
(89) EVA : 	 I mean when- when (h)e ' s not drunk he won't talk 
t(o) me - as though I didn't even exist YK? 
SUE : Yeah. - He's too shy ta talk t(o) you. . . [LAB-A,54) 
(90) 	 SUE: .• •But ya see three i(t)'d hafta be like th(e) whole 
summer , YK? 
(p) 
EVA: Yeah. 	 [LAB-A,58] 
(91) 	 SUE: .. . that's all I can see is - like eighty million 
buildings a(h)ll (th)e way around me YK? ( ) 
[ 
EVA: Really 
In cases where no verbal response occurs, there may have been 
a kinesic one; or, since the question routinely expects a positive 
response , silence may be taken as compliance. 
In the RTS transcript callers to a radio talk show frequently 
use YKb, but in 169 instances, there is not a single case of interro-
gative YK. A possible reason for this is that callers realized 
that in conversations with a talk show host--with anonymous listeners 
potentially numbering in the thousands--it is not entirely appropriate 
to ask for confirmation of understanding, the host being the only 
one in a position to respond . 
5.9. YK and Turn Taking 
Several writers have proposed a connection between YK and the 
turn taking system for conversation . 
1. Utterance lengthener . Jefferson (1973:69ff) characterizes 
YK asan 'utterance lengthener ' and has also referred to it as a 'stand-
ard completion signal (1972 : 329). As a lengthener, YK is classed 
with other items , such as an' everything, "which indicate to the 
recipi.ent that the utterance can have been completed so that he may 
begin to talk, while as well providing that the ongoing speaker has 
not stopped talking" (1973:69) . The function of YK in this view 
depends on its placement at a point of possible utterance termination . 
YK in itself is only a signal that "can be included among a series 
of utterables which provide that a speaker has not stopped talking 
although a possible utterance has been produced" (1973 : 73) . Tag-
positioned address terms , when also used this way , are described 
as "mere sound" and as "sound particle[s] in the service of another 
type of interactional work" (1973:74). 
-94-
Utterance lengtheners may be used after what Jefferson calls a  
"problematic component", as in (92):  
(92) Jim: And a goodlooking girl comes up to you and asks you 
y'know,  
Roger: Gi(hh)rl asks you to- Alright  
The lengthener here indicates "that one does not intend to talk about" 
the problematic component, "by REPLACING such talk with a signal that 
transition is now underway" (1973: 69), 
Note that Jefferson is here talking about YK as an item that can 
occur after a problematic component, but this is not considered an 
essential feature of its use as a lengthener. She finds that it is in 
general a 'standard completion signal' which displays the speaker's 
willingness for the recipient to begin talking during or right after 
the signal, but, because it allows the present speaker to continue 
talking, does not make the more pointed offer of turn that would be 
made if the present turn-holder simply stopped talking and waited for 
another to begin . 
Jefferson refers to YK? as a 'plea' (1973 : 74) which is, like the 
declarative, an utterance lengthener, though presumably the status of 
YK? as a plea would preclude its being considered a meaningless par-
ticle of sound. 
2. Sociocentric sequence . Duncan and Fiske (1977) consider YK 
to be a 'sociocentric sequence' (a term originally due to Bernstein; 
see 5 . 7), listing as other examples of this class but uh, and or some-
thing, Such items (like is excluded; seep. 170) are described as 
being "stereotyped expressions" which typically follow "a more substan-
tive statement" (171) . 
Duncan and Fiske regard sociocentric sequences as one type of 
'speaker turn signal' (185) indicating the speaker's willingness to 
yield the turn. As such, sociocentric sequences are one of several 
kinds of turn signals, the others being: occurrence of an intonation 
marked phonemic clause; completion of a grammatical clause; 'paralin-
guistic drawl'; onset of gestural signals; and "decrease of paralin-
guistic pitch and/or loudness on a sociocentric sequence" either dur-
ing the whole sequence, or its final syllable(s). 
Duncan and Fiske are thus in agreement with Sacks et al. that YK 
is 'transition relevant ' --inviting a change of speaker turn . This 
raises the question of how often the turn offer embodied in the use of 
YK is actually accepted by auditors. If turn changes occur frequently, 
this would support the claim that YK is a turn signal. OP-ly a partial 
and indirect answer to this question is provided by the discussion in 
Duncan and Fiske. The answer is indirect because they do not report 
results for YK alone, but for the entire class of sociocentric sequen-
ces. It is partial because the data are grouped in a way that happens 
to obscure the location of turn attempts with respect to sociocentric 
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sequences : turn attempts during these sequences were tallied, but 
those occurring just after a sociocentric sequence are lumped together 
with turn attempts after units not terminating with a sociocentric 
sequence . We can therefore only look at turn attempts during socio-
centric sequences in general . Of 100 attempts in the Duncan Fiske 
exploratory study, six occurred in this position . There were, how-
ever, 21 back channel responses in this position (i.e ., brief responses, 
e.g . m hm, offered by an auditor during the turn of another speaker 
and not used to take the floor) . Even the figure of 6/100 is difficult 
to interpret with respect to the present question since included 
were turn attempts and back channel responses beginning simultaneous-
ly with or even just prior to the onset of the sociocentric sequence . 
In such cases the turn attempt or back channel response could not 
be viewed as a response to the sociocentric sequence . 
3 . Recompleter . Utterance-final YK , according to Sacks et al. 
(1974) is a 
generally available ' exit technique ' for a turn. That is , a 
current speaker having constructed a turn's talk to a possible 
transition-relevance space without having selected a next , and 
finding no other self-selecting to be next may, employing his 
option to continue, do a tag question, selecting another as next 
speaker upon the tag question ' s completion, and thereby exiting 
from the turn. In this regard , t he tag question is one member 
of ·a class we may call 'recompleters' . . . (Sacks et al. 1974 : 718) 
Goldberg (1980) criticizes the position of Sacks et al . on several 
grounds hoping to establish that terminal YK is in fact not involved 
in the dynamics of turn taking, but is instead better characterized 
by the TT proposal. The TT analysis has been argued against in sections 
5 . 6 . 2, but Goldberg's arguments against regarding YK as a turn exit 
device can be examined on their merits . She suggests six such arguments . 
1. She claims that the turn exit idea predicts, falsely, that 
there should be a pause just prior to YK at transitional relevance 
places . The pause is thought necessary for the speaker to ascertain 
that there are no self-appointed next speakers (Goldberg 1980:136). 
The form of this argument is valid against the specific proposal 
of Sacks et al . quoted above , since they require the speaker to check 
first to see if self-selection occurs , but YK could still be a turn 
exit device without this checking . Moreover, Goldberg seems to presume , 
without justification, that such pauses to check for self-selection 
do not occur, 
2 . Goldberg argues that there are cases of turns interrupted 
during items following issue of a YK at a transition relevance point 
(1980 : 136) . This alone is not a valid argument against the turn 
exit idea since it presupposes that the interrupting speaker wished 
to interrupt earlier , at the poi nt just following YK , and did not. 
The decision to interrupt could, however, be made at or just before 
the point of interruption itself. 
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3 . Goldberg argues that the turn exit idea is faulty because 
11there are cases of locution-final YK that are turn-medial . These , 
however, cannot be used to argue against the turn exit idea because 
the argument presupposes that all turn offers are accepted , which 
is certainly not to be expected (see Sacks et al . 1974 : 706). 
4. Goldberg cites the following instance of overlapped YK : 
(93) Ken : She's gotta gun in it. She's gotta gun hangin ' there? 
And I said what's the gun for . She said in case 
any a ' my nei ghbors wanna come in, // yuh know? 
Al : heh 
Roger : hehh . An' she invi(h)tes you i(h)n to// see it. hehh 
Ken : Y/know? 
Ken : I s'd- well// well you know , all yer neighbors ' ve 
gotta do is just put a little mud in that little 
air hole up there in the top a~yer all done . eheh . 
[GTS : 2 : 2:19) (Goldberg~80 : 137) . 
She argues that "on the basis of Ken ' s inunediately subsequent ' turn' 
it appears that Ken has not, in fact , completed his turn which ended 
with Al's and Roger ' s interruptions. Ken demonstrates the unwarranted 
nature of the interruption by his interruption of Roger" (Goldberg : 
1980 : 137). This argument is also questionable; it assumes without 
justification, that Ken wanted to continue his turn at the point 
at which he uttered the first YK, which is speculative . 
5. In a later defense of the TT idea Goldberg (1981a) argues 
that the turn exit idea is clearly irrelevant in cases where the 
speaker is engaged, for example . in a long narrative and , for obvious 
reasons, wants to retain the floor until completion of the narrative. 
A problem with this argument is that in Goldberg ' s examples none 
of the YK's are interrogative , and it is specifically interrogative 
YK's that Sacks et al . claim are instances of turn exiting (see the 
quotation at the beginning of this section). This argument thus 
strikes beside its target . 
The position taken in the present work is that neither Goldberg's 
TT account nor the Sacks et al. view of YK? as a turn exit device 
is an adequate description of the facts. Terminal YK? only once 
results in a turn change in the present data, although it does frequently 
elicit a back channel response , such as m hm , uh-huh, or yeah (12 
back channel responses to 24 instances of YK?) . This is what would 
be expected if YK? is used with its usual contribution . We would 
not expect a full change of turn , but simply a brief response to 
the speaker ' s question (i . e. to, roughly, "You follow , don't you?) 
or a perfunctory nod of agreement , or at the very least a peaceable 
silence . This position is in harmony with Goldberg's on one point: 
the turn exit idea is incorrect . But the YK's in question cannot 
be assigned TT status by default. 
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5.10. Distributional Properties of YK: Quantitative Results 
In this section the occurrence of tokens of YKb in LAB and RTS 
materials is examined quantitatively to determine gross distribution-
al properties of the item which support the treatment proposed above 
and tend to disconfirm other approaches. 
1. YK and filled pause. In popular works on language use, and 
even in some serious research, YK is often suggested to be a hesita-
tion form amounting to nothing more than a filled pause . This view 
is, of course, squarely at odds with the claim that YKb has a speci-
fiable linguistic contribution and that it is this contribution that 
determines where YKb is used in conversation. It is therefore possible 
to predict differences between the positions of occurrence of YKb 
and filled pauses. Such hypotheses will be easy to test since both 
filled pauses (um, uh) and YK occur in large numbers in the tapes 
used for this study-.-
Uh (cf. Chapters 2 and 6) may be viewed as an evincive item 
indicating that the speaker's thoughts are momentarily null, unclear, 
or unpresentable. As such, uh issued mid-utterance expresses that 
the speaker has faltered forsome reason, but hopes to be able to 
continue.12 If the uh is followed by silence, a problem arises: 
the speaker may be seen as wishing to continue but unable to do so . 
This both constitutes a face threat to the speaker, whose conversa-
tional competence or cooperativeness may be impugned and can lead 
to unwanted loss of the turn. 
Mid-utterance YK, on the other hand, is a sign not that the 
speaker is simply faltering, but that the speaker is actively and 
competently engaged in the communication. This follows from the 
core use of YKb to indicate that the speaker is concerned with whether 
what is said is 'getting across ' , recognizes that there may be some 
difficult on the addressee's part in this regard, and displays current 
control of his or her comrnunicative role by acknowledging this diffi-
culty before continuing. YKb, because it demonstrates control, is 
especially apt to occur in situations where an addressee might suspect 
that this control has been lost . Since the position in which uh has 
just been issued is one such place, we might expect YKb to commonly 
fellow uh as an attempt to reassert control . 
The tapes were examined for cases of adjacent uh and YK to see 
whether these items appear significantly more oftenin the order 
uh YK than the other way around. YKb occurs adjacent to uh frequent-
ly in the RTS transcripts, but only once in the face-to-face conversa-
tions. This may reflect the relative casualness/formality of these 
two speaking situations. The face-to-face conversations are more 
fluent and relaxed than the RTS conversations, no doubt because the 
latter take place before a vast and imaginably astute radio audience. 
In situations of moderate casualness (e.g . the Pear Story recountings, 
Chafe 1980), a moderate number of YK and uh adjacencies are found. 
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In the RTS materials 45 cases of adjacent YKb and uh occur. 
Of these 35 are in the order uh YK, and ten are in the opposite order 
(chi square 6.94; p< . 01; df=l"f: 
Unfilled pauses are an even more stark sign of loss of control; 
relatively more pauses before than after YKb would therefore be ex-
pected, This expectation is strongly confirmed by the present data. 
Of 117 adjacencies of YK and pause, 88 are with the pause preceding, 
19 with {t following (chi-square 14.88; p<.001; df=l) . 
Two other differences in the way YK and uh pattern were noted. 
1) In many cases some item is followed by YKb after which that item 
is exactly repeated before the speaker continues. These are clause-
internal 'restarts' ; 
(100) 	 ... they can get- YK they can get close (ta you) [RTS18, 
56] 
(101) 	 • . . for instance they YK they have a- an area where  
[RTS6,52)  
YK is significantly less likely to intermit in these cases than is 
uh (clause-internal retracted restarts with YK/all clause internal 
YK's = 1/46; for uh= 15/76; chi-square 16 . 68; p<.001; df=l). Why 
this should be the case is not clear. 2) The proposed core use 
of YK provides an explanation for the tendency of uh to occur much 
more frequently than YK after conjunctions. In issuing a conjunction, 
the speaker gives the addressee little to go on for the purpose of 
guessing what might come next. Conjunctions can be used to hold 
the speaking turn before the speaker has planned anything substantive 
to say. We would therefore expect to find uh after conjunctions 
more frequently than YK, and this is the case13 (YK after conjunctions/ 
total YK's = 23/347; for uh= 114/459; chi-square 46.44; p< . 001 ; 
df=l). 
5.11. 	 Conclusion 
In this chapter various hypotheses about the function of the 
discourse particle YK were examined. In each case it was argued 
that some particular function can be served by YKb because the basic 
use of the ite~ is appropriate to that function. As in previous 
chapters, the intent was not to show that the item does not have 
multiple functions, but to show that a unified account of these func-
tions proceeds naturally from considering how the basic use of the 
item is interpretable in particular conversational contexts. It 
is therefore inaccurate to consider YKb to be a 'device' especially 
'marking' these functions. This claim would be odd in the same way 
that it would be odd to claim that "Can you tell me when there are 
trains to Boston" is a device for marking train schedule inquiries . 
Certainly this is the principal function to which this sentence can 
be put, but if it is considered a marker, we face the uncomforatble 
prospect of an essentially infinite set of such devices. 
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These remarks should be tempered with some discussion of the  
conventionalization or routinization of YKb. It is certainly true  
that, as a standard way of seeking or inviting confirmation of under- 
standing, YKB has come to be routinely associated with several common  
conversational situations in which the speaker is uncertain how well  
s/he is getting across. But, just as in the case of well and like,  
the routinization has not obliterated the core use of YKb, since,  
as in the case of well and like, the core use of YKb is consistent  
with the routine functions.~ this chapter statistical evidence  
was brought to bear on this issue: distributional tendencies of  
the item demonstrate the relevance of the core use of YKb to its  
placement in conversation.  
This analysis is not functional per se, but complements function-
al analyses by providing an answer to a fundamental question these 
other analyses raise: why is the particular item YKb used for the 
specific functions that it is, rather than some other item? 
The basic use of YKb proposed above is not in the nature of 
a discovery--many writers have tried to specify the use of the item, 
and some have come relatively close to the formulation used in the 
present work. The addition attempted here has been to refine the 
statement of this item's use and to relate it to the diverse functional 
claims that have been made about YK. There seems to have been a 
failure to directly associate these functions with proposals about 
the general contribution of the item, perhaps because to do so weakens 
the claim that YKb stands as a 'marker' of any single function. YKb 
is not associated with certain discourse functions because it marks 
them but because its basic use is appropriate to each such function. 
The effort to identify distinct functions of YKb is not a waste of 
time: we must understand both the functions and their linguistic 
underpinning to have a balanced and complete account of this particle. 
The present approach differs, however, from that in Goldberg  
(1980, 1981a, 1982b) in not claiming, as she does, "that there are  
[discourse] structural and functional properties which underlie the  
use of items like y'know". Rather, the principal claim made in the  
present work is that the range of functions of such items represents  
an interaction of the basic linguistic value of the item and specific  
discourse contexts .  
The great frequency of occurrence of YKb in conversation is 
predictable from its core use. It appears in so many different places 
becuase this use is appropriate at any point at which the speaker 
is unsure of how wells/he is coming across. YKb is at home--though 
clearly optional--wherever the speaker feels that whats/he has just 
said,or will just now say in the shared world may not have had its 
desired effect in the other world . The frequency of use of YKb will 
obviously differ depending on many factors, including the relationship 
between conversants, the degree of fluency and clarity of what they 
say, feelings about the overuse of YK, and the perceived importance 
of the addressee ' s having understood some particular utterance. 
FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER 5 
1This istem has several phonological variants, including [yilno], 
[ytno], and [yo] . The question of which variants occur in what dis-
course, phonological, and syntactic environments is not considered 
here. There is at least no straightforward correlation between any 
of these variants and the distinction drawn in this chapter between 
y'know and y'knowb. Both types occur in full and reduced forms.-"----a 
2As 'verbal garbage' y'know is often classed with like (Chapter 3). 
This grouping finds its way into the popular literature()Ilspeech 
abuse in Newman's claim that YK and like are "much the same thing" 
(1974:15) . As a comparison of the conclusions of Chapters 3 and 
5 will indicate, YK and like are in fact quite different in function 
and distribution. --
3A copy of a brief monograph on YK by astman (1981) was received 
too late for review here. His formulation of the use of YK is similar 
in some ways to what is proposed below. I would, however, take issue 
with some aspects of Ostman's statement of the "prototypical meaning" 
of YK and most importantly the emphasis he places on the propositional 
content of utterances with which YK occurs (cf . 5.4 below) . Ostman's 
monograph contains intriguing sections on the acquisition of YK by 
children and on the differential use of YK by men and women . 
4These trees are drawn as Ross drew them, with the verb first. 
This practice has since been abandoned. 
5As Knowles points out, the constraint is semantic, not syntactic. 
Consider: John, I don ' t doubt, will win the race. 
6Though superficially identical, y'see differs from YK in that 
only the former is necessarily cohesive. Thus (a) would be bizarre 
as the first utterance in a conversation, while (b) would not: 
(a) Y'see, there's nothing like a Coke. 
(b) Y'know, there ' s nothing like a Coke. 
7YK is acceptable in these cases if, for example, Hello is under-
stood as a quotation . YK is frequently used in the present data 
for unquoting. 
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8The usual restrictions on where speakers may insert interjection-
al pauses, however, remain in force (seep. 40) above. 
9claims that initial YK is an attention getting device used in 
pretopical position square nicely with the core use of YKb . The 
presumption of shared ground prior to issuing any contentive material 
has the effect of asserting something about the addressee's state 
of mind--namely its predictability in one respect . Speakers approach 
the matter of asserting the mental contents of others who are present 
gingerly . The potential face- threat involved withYK is normally 
attenuated by the obvious sociable intent of the speaker, but if 
intimacy is undesired by the addressee, the potential for offense 
is still present. 
lOThis passage is an expansion of the propositional constituents 
of a segment of natural conversation , but it serves here to illustrate 
the point being made . 
11The fact that there are cases where a turn change occurs just 
after YK would not, itself, constitute even weak evidence for the 
claim that YK is a turn signal. Statistical evidence is required 
since turns can change at any point. What must be shown is that 
turn change is more likely after a tag-positioned YK than at other 
points. 
12This view of uh is consistent with what is known about its 
positions of occurrence in conversation. No reliable differences 
have been found between the positions of occurrence of filled and 
unfilled pauses. It is known that unfilled pauses tend to occur 
at constituent boundaries, before the first content word of a phono-
logical phrase , and bisecting major constituents (see Boomer 1965 , 
Rochester 1973, and, especially, Grosjean et al . 1979). 
13Only the two most frequently occurring conjunctions in the 
present data were counted: and and but. No other conjunctions 
approach these in text frequency. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE ROLE OF DISCOURSE PARTICLES IN CONVERSATION 
6.1 General Remarks on Like, Well, and Y'know 
This study has focused attention on the discourse particles like, 
well, and y'know, attempting to isolate a single core use for each one. 
This was possible in each case: like indicates a possible minor non-
equivalence of what the current speaker will now irrnnediately say (or 
has just now said) and what the speaker now has (or just now had) in 
mind to convey; well indicates that the speaker, at the time well is 
uttered, is consulting his or her current thoughts; y'know (YKb) checks 
(with a positive expectation) on the correspondence between what the 
speaker intends to convey and what the addressee has been able to 
grasp in regard to what the speaker has just said or is just about to 
say. In each case this core use survives regardless of the 'local' 
purpose the speaker may have in using the item at a particular position 
in discourse; and in each case the set of functions the item may serve 
makes sense in terms of its core use. Previous analyses of these items 
have not attended closely to the question of whether such a core use 
can be formulated, so that although various functions for these items 
have been identified, these analyses are in general unable to explain 
why individual particles serve the particular functions they do. 
The question of what the linguistic contribution of these items 
is is complicated by their routinization as standard ways of dealing 
with recurrent conversational situations. Thus, for example, well can 
be used as a conventional way to introduce an abrupt change of topic. 
The point repeatedly made above regarding the varied conversational 
uses of these items is that the items do not, simply by virtue of be-
coming routines, lose their basic use. What can happen (as argued for 
like in Chapter 3) is that the basic use of the item can be dominated 
by some particular routine value. But that the basic use is~~½'.. domi-
nated, not obscured or lost entirely, through routinization is 
indicated by the fact that the conversational uses of the item are un-
derlain, informed by, and consistent with the basic use, and by the 
fact that when the particles are scrutinized in situ in discourse their 
basic use illuminates descriptions offered by subjects of the 
'meaning' of utterances containing the items (see Chapter 3), 
Probably the failure of subjects to be able to isolate im~ediate-
ly the core use of like, well, and YKb is largely due to their ina-
bility to differentiate the~e use from contextual and pragmatic 
factors, an expected and very general limitation on the usefulness of 
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linguistic intuitions. 
In the most general portrayal these particles are all related to 
the disclosure of covert thinking. They all represent responses to 
problems arising due to the 'invisibility' of undisclosed thinking. 
Each participant in a conversation is aware of three 'worlds' of con-
versational activity: the private world of current disclosable 
thought; th~ shared world in which speakers collaborate in placing 
linguistic, paralinguistic and kinesic elements in view of each 
other in a particular sequence; and the other world, containing the 
disclosctble but otherwise invisible thinking of some co-participant(s). 
Particles such as like and well (and many others: see Chapter 2) 
are evincives: they permitthe speaker to bring up, without thereby 
specifying, contents of the private world. Such items are a means of 
calling attention in a general way to the relevance at some particular 
point of thinking the speaker leaves partially undisclosed. The 
reasons for such partial disclosure are varied, depending on context 
and the speaker's communicative abilities and intentions. It is, 
notice, the partialness of the disclosure that renders an item evincive 
at all, for if disclosure were complete, the item would assume the 
status of an ordinary lexical item with a conventional and therefore 
shared mectning; notice also that while ordinary lexical items may be 
spoken accompanied by undisclosed thinking, only evincives specifically 
indicate that some such undisclosed thinking is underway. 
YKb responds to the disclosure problem in a different way: here 
the speaker is concerned about the undisclosed contents of the other 
world and is, in particular, interested in whether the desired effect 
of his or her words obtains in that other world. A positive response, 
indicating that the private and other worlds are in essential respects 
in harmony, is anticipated. 1 
A distinction may be drawn between the disclosure problem just 
discussed and the kind of disclosure solicited when asking a question 
such as "What time is it?" By using this sentence the speaker also, 
obviously, seeks disclosure of information, but not specifically of 
thinking then current in the addressee's mind. Disclosure in the case 
of the discourse items well, like, and YKb is of current (in real time) 
thou~ht arising in connection with the events of an ongoing conversa-
tion . Each of these items thus inhabits or responds to the 'now' 
of actual talk rather than some imagined, recalled, or projected now. 
The frequent characterization of these items as lubricants, punctuation 
devices, and so on, hints at their temporally local domain. Even when 
retrospectively quoted, these particles occupy some real (albeit re-
ported) now at which they were spoken. They represent an acknowledg-
ment by speakers that, despite the negotiated pace of actual talk, in 
both the private and the other world thinking runs apace: covert reac-
tions occur always now and must be placed in the shared world if they 
are to be jointly known and responded to. 
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Previous work on conversational behavior has largely--and under-
standably--been limited to what occurs in the shared world. As cor-
rectly and repeatedly stated by sociologists, what occurs there can be 
understood in terms of what else is said and done--what stands 'bones-
out' for examination. The logic of the shared world of talk and 
other behavior is accessible because in general speakers place in that 
world what they mean to be understandable. On the other hand, however 
inaccessible they are to the nonparticipant researcher, the private 
and other worlds are of no less importance to the participants in a 
conversation than is the shared one. ln fact, a major question for the 
speaker in conversation is how to effectively introduce what is pri-
vate into the shared world, and how to properly and effectively oh-
tain disclosure from the other world. A game of poker is an excellent 
analogy. 
If we limit our attention to the shared world of talk, we thereby 
exclude two 'thirds' of what is involved when people converse. The 
importance of the unseen aspects of conversation is clearly shown by 
the very frequent use in conversation of discourse particles that 
specifically relate the covert worlds to the overt one. What conver-
sants are thinking to themselves, unless disclosed or infcrrable from 
what is said or done by them, remains perforce a mystery to anyone but 
them, but we can watch conversants orient in their talk to what is un-
disclosed and perform and solicit partial disclosures, and we can be 
mindful of the fact that linguistic behavior, from the speaker's 
vantage point, is even richer and more complex than displayed, record-
able speech. This is not just a matter of some things being 'bewteen 
the lines'--a problem of inference and implicatures--but of material 
that underlies the proceedings but is not inferrable by all the co-
conversants. 
Most of the remainder of this chapter is an attempt to provide 
a more general perspective on the discourse particles found in English 
conversations by answering the following question: What kinds of dis-
closure functions are represented by these particles? Or, to state 
the question in human terms: How do speakers connect public to private 
when they use discourse particles? In doing this, it will be necessary 
to discuss work by others on several particles beyond the three already 
discussed above at length (some of these additional items are first 
mentioned in Chapter 2; the reader is referred there for background). 
6.2 Now 
Schiffrin (1981b) finds that the 'discourse marker' now is used 
"to preface evidence, to precede a change in topic or sub-topic, a 
switch from main to subordinate topic 1 a switch in speaker stance, in 
speaker-hearer relationship, and so on" (14), and abstracts two common 
features of these environments: "they open something new and current 
in the discourse context [and there is] some kind of switch, or contrast 
with the immediately adjacent discourse" (14-15). 
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This analysis of now fits the data of the present study, but a  
slightly different characterization of the use of now can be offered  
based on the notion of disclosure. In this connection it is of in- 
terest that now opens "something new and current". In this now is  
alligned with well, like, and YKb for being tied to a particular dis- 
cour~e moment.-rwe do not find the particle now leaving the present  
speaker's moment of utterance though, of course, the usual adverbial  
use of~ may do so:  
(I) They saw that they were now in the deepest part of the jungle. 
Items tied to their moment of utterance may be viewed as intru-
sions fro.J the private world. R. Lakoff (1974) suggests the word 
'stance' for what such items indicate; this may be clarified: it is 
the speaker's current stance toward what is right now occurring or has 
just now occurred or will now inunediately occur in the conversation. 
The time line of the shared world is dictated by requirements of turn-
taking, topic development, sequencing conventions, and the necessity 
of taking time to say what may already be in mind. The items being 
discussed here, however, are not so bound. Although placed at particu-
lar points in the collaborative time line, they are used and taken as 
unfettered then-current reflections from the private world . 
Viewed this way now is an item used by a speaker to indicate that 
whats/he is now/will now be saying4, is viewed by the speaker as a 
'switch' from what has come just before and, by contrasting what came 
before with what is said next, also represents a larger continuity 
subsuming the switch. Thus now at the beginning of a lecture or a 
meeting evokes some pre-existing situation which (within the confines 
of the present proceedings) will now be abandoned in favor of an en-
suing one. Now is an evincive since it has the two coincident proper-
ties of evincives: it is tied to the speaker's now of actual utterance,5 
and it indicates but does not specify current covert thinking on the 
part of the speaker. This second property is reflected in the fact that 
now indicates the existence of some perceived (by the speaker) discon-
tinuity-within-continuity which the speaker has in mind, but leaves it 
to the addressee to (if possible) determine the precise nature of the 
discontinuity. 6 
Consistent with this portrayal of now its primary use is to in-
dicate 'This belongs now'. Other aspectsof the use of the item arise 
from what issuing an evincive with this basic use implicates in par-
ticular conversational contexts. Since speakers say things purpose-
fully, someone who would indicate 'This belongs now' would normally 
only do so in situations in which to so indicate would advance that 
speaker's communicative purposes . Presumably, then, now--if 'This be-
longs now' were its basic use--would only be said if itmattered. 
Consider the separate elements of use isolated by Schiffrin: 
1. It opens something new. To indicate 'This belongs now' im-
plies that what foilows requires a disjunctive preface; since the speak-
er is bringing up the fact that what happens next belongs next, the 
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appropriateness of bringing it up next is brought into question. If 
the prefaced item is not obviously something that belongs next , it will 
be 'new' . 
2 . It opens something current. This follows from the evincive 
status of now: its use is related to the now of the current speaker ' s 
current utterance, the now in which the sequentially next item of talk 
is about to occur. 
3. There is a switch or contrast with the immediately adjacent 
discourse. This follows i) from the fact that cooperative speakers 
should not abruptly change to completely unrelated material in a con-
versation without providing for the reasonableness (or the unreason-
ableness) of the switch in some way (e.g . by issuing by the way, or 
I know this is unconnected but .. . ); since ' This belongs now' does not 
specifically provide for an abrupt and complete change, the usual con-
vention is in order: what is said should be related somehow to foregoing 
material (which is, roughly, Grice ' s Maxim of Relevance); and ii) from 
the fact that the speaker nevertheless has some reason to utter 'This 
belongs now'. The continuity is presumed, and the discontinuity-within-
continuity is provided for by now itself. The material now introduces 
is both presumed relevant (a contribution of a cooperative speaker) 
and implicated to be discontinuous with preceding material. As Schriffrin 
points out, the contexts in which this item receives its interpretation 
may be of various kinds: discourse, referential, expressive. The parti-
cular discontinuity is something the speaker is privy to but which address-
ees must reconstruct, if they can and if they wish, for themselves. 
6 . 3 . I mean 
The discourse item I mean is discussed at length in Goldberg 
(1976, 1980); Crystal and Davy (1975) devote two concise pages to it. 
The use of the phrase is suggested by its literal meaning; the item 
is found in repair situations where it "marks the contribution as a modi-
fying or clarifying continuation of the previous (usually the speaker's 
own) contribution11 (Goldberg 1980:124-125). The functions of the item 
in particular discourse environments may vary according to how the basic 
corrective or clarifying core use is applicable in the particular context 
at hand. Thus I mean "may redirect the ongoing talk by introducing 
'modifications' which both correct and add to the previous contri-
bution" (125), or it may regain the floor (251a) by signaling "that 
the intervening turn interrupted the speaker" (127), or, in utterance-
medial position, "tends to repair a prior phonological or grammatical 
error" (244). The description of the item offered by Crystal and Davy 
is essentially in harmony with Goldberg's. They claim 
The meaning of this phrase is extraordinarily difficult to define: 
it seems to perform a variety of semantic functions, some of which 
are more important than others in any given instance. Generally 
speaking , its main function is to indicate that the speaker wishes 
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to clarify the meaning of his immediately preceding expression. This 
clarification may stem from a number of reasons and take a number 
of forms (1975 : 97). 
In the framework of the present study, 1 mean may be regarded as 
an item with a disclosure function. I mean appears to be used to indi-
cate that what the speaker has said and what the speaker has in mind to 
express are not well matched . Or one might say that I mean indicates 
a nonequivalence of what is in the shared world and what is in the pri-
vate world. This is similar to the characterization of like, but the 
items differ in that like indicates a minor nonequivalen~one the 
speaker finds unlikely to result in an important misunderstanding of the 
intended meaning; while I mean indicates that what is said and what is 
meant may well be substantially nonequivalent and , unless repair is un-
dertaken , could lead to misunderstanding. It is thus important that 
I mean, but not like, prefaces corrections. 
I mean is evincive since it is tied to its moment of utterance  
and indicates but does not itself specify the nature of the nonequiva- 
lence the speaker finds to exist between what is said and what is  
meant . Typically (but not in every case) the speaker's intention is  
spelled out in what follows I mean. 7  
6.4 Mind You 
Mind you as a feature of British English is discussed in Crystal 
and Davy (1975:99-100) . They comment: 
This is another phrase whose meaning is extremely difficult to deli-
mit . We have noted a number of different 'strands' of meaning, of 
which the most important seems to be the expression of some kind 
of contradiction, with a reduced or apologetic force . The speaker 
feels the need to state a different or additional viewpoint from 
what he or other speakers have already expressed, but he wishes to 
do this without causing offense . .. In addition, mind you is used to 
express the speaker ' s awareness that he is (a) saying something 
controversial, and is worried about the possibility of being disa-
greed with later, or (b) saying something which he thinks is ob-
vious but which his listener may dispute (100) . 
Taking this description at face value, it would seem that the use 
of mind you parallels that of the other items so far discussed, but that 
the specific function of this item is to indicate a nonequivalence of 
what the speaker has injected into the shared world and what s/he ex-
pects may have arisen in the other world as a result . The item is thus 
also characterizable as having a disclosure function in that it indi-
cates the possibility of the topical relevance but ultimate insignifi-
cance of material that has just arisen or may now arise in the other 
world. This characterization of mind you is intended as a provisional 
and possibly incomplete one , but one which captures certain key features 
of the item's use . 
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6.5 Sort of, Kind of, And everything, And stuff, And so on, etc. 
Such items as sort o(f) and kind o(f) (discussed in Crystal and 
Davy 1975:98-99) were claimed above (Chapter 3) to be related in 
function to like in indicating a possible minor nonequivalence of what 
is said and what is meant. The analysis of Crystal and Davy accords 
well with this assessment: "These phrases may be used immediately be-
for any word or phrase about which there is uncertainty, vagueness, or 
idiosyncracy". Such phrases may follow the item in question, of course: 
(2) She was carrying it in (h)er hands sort of, 
These items differ from like in not being used to introduce utterances: 
(3) *Sort of, I handed her the letter of intent. 
Several items can be used utterance-finally to indicate that the 
speaker is not saying everything that might be said. For example: 
(4) He came home last night bangin(g) 
[LAB-A,30) 
the door an(d) everything. 
(5) Somebody would have ta get up at four o'clock in the morning 
ta take me ta Wooster y'know and all that stuff. [LAB-A,36) 
(6) I really don't think they'd play in any bar or anything [LAB-A) 
These items fairly obviously indicate that some contents of the private 
world are being withheld from the shared world because they would add 
nothing essential to what has been said, or because for some other rea-
son the speaker chooses not to express them. They therefore evince the 
availability of more material in the private world than is presented in 
the shared world. 
6.6 Interjections 
There appears to be a fundamental identity between many items 
referred to as interjections and those considered discourse particles 
or markers. Both represent partial intrusions from the private world 
and arise from the necessities of disclosure. Some of these items, 
because of their basic use, have multiple discourse functions connected 
with such notions as topic development and topic change, but all share 
the property of being free, in interpretation if not always in place-
ment, of the 'negotiated' time line of shared talk, and of acknowledg-
ing the existence, relevance, and (most often) general tenor of undis-
closed thought. The use of several items first discussed in Chapter 2 
can now be fully appreciated: 
1. Oh 1 indicates that the speaker has just now become aware of 
something covertly and wishes to display that this private world event, 
the exact nature of which is not specified by oh1, has occurred. 
2. Oh2 indicates that the speaker has now paused to make a deci-
sion or choice between alternatives, no one of which is the correct or 
~ccurate one (see James 1974); the item is evincive because the alterna-
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tives and the course of the decision process are not displayed by oh2 
itself. 
3. Oh3 is similar in use to well; it evinces introspection. 
4. Hey indicates that the speaker is with thought at the time of 
uttering hey and desires the addressee ' s attention in order to place 
material into the shared world . 
5. Aha indicates that the speaker has just now covertly pieced 
together the logic of a situation or seen a connection previously mis-
sed. The particulars of the connection seen are not displayed by 
using aha itself. 
6 . Ah indicates that the speaker has just now thought of some-
thing andfinds that thing, or having thought of it, pleasing or sig-
nificant (see James 1974), but does not say what the thing is exactly. 
7. Uh , according to James (1974), indicates "speaker is hesitat-
ing to tryto think of the best or most accurate thing to say next, or 
to remember something, or is reluctant to say what is to follow". She 
adds, "uh is very commonly used when the speaker has any uncertainty 
at all about what he is saying, or about whether he is using the right 
words, or even about how his addressees are reacting to him" (1974:87). 
The use she assigns to uh is thus not very specific. Apparently it 
boils down to the speaker's having paused for some reason--any reason--
and marking this as a pause {rather than, say, a definitive halt). 
James shows that there are several differences between uh and the other 
interjections she studied, but looking at her argumentscarefully one 
finds that in every case the 'meaning difference' is a result of some 
other interjection having an element of meaning that uh lacks. The 
item thus appears to mark pauses of unspecified nature. 
In every case, these interjections are capable of serving as 
discourse particles in the sense that with their basic contribution 
they can take on particular discourse functions . Thus, for example, 
even uh can assume such a function if uttered in the proper context. 
Consider the uh issued by a member of a large audience three sentences 
into a formallecture by a well-known visiting scholar. Or consider 
the role of oh1 in its use by the same scholar upon discovering a page 
of text missing in the lecture . Clearly such items are important for 
structuring discourse. 
6. 7 A Taxonomy 
The relevance of disclosure to the analysis of the frequently 
occurring discourse particles in English conversation should by now be 
clear . The items discussed include most of those found in large num-
bers in the conversations used for this study. Because of this, it is 
possible here to offer a tentative sketch of the domain of discourse 
particles in English. This taxonomy reveals the types of disclosure 
functions served by the most common discourse particles. 
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Table 4 lists the disclosure relationships relevant for the de-
scription of items discussed in this study . Items listed in each 
category constitute exemplary members of a set each member of which 
differs from the others in the set but is generally classifiable in 
the way indicated . 
TABLE 4 
DISCLOSURE RELATIONSHIPS AND DISCOURSE PARTICLES 
Items General Disclosure Function 
indicates: 
well , let me see , oh P now active3 
P now faltering temporarily  
mind you (Br. E. ) O#P but S=P  
like , sort o(f), S~P  
--"ITnd o(f)  
I mean , that is P/S  
something has arisen in P  
y'know, y'see check : O=P , doesn't it?  
an(d) stuff, oh S(P 
2 
P = Private world 
S = Shared world 
0 =Otherworld 
The relationships not occurring in this taxonomy can, in some 
cases, be expressed through circumlocutions. But the existence of 
common routine items for expressing certain relationships and not 
others probably reflects the prevailing dynamics of conversations . It 
is not surprising, for instance , that there are no i tems for ma r king 
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that something has suddenly arisen in the other world. To claim the 
existence of undisclosed thought in the other world is ripe with po-
tentially disastrous implicatures ('you are predictable--you mind is an 
open book') The offense occurs enough to have names: putting words in 
someone's mouth, second guessing. 
6 . 8 Conclusion 
The problem of disclosure arises within the general communicative 
purpose of speech. The problem arises becaw:::e conversants are 
engaged in a complex form of behavior in which some of what occurs is 
displayed as occurring by being placed in view in the shared world, 
while thoughts may remain undisclosed . Speakers frequently call atten-
tion , for reasons varying with their communicative aims, to what is oc-
curring beneath the 'visible ' surface of a conversation . The disclo-
sure problem is that what is covert may to some extent and for some 
reason be relevant to what is not. In this study the function of items 
usually called discourse particles and interjections has been examined. 
It was found that each such item has a core use related to disclosure 
and , based on that core use, a variety of secondary functions depending 
on specific conversational contexts . 
Each of the items discussed is used, generally speaking, to re-
late what is covert to what is overt in ongoing conversational behav-
ior. The relationships involved here have been described i n terms of 
three 'worlds': the one known to the speaker alone, that known to the 
addressee(s)8 alone, and the world known to both. The disclosure prob-
lem may in individual cases involve the incongruity between what is 
shared and what is private, the invisibility of the other world to the 
speaker, the incongruity between what is presumed to be in the other 
world and what is in the private one, and so on . 
The particles discussed in this study differ in the ways in which 
they respond to the general problem of disclosure . Like is a response 
to the nonequivalence of what is shared and what is privately intended; 
well indicates in the shared world that consideration is occurring in 
the private world; YKb responds to the need of speakers to be assured 
of the equivalence of the private and other worlds in some crucial 
respects with regard to what is being said . Several other d i scourse 
items may De characterized in similar ways, and, in fact, it appears 
that disclosure may be relevant to the description of almost all dis-
course particles and many of the items traditionally referred to as 
interjections. 
The program of this study has been to isolate a core use for each 
discourse particle considered and then examine the disclosure functions 
of the entire set of such items. Therefore, in contrast to earlier 
studies of disclourse particles , the emphasis he r e has not been on 
identifying multiple discourse functions for each item, but on providing 
an explanation for why each particle i s capable of serving the variouN 
context-specific functions that it does. The results of this study 
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therefore contribute to our understanding of the general function of 
discourse particles. In that sense, the view proposed here is not an 
alternative to functional analyses like those of Goldberg but illumi-
nates what is correct in these other studies both by clarifying the 
core use of particular items and providing a general framework in which 
their core uses can be compared. 
The results of this study also bear importantly on a basic issue 
in semantics: that of ambiguity versus vagueness (see Zwicky and Sadock 
1973) . For each of the three discourse particles examined at length 
above, it has been possible to find a way through the multiple readings 
to a single basic use. Additional readings of each item can be pre-
dicted from features of the context and conversational implicatures. 
This work is thus aligned with recent work (e . g . Atlas 1977, Kempson 
1980, 1981) suggesting that in most cases it is possible to regard 
additional understandings of an item as due to lack of specificity 
rather t han to true ambiguity. 
So long as conversation is viewed as solely a matter of what is 
displayed and openly reacted to by conversants, and of background under-
standings they share, and of what is inferrable from their external 
behaviors, it remains accessible to the researcher . As a working 
assumption, most conversation studies take the shared world to be some-
how independent of what occurs privately in the minds of the conver-
sants. This methodological tack is not only convenient but has a pow-
erful logic to recommend it--after all, individual conversants, in 
choosing what they will do and say next, attend to what they and their 
co-conversants have said and done. Examination of discourse particles, 
such as well, like and y'know, however, points up the fact that each 
individual participant in a conversation is aware that some thoughts are 
not disclosed and of the fact that conversants enter material selective-
ly in the shared world . Although the private and other worlds are 
essentially inaccessible to the nonparticipant observer, their exis-
tence cannot be ignored--particularly since speakers themselves often 
acknowledge to each other, in a number of ways, the existence and im-
portance of their own unexpressed thinking. 
FOOTNOTES -- CHAPTER 6  
1
It is interesting , though probably not very fruit[u], to ask 
how the addressee is to know whether his or her understanding matches 
the intent of the speake_r_._ 
2Of course, much is left unsaid in conversation in general, but 
this is not indicated by most of the items we use in talk. 
3As the reader will have gathered already, the conversational 
'now' is not a single point in time; it has dimension and can contain , 
at least, a whole utterance. 
4Th " d"1ng is necessary because now can e emb e edis wor · b dd in an 
utterance it introduces : 
There were, now , three bears in that part of the forest. 
5s · · . d hecause it is tie tote present speaker's moment of utterance 
and because it is used predominant ly as an initiator, now enquotes 
(see Chapter 2) : 
She thought there were typewriters in Greece at that time .  
She thought now there wer~ typewriters in Greece at that time.  
6other kinds of lexical items also require contextual interpre-
tation (for example, deictic terms) but not tied to the present 
moment of utternace and cannot be viewed as intrusions from the private 
world. 
7r mean also occasionally fo l lows the clarification it announces : 
There were five apples in the basket , I mean . 
8The term 'addressee' bas been used throughout this study. It 
is not entirely acceptable, but then neither are 'listener ', ' inter-
locutor ', 'auditor', ' hearer', etc . In general I have used the term 
simply to mean ' some attentive participant in a conversation other 
than the current speaker ' . 
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